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1.1. Background 
 
“Competition within the transport industry enables citizens to benefit from efficient and 
cheaper transport. Free competition also acts as a driving force to open up European 
networks and therefore gives investments and the network a continental dimension” 
(European Commission, 2012). Increase competition within this industry is one of the 
main European Commission’s (EC) objectives. Transportation is vital for every countries 
not only because allows the movements of people and goods, but also because accounts 
for about 3.7% of European GDP and for 5.1% of employment in the EU (European 
Commission, 2012). Competition induces companies to continually offer the best 
possible range of products at reasonable prices because, otherwise, consumers will buy 
from other operators; it encourages innovation and turns down the product prices. In a 
free market, trade should be a competitive game where last beneficiaries are the 
consumers. To ensure the smooth functioning of the markets appropriate competition 
policies (antitrust laws) are required. These policies consist mainly in enforcing the 
rules in order to ensure that operators behave fairly, encouraging entrepreneurship, 
efficiency, and growth of consumer’s choice possibilities and by contributing to lower 
prices and to improve the quality of products (Motta, 2004). In particular, transport 
competition leads the transport operators to operate more efficiently and consumers to 
benefit from lower prices and new services which are usually more innovative and 
consumer-friendly than before. This helps to make our economy more competitive 
(European Commission 2012)1.  
Crucial role in applying these policies to both promote and preserve competition is 
assigned to those Antitrust Authorities that therefore should prevent and correct anti-
competitive behaviors. The Federal Trade Commission had an historic and pioneering 
role in the United States, exactly where the culture of protection of competition and the 
first antitrust law was born (Motta, 2004; Motta & Polo, 2004; SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW, 2003).  
In recent years in Europe the liberalization, privatization and rationalization processes 
of the most important transport companies have introduced strong competition 
elements in sectors traditionally characterized by monopolistic structures and by a 
strong presence of public ownership (Benacchio, 2008). At the same time, following the 
advent of these processes there was a considerable increase of the ef forts carried out by 
these Authorities by improving anti-competitive behavior and transport competition 
and by providing suggestions governments in order to encourage an effective 
liberalization of the transport markets (Davis & Garcés, 2009). Like other economic 
sectors, transportation has also been subject to the competitive pressures mentioned 
above and has seen the gradual entry of new private operators in areas mainly identified 
by the presence of a monopolistic public operator (Button, 1993). The Italian air 
transport market was among the first to be affected by liberalization policies and the 
traditional flag carriers had to compare themselves with new competitors that have 
proposed an innovative and aggressive business model such as low cost airlines - LCC - 
(Doganis, 2006). In addition, different types of co-operation (alliances and code sharing) 
have been developed at both intercontinental and international level in particular by full 
service carriers - FSC - (Kleymann & Seristö, 2004). Also in Italy important changes in 
this market are detected such as the entrance of LCCs (i.e., Ryanair, WindJet etc.), the 
                                                                 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/liberalisation/overview_en.html.  
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failure of the ex-flag carrier Alitalia and the resulting establishment of a new airlines - 
CAI Spa. - together with AirOne Airlines Spa. etc. 
The Italian rail transport industry is traditionally identified by a national public operator 
that manages both the rail infrastructure network and the transport services. With the 
European liberalization process, this structure has progressively changes toward a 
separation between the infrastructure and transport services management. However, in 
Italy this transformation has not been completed. In fact, Ferrovie dello Stato Holding, 
owned by the Italian Ministry of the Treasury, controls the railway infrastructure 
manager (Rete Ferroviaria Italiana Spa.), the main operator (Trenitalia Spa.) and other 
specialized companies (e.g. real estate, certification etc.).  Although Italy was an 
advanced country to receipt of EU directives, a free rail transport market entry has been 
characterized by contradictory elements, especially for the rail transport market. On the 
contrary, an important sign of market opening is occurred in the Italian HSR market. In 
fact, a new private operator (Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori Spa. - NTV -) operates on the 
Tourin-Salerno corridor, competing since the end of 2009 with the incumbent (Trenitalia 
public operator).  
 
 
1.2. Hypothesis 
 
 Disaggregate passenger mode choice models can be implemented to forecast travel 
behavior and analyze transport competition;  
 Focus on the Rome-Milan (Ro-Mi) corridor where competition between HSR and air 
transport took place; 
 Given no financial resources to collect data, different trained and motivated students 
were used to administer interviews; 
 Efficient experimental design is an important strategy to build choice tasks; 
 The modeling process, based on the mode choice probabilities, allows to analyze 
transport competition and to test several hypothetical policy scenarios in term of 
market share variations. 
 
 
1.3. Research Scope and Motivation 
 
As in other European countries, in Italy the air and rail transport markets are, at least 
formally, opened to competition imposing on transport operators to respond to these 
changes. For instance, the ex-flag carrier Alitalia Airlines (Alitalia), operating over time 
as a monopoly on major domestic routes, had to reorganize its business model to 
compete with the new low cost airlines (such as Ryanair, Easyjet, WindJet etc.) entered 
into the market thanks to the liberalization process.  
In addition, the rail transport sector was opened to competition even if some of the 
Italian rail market characteristics make the competition less evident and effective. Since 
2011 in the Tourin-Salerno corridor, the newcomers NTV private transport operator 
compete with the incumbent Trenitalia public operator in the HSR market. This is a first 
European example of competition in the HSR sector. In this corridor, the Ro-Mi section 
connects the metropolitan cities most populated of Italy (Milan and Rome) and other 
intermediate cities (such as Florence and Bologna), and meets mainly business 
passengers. In fact, not surprisingly the new HSR operator has decided to operate in the 
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most profitable Italian rail transport corridor as well as was among the most profitable 
European air transport route.  
Despite the beginning of the opening of markets, substantial critical aspects for both 
rail-HSR and air transport still restrict free competition. 
In the past, the European Commission Directorate General of Transport (1998) 
analyzed, with its COST 318 project, the interactions between HSR and air passenger 
transport on several HSR corridors (i.e., Milan-Naples and Turin-Venice) and concluded 
with the difficulty of air transport in short route to compete with HSR services, but 
highlighting that “it would be necessary to get more detailed information about the impact 
of HST on such O/D as Milan-Rome or Milan-Naples (…)”. 
Furthermore, the Ro-Mi corridor was considered by the European Commission DG TREN 
(2006) among the main eight intra-European air/rail routes in order to analyze 
competition and complementarity between air and HSR transport. Though it is 
considerable effort is made to compare the main European experiences of intermodal 
competition are not clear some important aspects of the methodology used. 
The Centro di Economia Regionale Trasporti e Turismo (2006) of the Bocconi University 
has assessed the possible effects of the HSR system’s advent on the domestic air 
transport market. Based on the number of passengers carried and frequencies made  by 
transport operators, assessments mainly for the Ro-Mi corridor of the level of transport 
competition and of the type of reaction operators (in terms of reduction of air transport 
frequencies) were made. 
Recently, appreciable results of a study commissioned by the NTV operator to two 
important international analysts on discrete choice models (Prof. Ben-Akiwa and Prof. 
Cascetta) in order to define its price strategy are available. Since this study has been 
done on the national travel demand, no specific analysis were performed for the Ro-Mi 
corridor that is the main link where the HSR competition, at least initially, took place  
(Moshe Ben-Akiva, Cascetta, Coppola, Papola, & Velardi, 2010; E. Cascetta & Coppola, 
2012). 
Moreover, the Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) has also paid particular attention to this 
corridor. Since 1998 he has suggested the possibility of introducing competition 
between airports in the two areas multi-airport of Rome and Milan. Over time, the IAA is 
constantly intervened by sanctioning actors operating in both markets  and reporting to 
policy makers  on the structure of the Ferrovie dello Stato Holding. Recently, an 
important assessment on the economic substitutability between air and HSR transport 
operators for the Ro-Mi corridor has been formulated by the Italian Authority Antitrust 
(2012b). 
This research was carried out in a context of post-liberalization phase. The Ro-Mi case 
study is particularly interesting both for air and HSR transport due to the recent 
dynamics observed in both passenger transport markets. Moreover, this thesis want to 
overcome some critical aspects such as the existence of partial, limited or outdated data 
for this link to formulate appropriate policy implications. To do this, data are collected 
and used in order to provide sector recommendations. 
 
 
1.4. Aim and Objectives  
 
The main purpose of this research is to develop mode choice models to test the travel 
preferences and competition in the Ro-Mi corridor and simulate operators’ reactions to 
different and potential policy changes.  
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List of the main research questions: 
 Which attributes are important for the Ro-Mi passengers’ mode choice?  
 Which are the Value of Time (VOT) measures for different types of passengers 
(business vs. non-business pax)? 
 Which are the own and cross-point elasticities of mode choice probabilities, in 
particular referring to the travel time and cost attributes?; 
 Which are the market shares in the Ro-Mi corridor? Which are the Ro-Mi 
passengers’ reactions to hypothetical policy changes (i.e., a decrease of 15 minutes 
of the HSR’s total travel time)?; 
 It is possible to create a Decision Support System (DSS) to evaluate policy changes?; 
 Is there substitutability between Ro-Mi transport operators? 
 
In order to carry out the above aims, the following minor objectives are been explored: 
 Focus on liberalization process evolution: description of the air and rail transport 
markets evolution: from monopoly to competition; 
 Focus on  Antitrust Authority activities: analysis of the IAA’s activities carried out in 
these transport markets up to May 2011 and analysis of the European Commission 
Competition’s approach for the definition of the relevant market; 
 Dataset creation: creating an extended and focused dataset with which it is possible 
to analyse the main research question mentioned above. 
 
 
 
 
1.5. Organization of the Thesis 
 
The relevance of the chapters is shown in Figure 1. 
The first chapter includes some introductory remarks as well as the objective and 
motivation for the research.  
In the second chapter the transport competition and its evolution in both air and 
rail/HSR transport markets is presented, describing liberalization processes. An analysis 
of the IAA’s activities carried out since 1980 to May 2011 and the European Commission 
Competition approach to define relevant market are reported in chapter 3. Follows the 
theoretical model of transport competition subsequently applied in the case study 
(chapter 4). Chapter  5  presents an overview about a selected international literature 
review about intermodal transport competition. The results from the literature review 
are used as input to plan and realize the Ro-Mi case study. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
method used in order to answer to the research questions (section 1.4). 
In chapter 7, the Ro-Mi case study is described and detailed. These results provide a 
better understanding of the potential competitive level in the Ro-Mi corridor based on 
travellers’ preferences. All discrete choice models calibrated are reported and 
explicated. Simulated scenarios and relative policy implications are in chapter 8. 
Conclusions and future research are provided in chapter 9. Last chapter (n. 10) contains 
the appendices to this research. 
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Figure 1 – Research structure 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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2. The liberalization process in air and rail transport  
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2.1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the liberalization process and the market 
structure evolution of the air and rail transport. 
 
 
2.2. Air and rail transport liberalization 
 
2.2.1.  The air transport market 
 
2.2.1.1.  In Europe 
 
In the recent years the worldwide trend towards liberalization and privatization has hit 
the air travel market (McHardy & Trotter, 2005). The wave of liberalization and 
deregulation coming from the USA was introduced to Europe in the late 1980s. 
Previously, bilateral negotiations between flag carriers, prevented other companies 
from entering the market. Arrigo and Giuricin (2006) describe the liberalization process, 
starting from the bilateral agreement between Grain Britain and Netherlands , and the 
rule of double disapproval fares. The European liberalization process took place 
gradually for ten years (1983-1992), through the implementation of three air measures 
packages which established different stages of deregulation. The complete liberalization 
(inclusive of the nine air freedoms) begun after April 1997, after nearly fifteen years 
from the beginning of the process.  
 
First Air Package 
 
In 1983 the Council adopted the Directive 83/416/EEC to liberalize some inter-regional 
air services in Europe, but Member States still insisted about a number of restrictive 
conditions. It essentially left the bilateral framework in place but released some 
restrictions. It removed “single designation” provisions so that any number of airlines 
was able to operate on the major international routes in the Community; overrode the 
insistence of a number of Member States which their national airline gave a fifty per cent 
share of the market; removed most capacity restrictions; gave airlines automatic but 
limited rights to operate “fifth freedom” services linking points in the territories of two 
(or more) other Member States; and removed the ability of Member States to block 
proposals for low economic fares.  
The relevant legislative instruments were listed as follows:  
 The Regulation 3975/87/EEC has set down the procedure for the application of the 
rules on competition to undertake the air transport sector;  
 The Regulation 3976/87/EEC set out how the Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty would 
apply to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport 
sector;  
 The Directive 87/601/EEC provided rules on fares for scheduled air services between 
Member States; and  
 The Decision 87/602 set down rules about the sharing of passenger capacity between 
air carriers on scheduled services between Member States and about access for air 
carriers to scheduled air service routes between Member States.  
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As a result of the first air package a number of smaller airlines was able to enter in some 
of the most important intra-Community routes or provide the capacity and charge their 
own  fares. These included existing airlines such as British M idland, Hamburg Airlines 
and new entrants such as Air Europe and Ryanair airlines.  
 
 
Second Air Package 
 
The second air liberalization package (agreed in July 1990) which comprised three 
Council regulations on fares, market access and the application of the art. 85 of the EC 
Treaty. It was based on the first air package by introducing an element of “double 
disapproval” for fares,  under which a fare set by an airline for a route between Member 
States would have been permitted unless both States disapproved it. The second air 
package also opened up routes between almost all European airports; released limited 
restrictions about the fifth freedom services.  
The relevant legislative instruments were as follows:  
 The Regulation 2342/90/EEC provided rules on fares for scheduled air services, 
revoking Directive 87/601/EEC; 
 The Regulation 2343/90/EEC set down access for air carriers to scheduled intra -
Community air service routes and rules on the sharing of passenger capacity between 
air carriers on scheduled air services between Member States, revoking Decision 
87/602/EEC; and 
 The Regulation 2344/90/EEC amended the Regulation 3976/87/EEC on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the EC treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices in the air transport sector. 
 
 
Third Air Package 
 
The liberalized internal Community market was achieved only with the third air 
liberalization package. This package focused its attention on the following issues: 
licensing of airlines, market access,  air fares and rates. In particular, statutory 
requirement for air carriers was set up in order to hold insurance to cover liability in 
cases of accidents in respect of passengers, luggage, cargo, mail and others; from the 1st 
of January 1993 airlines would have full access to all routes between Member States and 
have the right to offer services between airports in two other Member States (seventh 
freedom); unrestricted access to all routes within the Community which commenced on 
the 1st of April 1997 for both scheduled and charter services (eighth freedom, also called 
“consecutive cabotage”); the art. 6 of the Regulation 2408/92/EC provided safeguards 
for new inter-regional services and the art. 10 prevented capacity limitations except for 
environmental and/or air traffic reasons; from the 1st of January 1993 airlines would be 
have been able to set their own fares on services both within and between Member 
States. 
The relevant legislative instruments were as follows:  
 The Regulation 2407/92/EC provided some common specifications and criteria for 
the licensing of carriers and the provision of a Community air transport certificate 
with effect from the 1st of January 1993; 
 The Regulation 2408/92/EC set out the rules on access for Community air carriers to 
intra-Community air routes;  
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 The Regulation 2409/92/EC set down further rules on fares and rates for air services;  
 The Regulation 2410/92/EC amended the Regulation 3875/87/EEC regarding the 
procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertake the air 
transport sector; and  
 The Regulation 2411/92/EC amended the Regulation 3936/87/EEC on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices in the air transport sector.  
 
Through these steps the European countries have made extensive liberalization of the 
internal market for air transport services, creating conditions for an increase in 
competition. A legislative liberalization aimed to open markets, allowing both market 
accesses to new entrants and competitive strategies for existing operators. 
In 2007, the EU-USA Open Skye Agreement represented another important step towards 
a single and worldwide market. This agreement allows EU and USA airlines to fly 
between any point of these continents, superseding previous agreements with 
individual European countries and permiting them to decide which routes to operate in, 
aircraft capacity, schedules and fares (Aviation Management Associates, 2008).  
In the literature there are a limited number of papers that analyze the impact and effect 
of the liberalization process (Adler & Berechman, 1996; European Low Fares Airline 
Association, 2004; Fu, Oum, & Zhang, 2010; International Air Transport Association, 
2008; Piermartini & Rousovà, 2008; Senguttuvan, 2007). Generally, they focused on the 
impact of air service regulation on airfares, passenger flows or on the share of trade 
occurring via air. They found a negative impact of restrictiveness of regulation on the 
economic performance of the industry (higher fares or less trade). More specifically, Fu, 
et al. (2010) analysed the economic effects of the liberalization process on competition 
and on the air transport market; Piermartini and Rousovà (2008) studied the impact of 
liberalized air transport services on air passenger flows for a sample of 184 countries; 
Adler and Berechman (1996) investigated the effects of deregulation on European 
aviation industry, from the point of view of the airlines and the effects on the airports. 
As a result of the liberalization process two scenarios  are possible (International Air 
Transport Association, 2008). The first scenario involves a release of ownership and 
control restrictions that make it easier for airlines to merge with or take over another 
airline. The higher risk of takeover could lead to increased pressure on airlines in these 
countries to improve their efficiency. However, since most or all of the airlines already 
concerned face competition on at least some of their international routes, we would not 
expect a large impact on output or employment simply because of an increased risk of 
takeover. The main impacts of such liberalization could induce airlines to be directly 
involved in two types of merger activities: 
 present the moment, some mergers (such as Air France-KLM airlines) are structured 
in a way to keep their national status of the individual airlines. If liberalization 
reduces the need for such measures and allows a completer integration of the 
individual airlines’ operations, this could well lead to further productivity 
improvements for the airlines; 
 in the case of airlines performing badly and perhaps facing bankruptcy, liberalization 
may increase the ways in which such airlines can be rescued. It would be difficult to 
quantify this impact, but the effects could be significant in individual countries or 
areas where a particular airline may otherwise cease trading. 
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The second liberalization scenario involves the removal of market access restrictions on 
all routes between and within this group of countries. While many of these routes may 
already be liberalized, the removal of all restrictions would be likely to lead to further 
increases in competition. International Air Transport Association (2008) calculated 
some estimates of the potential impact of such measures, assuming that they lead to 
productivity improvements between 5% and 10%, and fares reductions between 10% 
and 20%, on routes that were not previously liberalized. If there is no change in output, 
total employment in the air transport market might increase by 0.1% to 0.2%. However, 
if the service levels on newly-liberalized routes is assumed increased between 5% and 
10%, then the increase in air transport employment could be between 0.5% and 1.5%. 
The positive estimated impacts (i.e., without any additional increase in service levels) 
reflect the relatively modest scale of the assumed productivity improvements. A change 
in fares could be larger than an improvement in labour productivity. Significant fares 
reductions may occur on routes where airlines previously faced relatively weak 
competition. But efficiency improvements are not route specific, and the aim for future 
improvements may be quite limited if airlines have already been exposed to strong 
competition on some of their main routes (International Air Transport Association, 
2008). 
 
Summarizing, the main effects of the liberalization process are: 
o entrance of new operators (low cost airlines) with a new organizational model 
(point-to point); 
o significant increase in the number of routes offered, not previously served by major 
airlines, and services related as well as regional air transport; 
o increase of the number of air passengers; 
o reduction of the fare (price determined by market forces); 
o free market competition due to the removal of the different type of restrictions on 
routes, capacity, frequency, fare etc.; 
o cooperative agreements (code sharing or leasing); 
o more jobs created in the air transport market; 
o development of other industries (i.e., tourism). 
The main beneficiary of this situation are without any doubt the final consumers, who 
are the passengers. 
 
Another important step carried out by the EU towards the opening of the air transport 
market to competition is the liberalization of ground handling services,2 after the 
implementation of the Council Directive 96/97.  
Müller, et al. (2003) show the following Figure 2 . 
These activities can be performed by airlines themselves (self-handling), by a third part, 
or a mixture of themes. The third part of handlers can be airports, specialized ground 
handling companies or another airline, which serves as such. The monetary value of 
ground handling services accounts for about 5% to 8% of the airline ticket, depending 
on the type of airline used (Müller, et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
                                                                 
2 Ground handling services  are divided into five main categories: ramp handling, baggage handling,  
freight/mail handling, fuel /oil handling, passenger handling and other services ((Müller, Orak, Petkov, & 
Schulz, 2003)) 
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Figure 2 – Ground handling activities  
 
Source: (Müller, et al., 2003) 
 
 
The global market for ground handling service  was estimated to have a size of about 
32bn € (Templin, 2007). Due to the size and importance of the market, the effectiveness 
of these services, their organization and by whom they are performed, is a significant 
issue for all the stakeholders in the ground handling market: airlines, infrastructure 
suppliers (airports), independent ground handling service suppliers (handlers), 
customers, and governmental authorities. 
The vertical supply chain in ground handling starts with the airport, continues with the 
handler, and ends with the airline. Two organizational issues arise along this supply 
chain. The first is due to the necessary contract between the handler and the airport. 
This contract insures that a handler will be able to use the facilities in the airport for 
handling tasks. However, this issue disappears through forward integration by the 
airport, when the airport handles these services itself and the airline has to purchase 
them from the airport. This organizational form was commonly observed before the 
liberalization in most European countries and is still dominant in Germany. The second 
organizational issue occurs because an airline can also enter into a contract with a 
handler to outsource this service; a solution would be a backward integration by the 
airline, when the airline itself handles these services. The kind of market organization 
and governance structure is chosen by airlines, airports and handlers will normally be 
determined by transaction costs, given the regulatory framework and the market 
structure in each activity level (Müller, et al., 2003).   
Historically, in each Member State there has been a national carrier dominating the 
ground handling service market at its national hub airports and working closely with 
their airports. Because of this monopolistic situation, there was little chance for 
independent ground handling service providers to enter the market. Other carriers at 
these hubs had, therefore, little choices about handlers and were facing high ground 
handling service fees. The air transport liberalization turn placed airlines under 
significant competitive pressure which forced them to look for a reduction in costs 
(including ground handling services’ costs). Eventually, the European Council 
implemented the Directive 96/67/EC, which enforced competition on the European 
ground handling services market (although allowing some exceptions). The directive 
requires that airports with more than 2 million passengers per year have to license at 
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least one independent handler. To avoid crossed subsidization by the airports, separate 
accounts have to be kept. The proposed revisions of the Directive 96/67 in 2007 were 
going much further: they envisaged at least three or four suppliers for airports above 10 
or 20 million passengers and tighter control over crossed subsidies, requiring separate 
subsidiaries for airports above 10 million passengers.  
Templin (2007), considering London Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Frankfurt, 
Amsterdam Schiphol, Madrid Barajas and Rome Fiumicino airports, observed in 1998 
the developments of ground handling service after the market opening. All airports 
analyzed are the largest in their country and serve, as hubs, the national carriers (British 
Airways, Air France, Lufthansa, KLM, Iberia and Alitalia airlines). Significant differences 
in the ground handling markets can be observed, highlighting different ways in which 
the value chain can be organized. Eight years after the implementation of the EC 
Directive, only two out the six airports analyzed by Templin  (London Heathrow and 
Amsterdam Schiphol airports), had a completely deregulated market without any entry 
restrictions. Many self-handling by airlines were found. The airport operators of Madrid 
Barajas, London Heathrow and Amsterdam Schiphol airports did not offer ground 
handling services, instead Paris Charles de Gaulle, Frankfurt and Rome Fiumicino 
airports did.  
 
 
Table 1 – Ground handling services market organization at the six major EU airports 
 
Source: (Templin, 2007) 
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Figure 3 – Market share at the six major EU airports  
 
 
Source: (Templin, 2007) 
 
 
Ground handling service companies are able to expand their operations because they 
can enter new markets, achieving scale and air economies (since some of them were 
already in the logistics and freight business and were able to easily enter into related 
business areas). The former monopolists have, as expected, experienced significant 
losses of market share. For the airports considered above, these losses are ranged from 
11% (Madrid) to 67% (Rome), coupled with increased pressure on working conditions 
and producing significantly lower salaries for employees. Since labour costs constitute 
about 80% of total costs, they have to bear the brunt of the adjustment (a large part of 
the independent handlers’ cost advantage is due to the fact that they pay up to 30% 
lower salaries and have a much more flexible labour force). This is one of the reasons 
why several countries have tried to protect the ground handling service activities of the 
airports and their ground handling employees (i.e. slowing down the process of 
liberalization and supporting the political initiatives of the trade unions and airports 
against a further strengthening of the European directive that was to come into force in 
2008). Some regional governments have been willing to financially support their 
airports, which have suffered losses as a consequence of the ground handling service 
market’s liberalization process (Müller, et al., 2003). 
Ahsbahs (2008) proposed a focus on Amsterdam airport. The Figure 4 shows the impact 
of prices due to an increasing competition in Amsterdam airport (as a consequence of 
Council directive 96/67/EC). The monopoly rates of the former in duopoly safeguarded 
providers KLM and Aerogate have dramatically dropped down when the third-party 
handler, Ogden, come into the market in the mid 90’s. Ground handling service agents 
expanded their business in the beginning of this century with a ruinous price battle to 
gain market shares. In a clearing market consolidation process the number of providers 
will be reduced, which should lead on the long run to a slight increase in handling prices 
and create positive margins in the ground handling service business. 
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Figure 4 – Development of competition and handling rates at Amsterdam airport  
 
 
Source: (Ahsbahs, 2008) 
 
 
Competition among airports, which hardly existed twenty years ago, is developed thank 
to the privatization and liberalization of downstream markets. The airport market is 
divided in two sides: the supply of capacity (construction and infrastructure use) and 
the supply of services to carriers and passengers (ground handling services and 
businesses such as shops, bank etc.). While the latter lends itself to the competition and 
there are no features to prevent the opening of the market, a different situation relates 
the airport capacity (Sciandra, 2008). Airport capacity is characterized as a natural 
monopoly, which has given significant and fixed costs but unrecoverable (sunk costs) 
required for market entry, relevant investment costs and externalities associated with 
the airport market. Its cost function implies that the presence of a single operator is 
more efficient. In fact, these structural conditions induced the airport management by a 
single actor (often public owned), through the exclusive concessions. All these features 
make a necessary regulatory intervention. It could be articulated on two levels: 
1) Conditions for market access of the airport management (i.e., infrastructure 
construction and management of airports), 
2) Regulation of the modality of infrastructure market access (mainly through the 
allocation of rights to take off/landing - slot - and airport charges) and the provision 
of ground handling services and businesses. 
 
The liberalization and privatization processes that affected the European air transport 
sector, have increased the potential competition also for airports. In particular, the 
following aspects promoted competition between airports (Formica, 2007): 
 the dispersion of traffic to smaller airports;  
 the airport infrastructure development;  
 the overlap of airport catchment areas; 
 the extent of demand for air transport market segments most price sensitive;  
 the greater user sensitivity (both passengers and vectors) toward infrastructure 
costs;  
 the increased incidence of airport fees on the airline cost and on fares;  
 the development of the marketing activities; and 
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 an increased inter-modal competition.  
Recently, the attention in the air transport market has shifted to the airports 
competition. This is an interesting step for Italy due to the high number of airports on its 
territory and for the airport role within the air supply chain (Valeri, 2010a). On this 
point, in Figure 5 Martini and Scotti (2010) report  the average operating margins at 
different stages of the supply chain.  
 
Figure 5 – Average operating margins of the air supply chain  
 
Source: (Martini & Scotti, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that airlines actually enjoy small margins in comparison to other actors in 
other stages of the supply chain mainly due for two reasons: 1) failure to balance the 
market power from the buyers side (buyer power) and on the side of the sellers (sellers 
power) and 2) the fact that liberalization policies implemented so far have only covered 
some parts of the supply chain (in particular, the stage of the airlines and airport 
handling companies).  
Since the nineties the airport operators gradually change their organizational model, 
due mainly to the European macro trends, at the strong growth in air transport demand 
as well as at the pressure of international and national market dynamics (Danielis, 
2012). The reform process has been articulated with interventions aimed at the 
transformation of the airport operator in venture capital and at the abandonment of the 
public ownership toward a progressive privatization. Furthermore, the airport operator 
changes also their organizational structure competences. Moreover, a “total 
management” of the airport activities as a prevalent licensing system was defined with 
the Law 537/1993. 
In this context, there are possible two types of competition:  
1) competition between airports, and  
2) competition between hub airports belonging to different air transport networks.  
Competition between single airports (point-to-point) is expressed in direct connections 
between pairs of cities; competition between hub airports is structured as a competition 
between networks with different connections, aimed to attract transit passengers, based 
on indirect flights (hub and spoke). The monopolistic configuration of airport capacity 
and the lack of totally substitutability between airports tend to give to airport operators 
significant market power.  
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Furthermore, ACI Europe Policy Committee (1999) identified different forms of 
competition between airports: 
 Competition to attract new airline services (passengers and freight); 
 Competition between airports with overlapping catchment areas; 
 Competition for a role as a hub airport and for transfer traffic between hubs; 
 Competition between airports within urban areas; 
 Competition for the provision of services at airports; 
 Competition between airport terminals. 
The Civil Aviation Authority (2011) provides specific guidelines to assess airport 
competition in order to understand the level and nature of the airport’s market power3..  
 
“Airports are happy to be part of a competitive market” (ACI Europe Policy Committee, 
1999). Competition between two airports can be judged by comparing attributes. These 
can include for instance congestion, time and cost accessibility and airport charges. Not 
all these aspects are under airport’s control. For example, Birmingham and East 
Midlands airports compete in the charter market but not in the overnight and low-cost 
market. In part, some reasons are due to fewer environmental restrictions and 
congestion problems at East Midlands airport. Many airports have limited competitors, 
for example, remote airports will compete only with their nearest neighbour (if at all) 
and international hubs will tend to compete only with other international hubs. The 
main area of airport competition is between the regional airports. For example, large 
regional airports will compete with each other and the nearest hub airport and smaller 
regional airports will compete with each other. Airports will compete with each other 
according to the common market that both airports wish to serve. Cranfield University, 
INECO, Gruppo CLAS, and Denton Wilde Sapte (2002) found that, while there may be 
some concerns by individual airports on unfair competition due to differential airport 
charges and taxation, in general airports operate in a reasonably competitive 
environment and the main threats to fair competition are  congestion and 
environmental constraints. These limits both impact on airport operations in different 
ways that can vary from one country to another and even one neighbouring airport to 
another. 
                                                                 
3 These competi tion assessment guidelines are intended to support these economic assessments, which 
could inform investigations into: 
- which airports  should be subject to detailed ex ante economic regulation, either when the CAA is 
providing advice to the Government on whether an airport should be ‘designated’ or ‘de -designated’ 
for the purposes of price control under section 40 of the Airports Act 1986 (‘AA86’), or when the CAA 
takes a decision on whether an airport should hold an economic license under a proposed new regime 
of economic regulation of airports;  
- how to design regulatory approaches that are broadly proportionate to the level and nature of an 
airport’s substantial market power,  either under section 40 of the AA86 or under the prospective new 
regime of economic regulation; 
- potentially anti-competi tive conduct, under the CAA’s powers to investigate airport conduct and 
impose additional conditions on airports under section 41 of the AA86; and  
- assessments of the degree of competition faced by airports under t he requirements of the European 
Airport Charges Directive (ACD).  
The guidelines are structured in five chapters, setting out the elements that a competition assessment is 
likely to include: i) market definition; ii) market structure and market shares; iii) barriers to entry  and 
expansion; iv) airline buyer power; and v) other factors. In particular,  the assessment requires detailed 
consideration of the individual characteristics of the market, involving a comprehensive examination of all 
the actual and potential competitive constraints on a specific airport from both within the market (other 
airports) and outside. This must be undertaken against the background of airport’s market share being 
below the level usually associated with dominance.  
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2.2.1.2.  In Italy 
 
The domestic air transport sector has historically been characterized by the presence of 
an airline (the so-called “flag carrier”), owned or controlled by the State. It operated at a 
substantial monopoly on domestic routes and competed with other airlines with similar 
characteristics of international flights. In this context, the liberalization process and the 
development of the low cost airlines made a substantial change in conditions of 
production and use of the Italian air transport service (Italian Authority Antitrust, 
2005). 
The liberalization of domestic air transport has been fully effective in Italy starting 
around the 1999, with a market entrance of new airlines (i.e., Volare, Windjet) and with 
an additional development of airlines already existent on the market (i.e., AirOne, 
Meridiana, Alpi Eagles and Airdolomiti). The market structure was characterized by a 
monopoly on almost all routes from Alitalia and Meridiana 4 airlines. As a result of the 
liberalization process this scenario was profoundly changed, at least with respect to 
certain routes where it was witnessed by two or more major operators. Is important to 
highlight that the increase of competitive pressures did not extend to the entire national 
network. In fact, in the 2003 domestic routes operated by a single carrier still accounted 
for 65% of connections (42 out of 65) for the winter season and 73% (61 of 83) for the 
summer season. Recently, the ex-flag carrier Alitalia airline was saved from bankruptcy, 
merging it with AirOne airline creating the CAI Group (“Gruppo Compagnia Aerea 
Italiana”). Considering the total number of passengers5 carried in the 2011 for the top 
50 Italian airlines , the CAI market share was 24%. The second one was Ryanair with a 
21%, followed by Easjyet with 10%. A group of 9 airlines with a market share between 
6% and 2% follows. Other 38 airlines have less than 1% of the market share (Ente 
Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile, 2011). 
The Italian Authority Antitrust (2005) analyzed the impact of an increased competition 
on fares in the domestic network. The average revenue per passenger received by the 
four major Italian airlines in the years between 1999-2003 was considered6 (Table 2 and 
Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
4 Meridiana for routes with Sardinia. 
5 Both national and international traffic. 
6 In particular, the data were considered for the months of February and June, which are symptomatic of 
two seasons winter and summer, for routes in the months of February and June 2003 they recorded a 
traffic of more than 9000 passengers for the four companies. The data provided below relate to more than 
60% of the total passengers carried in the same period the total number of domestic routes, by all airlines  
operating 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
31 
 
Table 2 – Analysis of the number of seats, passengers and revenue of the first four Italian airlines – February 
1999-2003  
 
Source: (Italian Authority Anti trust, 2005) 
 
 
Table 3 - Analysis of the number of seats, passengers and revenue of the first four Italian airlines – June 
1999-2003 
 
Source: (Italian Authority Anti trust, 2005) 
 
 
From Table 2 and Table 3 emerge a decrease in fares against the entry of a new airlines on 
the respective route and a resulting increase in air supply (in term of number of seats 
offered). Moreover, the average revenue per passenger has increased overall where 
there was not a change toward a competitive market structure, persisting then a 
monopolistic situation (or duopoly established for the Rome-Milan and Bologna-
Palermo routes). 
In particular, the Italian Authority Antitrust (2005) underlined the following important 
market dynamics. Monopoly on the routes generated different situations. There are 
some routes where an increase in seat offers has achieved an increase in the average 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
32 
 
revenue per passenger to capture time-sensitive passengers then placing additional 
tickets at high prices. On other routes, an increase in supply has led to the reduction of 
average fares offered bringing an increase in the number of passengers. The supply 
control has increased fares and this can translate into a strategy of the airline to focus on 
noblest passengers. In other situations, the decrease of supply and the simultaneous 
reduction in fares could also help increase the number of passengers carried. On routes 
with the entry of more operators the entry of more operators, there has been an 
increase in the number of passengers carried and the reduction of average fares. The 
magnitude of the decrease rate is usually the more significant if there was a higher 
number of inputs of new operators on the route. 
The increased number of airlines is not within itself sufficient to fully explain the 
dynamic pricing, and this is confirmed by the existence of a residual number of 
abnormal situations, where a reduction in the degree of concentration on a route is 
matched by a substantial stability - if not increase - fares. The introduction of a new 
explanatory variable allows to characterize the significance of the change in competitive 
structure. The Italian Authority Antitrust (2005) represented in the following Figures 
the next variables: Hirschman-Herfindahl (HHI) concentration index, fares (average 
revenue per passenger), number of seats (represented by the bubble size). 
 
 
Figure 6 – HHI, fares, number of passengers for some Italian routes – February 1999-2003 
 
Source: (Italian Authority Anti trust, 2005) 
 
Figure 7 - HHI, fares, number of passengers for some It alian routes – June 1999-2003 
 
Source: (Italian Authority Anti trust, 2005) 
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A reduced degree of market concentration has a significant impact on the fare level only 
if the increased competition results in as increase in the total supply of seats on a route. 
For instance, in the parts of the Figure 6 and Figure 7 highlighted, it is possible to observe 
that with a homogeneous reduction of the HHI concentration (-40%, as indicated on the 
abscissa axis -0.40) different effects on fares are identified. In Figure 7 bubbles are 
detectable even in the upper part of the graph, indicating an increase of the fares. By 
contrast, in Figure 6, where there was a significant increase in the number of passengers 
carried on the route (larger bubbles), the dynamics of fares was downward. 
The lack of competitive forces on certain domestic routes can be attributed to two very 
different situations: the presence of a small catchment area does not make a route 
attractive for a new carrier, or the persistence of significant barriers that make difficult 
for operators to enter. In this regard, it should be noted that a free market access could 
be limited from existing regulatory schemes and strategic behaviour of incumbents in 
order to prevent competitive pressure. 
 
After airlines, ground handling services became the focus of European and Italian 
regulators with the objective to open the market. The EC Directive n. 96/67/EC 
regarding ground handling services has recently been incorporated in the Italian 
schemes with the Law n. 18/99. However, this law allowed exemptions and with the 
absence of an effective regulatory scheme by ENAC, the liberalization of ground handling 
services in Italy was characterized by delays and inconsistencies (Italian Authority 
Antitrust, 2004). In airports with at least 2 million passengers per year (or 50.000 tons 
of freight per year) a free access in the ground handling services market is recognized. In 
2011 the Italian airports with ground handling liberalized services were: Bari, Bergamo, 
Bologna, Brindisi, Catania, Cagliari, Lamezia, Terme, Milano Linate, Milano Malpensa, 
Napoli, Verona, Palermo, Pisa, Roma Ciampino, Roma Fiumicino, Torino and Venezia 
airports. With reference to the case study of this thesis, the number of ground handling 
service operators is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Number of GHS operators in the Roman and Milan multi-airport systems (2011) 
Multi-airport 
system 
Airport’s IATA 
code 
N. of passengers 
(2011) 
N. of the GHS 
operators 
Rome CIA 4.846.319 30 
Rome FIU 37.886.414 63 
SUB-TOTAL:  42.732.733 93 
Milan LIN 9.175.888 37 
Milan MXP 19.724.326 57 
Milan BGY 8.520.341 11 
SUB-TOTAL:  37.420.555 105 
TOTAL:  80.153.288 198 
Source: (Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile, 2011) 
(http://www.enac.gov.it/La_Regolazione_Economica/Aeroporti/Assistenza_a_terra_%28Handling%29/P
restatori_certificati/index.html) 
Notes: N. of pax = movements+pax+cargo ; GHS = ground handling services. 
 
During recent years several analysis have made on the Italian airport industry: Abrate 
and Erbetta (2010); Barros and Dieke (2008); Curi, Gitto, and Mancuso (2010); Gitto and 
Mancuso (2010); Malighetti, Martini, Paleari, and Redondi (2007)). Gitto and Mancuso 
(2010) carried out a very interesting paper. They measured the effects of regulatory 
changes on technical efficiency related to the management of all the business activities 
(ground handling services included). Using a data envelopment analysis on 28 Italian 
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airports between the year 2000-2006, they found a positive impact of liberalization 
ground handling services on increase of efficiency in both airside and landside activities. 
For a synthetic evolution of ground handling service liberalization process in Italy see 
Attili (2008).  
 
Recently, also the Italian airports have begun to look at the competition. This is favoured 
by the presence of numerous multi-airport areas (Figure 8). In 2009 Italian airports were 
113: 11 military ones and 102 civil traffic ones (Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile, 
2010a). An uncontrolled creation and development of more airports in 2009 induced the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Transports and the ENAC to analysed the current airport 
market in order to reorganize the national airport network through the “National Plan 
for Airports”7. From this analysis it was emerged that these airports are included in the 
territory as isolated points and not part of a network, and often with significant friction 
with the surrounding urban context and poor accessibility for users. In the last 10 years 
extensions and substantial revisions of the airports are relevant while the construction 
of new terminals (not considering renovations and extensions of existing terminal) are a 
very limited number. Still nascent are the implementations of structural policies of 
environmental sustainability, as well as the development of articulated projects with the 
aim to develop intermodality. 24 airports were identified like “not strategic” for the 
rationalization and development of the whole Italian air transport industry. For a 
detailed assessment of the airports’ position and role see the report of the Ente 
Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile (2010a). 
Limited assessment on airport competition was carried out. The numerous multi-airport 
areas have generated the opportunity to compete, cooperate and collaborate. Of course, 
both strategies are not easy to implement because of the following issues: the 
differences between rules concession of airport operators, the practice of the direct 
award of concessions and the automatic extension of those, the excessive duration of 
these airport concessions, the lack of price transparency, distortion of the behaviour 
induced by the difficulties related to the liberalization of ground handling services. 
However, none of the two possibilities have been undertaken with decision and energy. 
For instance, a failed Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate between the Bologna, 
Forlì, Rimini and Ancona airports  happened recently; in another case the policy maker 
has decided to prevent the competition between airport in the same multi-airport 
system (i.e. Milan Malpensa e Linate airports). 
No detailed analysis on airports competition was made in Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione 
Civile (2010a)’s report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
7 For further details see 
http://www.enac.gov.it/La_Regolazione_per_la_Sicurezza/Infrastrutture_Aeroportuali/Piano_Nazionale_d
egli_Aeroporti/index.html  
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Figure 8 – Map of the Italian airports (only commercial traffic)  
 
Source: http://www.enac.gov.it/Aeroporti_e_Compagnie_Aeree/Aeroporti_italiani/index.html  
Notes: In the map are reported Italian airports open to commercial traffic during the year 2007 were 
passenger traffic exceeding 10.000. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.  The rail transport market 
 
 
2.2.2.1.  In Europe 
 
Since the nineties, in Europe the rail transport industry has been affected by a process of 
liberalization and privatization aimed at rationalizing the market and introducing 
competition in a sector traditionally characterized by monopolistic structures and a 
strong presence of public ownership. 
As evidenced recently by the Corte dei Conti Europea (2010), the EC actions identified 
three main barriers to development of an European rail transport market: 
 the inadequacy of rail infrastructure network to provide pan-European services, due 
to the lack of links between national networks (especially at the borders), the 
bottlenecks on strategic priorities and obsolescence of the rail infrastructure. 
 the lack of interoperability between various national rail networks (the European 
network is composed of a patchwork of national networks historically developed 
with technical, operational and administrative similar procedures but not identical). 
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 the absence, mainly due to historical reasons, of a European competitive market of 
rail services, historically provided within national markets. 
 
 The EU used two main tools: 
 regulatory measures which aim to open up the European rail market and promote 
interoperability, safety and passenger rights; 
 co-financing to empower and build new rail infrastructures. 
A summary diagram is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 – Rail transport industry overview  
 
Source: Baccelli and Cattaneo (2001); Corte dei Conti Europea (2010) 
 
At European level, the liberalization process of the railway system began in the early 
nineties thanks to the EU. The objectives of the first EU intervention was to introduce 
elements of transparency of the railway system costs, due to the asymmetric 
information between incumbents and new entrants or between regulator and regulated. 
Moreover, another important EU objective was to revitalise railways, thus ensuring a 
greater integration of the Community railway sector for the completion of the EU 
internal market and moving towards achieving sustainable mobility for both passengers 
and freight. Since 1991 significant legislation efforts has been made, including: 
o The Regulation 1893/91/EEC amended regulation 1191/69/EEC concerning public 
service obligations; 
o The Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Community’s railways;  
o The Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings;  
o The Directive 95/19/EC on allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and charging 
of infrastructure fees. 
Subsequently, the Directives mentioned above have been updated within the 1st Railway 
Package that consists of three important EU Directives: 
o The Directive 2001/12/EC set down the EU members to adapt their legislation to 
enable the extension of access rights for international freight services to the national 
section of the Trans European Rail Freight Network. Moreover, The Directive also 
specified that independent organisational entities must be specified for transport 
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operations and infrastructure management. Railway undertakings are also expected 
to set up separate accounts for passenger and freight rail operations; 
o The Directive 2001/13/EC set down the conditions under which railway 
undertakings can obtain licenses. In particular, it established that a license issued by 
one EU member’s licensing authority will be valid throughout the EU); 
o The Directive 2001/14/EC set down the framework conditions for the allocation and 
charging of capacity and safety certification. The Directive specified that the 
infrastructure manager should develop/publish a network statement with 
information about the technical nature and limitations of the network, access 
conditions and rules on capacity allocation as well as the tariff structure. 
 
In 2001 EC proposed a new set of measures enclosed in the 2nd Railway Package aimed 
at: 
o completing the internal market in rail freight services; 
o developing a common approach to rail safety regulation across the EU members; 
o bolstering the fundamental principles of interoperability;  
o setting up an effective centre of expertise (the European Rail Agency) to advise the 
EC and EU members on railway technical issues. 
In particular, this package contains four pieces of legislation (Monsalve, 2011):  
o The Directive 2004/49/EC set down a common approach to rail safety. It laid down a 
clear procedure for granting the safety certificates that every railway company must 
obtain before it can run trains on the European network. It harmonized safety levels 
across Europe by, among other things, specifying what infrastructure managers need 
to do in order to receive safety authorization;  
o The Directive 2004/50/EC set down the interoperability of the European high speed 
and conventional rail systems, clarifying interoperability requirements . These 
requirements concerned the design, construction, placing in service, upgrading, 
renewal, operation and maintenance of the parts of this system placed in service after 
2004, as well as the qualifications and health and safety conditions of the staff who 
contribute to its operation. This directive was updated by Directive 2008/57/EC;  
o The Directive 2004/51/EC laid down the opening from 2007 of both national and 
international freight services on the whole EU network. The EC expects these 
measures to lead to greater than expected gains in terms of modal shift and the 
development of international rail freight transport. Furthermore, they should 
improve the efficiency of the rail mode compared to other transport modes. They 
wanted also facilitate sustainable transport between/within EU members by 
encouraging competition and allowing free entry of new operators;  
o The Regulation (EC) 881/2004, amended by Regulation (EC) 1335/2008, set up an 
effective steering body, the European Rail Agency to co-ordinate groups of technical 
experts seeking common solutions on safety and interoperability. This Agency is a 
driving force in the policy for modernizing the European rail sector. Moreover, the 
European Rail Agency had to gradually align incompatible technical and security 
regulations, and establish common safety objectives that all  Europe’s railways must 
achieve;  
 
In 2007 the EC adopted its 3rd Railway Package containing measures to revitalize the 
railways in Europe, putting forward new proposals in order to open up the international 
passenger transport market by 2010, and regulate passenger rights and the certification 
of train crews. 
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This main objectives are included in the following legislation (Monsalve, 2011): 
o The Directive 2007/58/EC set down the allocation of rail infrastructure capacity and 
the levying of charges for the rail infrastructure ’s use. Railway undertakings 
established in EU members must by January 1st, 2010 be granted the access right to 
the rail infrastructure in all EU members in order to operate international passenger 
services. Moreover, railway had the right to pick up passengers at any station located 
on the international route and set them down at another, including stations located in 
the same EU territory; 
o The Directive 2007/59/EC laid down conditions and procedures for the certification 
of train crews operating locomotives and trains. In particular, it introduced a EU 
driver license allowing train drivers to circulate on the whole European network; 
o The Regulation (EC) 1371/2007 ensured basic rights for passengers and quality 
standards in the following areas: non-discrimination toward handicapped travellers 
or persons with reduced mobility; liability in case of accidents; availability of train 
tickets; and personal security of passengers in stations. Rail transport operators have 
to provide a minimum information to passengers relative to their journey, contract 
conditions and the liability of rail undertaking in cases of accidents, delays or 
cancellations of services. 
 
 
On 20 September 2010, the EC submitted to the European Parliament and the Council 
the proposal for a Directive establishing a single EU railway area with the aim of 
recasting the 1st Railway Package in order to: 
o simplify, clarify and modernise the regulatory environment in European rail sector, 
and  
o eliminate several key problems which have been identified on the market over the 
last 10 years.  
The main three issues are summarized below:. 
1. A low level of competition due to market access conditions which are not sufficiently 
precise and therefore still biased in favour of the incumbents; 
2. Inadequate regulatory monitoring by national authorities, often with insufficient 
independence, competences and power (with a small number of exceptions, rail 
regulators’ offices in most EU members are understaffed, have limited investigating 
powers and cannot enforce their decisions with financial penalties); 
3. Low levels of public and private investments (as the quality of infrastructure) are 
declining in many EU members due of insufficient funding and investment in rail 
services becomes less attractive both for incumbent and new comers; 
 
Recently, European Commission (2011) with the white paper entitled “Roadmap to a 
Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport 
system” provide an integrated approach toward transportation, highlighting with  
reference to the EU rail sector important goals: i) by 2050 to complete the EU HSR 
network; ii)  by 2030 to triple the existing HSR network and maintain a dense railway 
network in all EU members; iii) by 2050 the majority of medium-distance passenger 
transport should go by rail; iv) to strengthen the European Railway Agency’s role related 
to the railway safety and to the control of the adoption of EU measures taken by the 
national authorities.  
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Moreover, HSR investments are considered a strategic success factor for rail industry. It 
is expected to increase to 9.000 kilometers by 2014 and to approximately 17.700 
kilometers by 20258 (UIC High Speed Department, 2010).  
 
In the coming months the EC intends to adopt a new package of measures, the so-called 
4th railway package, to open domestic passenger rail markets to competition, to reduce 
the time-to-market of the rolling stock (through a strengthening of the role of European 
Railways Agency) and to improve the governance of railway infrastructure (to reinforce 
efficiency of railway operations and improve competition)9.  
 
Laperrouza and Finger (2009) report a historic overview of what the liberalization 
process in rail industry has generated related to the main rail features (i.e., 
organizational structure, regulation policy and legislation, drivers, market structure and 
opening, ownership etc.). A schematic representation is shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 – European railway liberalization process 
Elements 
Previo us era 
(until 1990) 
Modification era  
(1990-2005) 
New era  
(2005-2012) 
Organizational 
structure  
Vertically 
integrated 
Voluntary  unbundling Mandatory unbundling 
 
Regulation po licy 
and legislatio n  
 
National  
 
National with s upra- 
national transport policy 
and directiv es  
 
National with EU 
Directives  
Drivers  Public service 
Public service, 
productivi ty and financial 
sustainabili ty  
Public service, 
productivi ty,  
financial s ustainability, 
environmental 
concerns  
Market structure  Monopoly  
Monopolis tic 
(infrastructure) and 
market (services) 
segments  
Monopolistic 
(infrastructure) and 
market (services) 
segments  
Market opening  
Clos ed with 
limited 
international 
traffic  
Ad hoc opening of 
domestic markets  
Freight open; 
mandated opening of 
passenger market 
Ownership  Public ownership Mostly s tate-owned 
State-owned 
(infrastructure) Some 
private rail companies  
Regulato ry 
arrangements  
None (Ministry) None (Ministry) 
Independent rail way 
authori ty  
 
Scale  
 
Regional and 
national  
 
National to international  
 
Increasingly  
international Source: Laperrouza and Finger (2009) 
 
 
The application of previous EU legislation varies deeply across EU members and only a 
few countries have been able to create a real competitive situation. In order to reach it a 
                                                                 
8 Currently, the EU network for HSR spans about 6.600 kilometers.  
9 For further interesting details in particular with reference to the vertical integration see The Economist ’s 
article, “Uncoupling the trains - Plans to liberalise Europe’s rail services run into opposition”,  Nov 10th 
2012. 
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rail transport operator has to be able to access in a new country to leverage growth 
opportunities. This depends on: 
- the regulatory competition setup, and 
- the factual degree of competition in the respective country (Schmidt, 2012). 
The first point is related to the degree of vertical integration of the infrastructure 
provider and to the structural position of national regulation and safety authorities10. 
The second point, indeed, is related to the (not) easy access to the national network, to 
the potential competition of national top routes as well as to the market dominance of 
incumbent. Schmidt (2012) reports a detailed analysis in Appendix 9.  
In particular, vertical disintegration between the infrastructure manager and transport 
service provider, and the independence of the regulator from the Ministry of Transport 
are the most important element that improve fair rail competition. However, an 
interesting point is to group EU rail members on the basis of previous highlighted 
aspects ( Table 6).  
 
Table 6 – Analysis of the competition in the rail transport market in Europe  
Group Countries Description 
Cluster 1:  
Countries ready for 
competition  
Denmark  
Great Britain 
Netherl ands  
In these countries the infrastructure manager is fully 
independent. Moreover, open access competition was 
fully implemented in these countries. Several new 
market players are active.  
Cluster 2:  
Countries with high 
market attractiveness; 
not completely ready for 
competition  
Austria  
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Germany  
Italy  
The infrastructure manager is still part of the 
incumbent rail holding. Open access competition has 
legally been implemented. However, in most of those 
countries open access competition has not been put 
into practice because incumbents are able to use their 
position to build up entry barriers. Some early 
challengers are in the market; others are building up 
their operations to kick off soon. 
Cluster 3:  
Countries yet not open 
towards competition  
France 
Poland  
Spain  
Switzerland 
Policy does not seem to welcome market access of 
foreign rail operators. Although in some countries the 
legal setup is pointing in the direction of liberalization, 
incumbents seem to know how to use their influences. 
Only other European incumbents are allowed to 
operate in those markets because of traditional 
solidarity from common historic incumbent roots. 
Source: elaboration of Schmidt (2012) on Beckers, Hirschhausen, Haunerwald, and Walter (2009); 
European Commission (2009) 
 
 
The long-distance passenger transport market is an attractive segment due to its 
commercial viability. Compared to the widely subsidized regional transport, long-
distance rail is operating with less influence of politicians on operational business 
decisions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006). However, 
incumbents are launching long-distance services into foreign countries as a result of EU’s 
rail liberalization (see Figure 10). At the same time, they were hardly open towards 
competition in their domestic markets and built up entry barriers to limit the entrance 
of other rail operator (Briginshaw, 2009). In fact, recently European Commission (2010) 
                                                                 
10 Regulatory institutions and safety authorities should thereby be independent from the national 
transport ministry that sets the strategic targets for the national rail incumbent.  
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indicate that 13 EU members11 violate existing law restrictions by multiple reasons, such 
as insufficient independency of the infrastructure manager, deficient creation of viable 
track renting systems or the lack of an independent national regulation authority .  
For further details on projections of the EU rail market development to 2020 see 
Schmidt (2012)12. 
 
Figure 10 – Overview of the inter-countries rail routes by EU incumbents 
 
Source: Schmidt (2012) 
  
 
 
 
 
2.2.2.2.  In Italy 
 
Since the late ‘90, European legislation on rail market liberalization has been 
progressively absorbed in the Italian legislative context.  
The liberalization process started with the D.P.R. 277/1998 (Directive 91/440/EEC) 
aimed to introduce the separation between the infrastructure manager and rail 
transport services, and the D.P.R. 146/1999 (transposing the Directive no. 18/1995) on 
the licensing of railway undertakings and (Directive n. 19/1995) on the allocation of 
railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of use charges. 
The most significant effect of the D.P.R. 277/1998 was the reorganization of the Ferrovie 
dello Stato (FS), creating 4 core Business Divisions: 
 Infrastructure Division; 
 Division Passengers (medium and long-distance); 
 Local and Regional Transport Division; and 
 Cargo Division. 
The last three Divisions were  managed by Trenitalia 13.  
                                                                 
11 Some of these: Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain. 
12 He proposes a methodology to identify two scenarios: convergence to a unites and competitive EU 
market and divergence of markets with varying degrees of competition. Its analysis is based on 4 factors: 
success of early challengers in long-distance passenger transportation, social awareness for choice of 
transport mode, EU’s rail liberalization progress, and increase in rolling stock availability.  
13 For further details on the evolution of the FS Holding see Baccelli and Cattaneo (2001)  
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The D.Lgs. 188/2003 implements the three Directives 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 
2001/14/EC, which make up the 1st Railway Package. In particular, the D.Lgs. 188/2003 
defines aspects which are relevant for the rail transport regulation (i.e., the license of 
railway undertakings and rights of the infrastructure use and access). In addition, it 
defines in more detail both characteristics and tasks of the infrastructure manager (RFI) 
and identifies the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport as the national regulatory 
authority. The implementation of the 1st Railway Package was completed with the 
enactment of the D.Lgs. 268/2004, which implemented the Directive 2001/16/EC, in 
order to establish conditions that allow to realize the interoperability of the rail national 
system among the EU members. 
 
2nd Railway Package has been implemented in Italy since 2007. The D.Lgs. 162/2007, 
implemented the Directives 2004/49/EC and 2004/51/EC relating to the safety and 
development of the rail European market. Moreover, infrastructure manager and 
railway undertakings were obliged to develop their own systems of security 
management. A national regulator office, the Italian Rail Regulatory Body Office, was set 
up aimed to regulate and control access to rail market services. Furthermore, the D.Lgs. 
163/2007 (implementation of the Directive 2004/50/EC on the interoperability of the 
Trans-European) defined the conditions to achieve the interoperability of the Trans-
European national high-speed and conventional rail systems. This D.Lgs. provideed that 
the Italian Rail Regulatory Body Office, fully independent of any railway undertaking and 
infrastructure manager, emanated technical rules and safety standards and monitored 
about their application, authorized the commissioning service of structural subsystems 
and rolling stock, issued certificates of approval of products, applications and 
components, issued safety certificates to railway undertakings and infrastructure 
manager to security clearance, established and updated by the vehicle national register 
rolling stock, cooperated with the European Railway Agency etc.  
 
3rd Railway Package was incorporated into Italian law with the D.Lgs. 15/2010. It 
implemented the Directive 2007/58/EC (amending Council Directives 91/440/EEC and 
2001/14/EC) concerning: i) the development of the European rail market, ii) the 
allocation of infrastructure capacity, and iii) the levying of a charging system for the rail 
infrastructure use. With this provision since January 1st of 2010, railway undertakings 
can provided international transport services with the right to carry passengers 
between national stations located along the route of the international service14. 
Moreover, the D.Lgs. 15/2010 refered to the L. 99/2009 with regard to the requirements 
for the development of passenger rail services at national level (Article 58), changed to 
the D.Lgs. 422/1997 (Article 60) and the amendments to the D.Lgs. 188/2003(Article 
62). With the D.Lgs. 191/2010, the Italian legislative system has however transposed the 
Directives 2008/57/EC and 2009/131/CE on the interoperability of the European rail 
system. This provision defined the design, construction, commissioning, upgrading, 
renewal, operation and maintenance, as well as professional qualifications , health and 
safety of staff who contribute to achieve and maintain the interoperability of the Italian 
rail system with the corresponding EU rail system. 
                                                                 
14 Only an exception is limitated to ensure that this service may compRo -Mise the economic equilibrium of 
a public service contract. In this respect, Article 59-Restrictions on passenger rail services in the national - 
Law 99/2009, “Provisions for the development and internationalization of enterprises, as well as in the 
field of energy”. 
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Finally, in 2010 the D.Lgs. 247/2010 (implementing Directive 2007/59/EC on the 
certification of train drivers operating locomotives and trains on the rail European 
system) was implemented. In particular, it identified the duties of the competent 
national administrations, the railway undertakings and the operators of infrastructures. 
Based on the main interesting studies (Beckers, et al., 2009; European Commission, 
2009), the main features of the Italian rail transport system is shown in Table 7. It has 
been included among the European countries with a high market attractiveness, but not 
completely ready for competition.  
 
Table 7 – Characteristics of the It alian rail transport market 
Competitive setup Factual competition potential  
Instrastructure 
manager 
Legal 
structure of 
infrastructur
e manager 
Legal structure 
of regulation 
authority 
Competi tion 
model 
Third 
party 
access to 
network 
Top route 
potentials  
Market 
domninance 
and new 
challengers 
Rete 
Ferroviaria 
Italiana (RFI) 
Accounting 
separation, 
integration 
in the 
incumbent 
holding 
The Italian Rail 
Regulatory 
Body Office, 
part of the 
Ministry of 
Transport, 
controls the 
public railway 
operator 
(Trenitalia) 
Open 
access, no 
transparent 
infrastructu
re charges 
definition 
Trans -
European 
and 
national 
access 
Very high 
98% 
Trenitalia, 1 
% TGV, 1 % 
DB-ÖBB 
venture, 
NTV HSR 
private 
operator 
Source: Beckers, et al. (2009); European Commission (2009) 
 
The rail market is dominated by the FS. Figure 11 highlights FS holding. As you can see, FS 
owns the 100% of both RFI (rail infrastructure manager) and Trenitalia (which owns 
about the 95% of the market). Limited competition is in both rail and HSR passenger 
transport market. In a context of lack of market opening and lack of a solid and clear 
regulation the entrance of a new HSR private operator (NTV) in the most profitable 
Italian corridor (Tourin-Salerno, but in particular the Rome-Milan link) is an important 
event. Further details on rail transport operators are provided in section 7.1.1.3. 
 
Figure 11 – Structure of the Ferrovie dello Stato Holding  
 
Source: Trenitalia web site 
http://www.fsitaliane.it/cms/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=cd5268ae9d50a110VgnVCM10000080a3e90aRCRD
.  
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2.3. Conclusion 
 
Liberalization and deregulation process have influenced and changed both air and rail 
transport markets. However, these two markets show a different degree of market 
access and competition. Currently, air transport has the characteristics of a competitive 
market mainly for airlines. The liberalization process affected first the airlines and then 
the airport management. The competitive pressure has reduced average fares by 35% 
from 1992 to 2004 and a new business model for airlines, so-called low-cost, has 
developed over time. Moreover, important agreements and alliances were born and 
developed between no low cost airlines.  
The rail transport is, more than any other market, characterized by natural monopoly in 
relation to the transport network of tracks and stations, but also to the rolling stock and 
to the organizational characteristics of the service. Several European countries have 
responded to liberalization process in different ways depending on their economic and 
cultural characteristics. In Italy, there is a particular market structure: the railway 
manager (RFI) and the main transport provider (Trenitalia) belong to the same holding 
(FS Group). The FS Group’s and the rail regulator (Italian Rail Regulatory Body Office) 
are the same owner (the Italian Government). An independent authority to regulate the 
transport markets is strongly required. The quality of rail regulation and questionable 
political choices contributed to the difficult opening of this market. However, the most 
important results have found for a long distance travel (i.e., entry of a new private 
operator in the Turin-Naples corridor; Trenitalia-Frecciarossa agreements with other 
HSR operators to provide international rail services). 
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3. Competition policy and regulation in air and rail transport 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter has two objectives. 
The first part of this chapter focuses on the all IAA interventions since its creation 
(1990) to May 2011. The different types of antitrust intervention, their numerosity, 
agents involved and the financial penalty conferred are reported. The following types of 
IAA’s activities are considered: 
o Fact-finding activity; 
o Advocacy activity; 
o Investigations activity (enforcement law), 
supported by summarizing tables of the interventions15. 
The second part analyses the investigations on intermodal competition carried out by 
the European Commission Competition, in particular with reference to the definition of 
the relevant market. 
 
 
3.2 Analysis of the Italian Antitrust Authority activities in transport sectors 
 
 
3.2.1.      Fact-finding activity 
 
Referring to this type of intervention, the IAA has identified the need to intervene both 
in the air and rail transport markets. An overview of all fact-finding inquiries carried out 
is shown in Table 8.  
With reference to the Italian air transport market in 1993 the IAA identified the need to 
revise the historical structure of this industry dominated by the ex-flag carrier Alitalia 
airlines. In particular, making a first fact-finding inquiry16, the IAA verified the 
correctness of fares applied by Alitalia, since on domestic routes fares resulted 
significantly higher than those applied by other European carriers on similar routes. 
Moreover, the IAA checked if Alitalia airlines’ domestic tariffs could not be related to 
actual costs incurred. In 2003 the IAA detected the need for a further inquiry17 to 
analyze the structure and dynamic of fares. Furthermore, a new airline organizational 
models (low cost carriers’ one) was analyzed. The competitive structure of this market 
was characterized by an Alitalia Airlines’ monopoly on almost all national routes. 
Afterwards, the IAA examined whether the market entry of new operators lead to a 
reduction in ticket prices for consumers. The results showed that in markets with new 
carriers (where the number of seats offered and passengers increased) the average fare 
decreased rapidly. On the contrary, constant high fares were found in the markets where 
the presence of the incumbent persisted. Although the air transport market has generally 
opened to competition, the IAA has found that structural barriers to market entry were 
not completely removed by the liberalization process. The IAA identifies the lack of slots 
at most major Italian airports as the main weakness as highlighted also by the European 
Commission. Another important weakness was represented by regulatory barriers (i.e.  
slots allocation). In fact, the grandfather’s right principle strengthens the position of the 
                                                                 
15 Complete lists of all alerts, notifications and investigations are set out respectively in Annex 1and 2.  
16 IC10 – Domestic Air Faires, 2003.  
17 IC24 – Dynamic Pricing of Passengers Air Transport, 2005. 
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incumbent which can preserve a large number of slots at the most attractive times 
without incurring costs. New carriers obtain few unattractive slots. The regulatory limits 
created also economic barriers. In fact, new carriers get economies of scale only if it 
reaches a minimum efficient in terms of aircraft numbers, flights frequency and number 
of seats offered. Moreover, to attract time-sensitive passengers (those most profitable), 
the network size and the flight frequency are essential conditions. Moreover, the IAA 
highlighted reputational barriers related to carrier image and consumer loyalty as a 
further element that prevented a free market entry. 
 
With reference to the Italian rail transport market, in 1993 the IAA carried out a first 
fact-finding inquiry on the rolling stock market18, aimed to evaluate some changes 
occurred in rail operators on both the demand and supply side. In fact, until the late 
seventies, the main buyer of supply of rolling stock (Ferrovie dello Stato, FS) protected 
the national market from foreign competition (awarding orders among various Italian 
regions). Towards the end of the 70’s FS promoted a process of consolidation in the 
industry and spurred its supplier to acquire the skills necessary to provide 
technologically advanced products, without opening towards international competition. 
The objective to reorganize the rail industry has been achieved only partially due at the 
“historical shares” (quote storiche) system that has never been entirely abandoned. Due 
to the Directive n. 90/531/EEC of 1993, the rolling stock market was officially opened to 
international competition, promoting a gradual process of market efficiency. Therefore, 
the Italian manufacturers of railway stock separating mechanical and electrical 
companies. This gave rise, in the late 80’s and early 90’s, to integration phenomenon of 
some operators aimed to create a consortium. The IAA evaluated there is the consortium 
had prevented a competitive process. The main results highlighted important pro-
competitive changes in the rolling stock industry and summarized as: a) the change of 
commitments’ criteria by FS (from the anti-competitive criteria of the “historical shares” 
to international competitive tenders, b) a more transparent determination of offer 
prices of rolling stock by the major companies, c) the competitive behavio urs of these 
operators during international tenders, d) the rationalization of commercial policies by 
FS, with the elimination of unnecessary orders of rolling stock, and e) the opening of the 
market to European competitors, particularly with reference to the segments of 
locomotives and of rolling stock trailers (in the HSR segment persisted strong forms of 
protectionism). Despite these pro-competitive improvements, the presence of 
consortium were potentially able to limit a free play competition, has motivated the IAA 
in 1993. For this reason, the IAA decided to carry out a further fact-finding inquiry in 
order to investigate also the construction of HSR network19 (due at the huge financial 
resources utilized to its achievement and creation of labour force). In this inquiry the 
IAA found that the dual role of the general contractor20, the pre-qualifying system as 
well as the unjustified fragmentation of commitment entrusted by the general 
contractor to third parties, favoured the deprivation of the requested requirements 
necessary to compete with the general contractors21. 
 
Referring to the fact-finding inquiries, an active and balanced effort in both air and rail 
transport markets by the IAA activity has emerged . Moreover, the presence of operators 
                                                                 
18 IC6 – Rolling Stock Market, 1995.  
19 IC7 – High Speed Rail Sector, 1996.  
20 It’s a company engaged in major infrastructure and station contractors.  
21 As happened for the reliance of Milan-Genoa, Milan-Verona and Verona-Venice routes.  
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in monopoly/monopsony motivated the IAA to identify the main critical aspects that 
prevent and limit a free markets competition and, at the same time, incentive anti-
competitive behaviours.  
 
 
Table 8 - Synthesis of fact-finding activity  
Transport 
sector 
Code Title Start 
survey 
Survey 
end 
Rail  IC6 Rolling Stock sector 1993 1995 
Rail  IC7 High Speed Rail Sector 1993 1996 
Air IC10 Domestic Air Fares  1993 2003 
Air IC24 Dynamic Pricing of Passenger Air Transport 2003 2005 
Source: own elaboration on IAA data (1980-2011) 
 
 
3.2.2. Advocacy  activity 
 
Also with reference to this type of activity, the IAA has intervened in both transport 
sectors. Table 9 reports the outline of the interventions carried out.  
In the air transport market, a consistent advocacy activity was carried out, according to 
Articles 2122 and 2223 of the Law 287/90. It can be grouped synthetically to the 
following macro-themes: i) liberalization and privatization of airport operations (e.g. 
handling services); ii) airport management, traffic distribution between Milan Malpensa 
and Milan Linate airports and the development of the operational capacity at the  Milan 
Linate airport; iii) transportation services for the airports accessibility; and iv) legal and 
regulatory aspects. For these points, the IAA provided advices, highlighted the critical 
issues that the laws (both in vigour or not yet ratified) have or could cause in terms of 
reducing the free play of competition between operators and of obstacles at the market 
entry of new operators. Furthermore, critical and crucial aspects , to prevent 
competition and identified by the IAA, related to the:  
 presence of constraints in the legislation for the liberalization of ground-handling 
transport services at airports24; 
 charging system for the use of centralized airport infrastructures;  
 allocation to Alitalia of the airport clearance activity (slot allocation); 
 duration of concessions and rules of renewal for the airports infrastructures 
management (no races); 
 limitations of the number of handling operators; 
 no provision regarding the definition of self-handling services (Art. 2 of the EU 
Directive 96/97); 
 slot assignment for and to Milan Linate airport by Assoclearance; 
 maintenance of n. 18 hour movements as the maximum capacity to Milan Linate 
airport; 
 common agreement between Municipalities of the taxi service fare for the routes to 
and from the airports; 
                                                                 
22 Art. 21: power to notify Parliament and Government.  
23 Art. 22: advisory activities.  
24 The imposition for new entrants to absorb surplus labor force may discourage the entry of new 
operators.  
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 the prohibition of night aircraft movements on all civil airports from 23.00 pm to 
06.00 am (with the exception of Rome Fiumicino and Milan Malpensa, and of the 
postal service flights). 
 
With regard to rail transport, the IAA has intervened mainly with reference to the: i)  
opening of the rolling stock market to national/international competition, ii) promotion 
of the public tender for the engineering and construction of tracks and HSR 
infrastructure, iii) separation between railway infrastructure management and 
transport operator activities, iv) FS organizational structure, v) “public service 
obligations” vs. competition, vi) system for the definition of the ticket price (“mileage 
rate”). The main critical aspects to a free play competition ia mainly related to the: 
 Difficult access to production and commercialization of the rolling stock due to the 
demand specificity (monopsony by Trenitalia), and the absence of a secondary 
market and of public procurement procedures as well as the production timing for 
new rolling stocks; 
 Italian railway market structure (FS holding); 
 Regulatory framework of non-univocal interpretation and not yet fully defined. 
 
 
Table 9 - Synthesis of alerts and notifications activity  
Transport 
sector:  
Number of interventions according to the articles 21 and 22 of the Law 287 -90 
art. 21 art. 22 artt. 21-22 Total 
abs. 
value 
% abs. 
value 
% abs. 
value 
% abs. 
value 
% 
Air 8 83%  9 90%  1 25%  18 77%  
Rail 3 17%  2 10%  3 75%  8 23%  
Total:  11 100% 11 100% 4 100% 26 100% 
Source: own elaboration on IAA data (1980-2011) 
 
 
From Table 9 emerges a greater commitment and a more intense activity by the IAA for 
the air transport market. This difference is mainly due to the different dynamics that 
affected this market compared to rail transport as well as the features and structure of 
the sector and operators. In addition, Table 9shows that the number of IAA’s 
interventions (carried out by artt. 21 and 22 of Law 287/90), is substantially balanced. 
With regard to the implementation of interventions over time, those related to rail 
transport focused from 2002 till 2011, in contrast to the air transport in which the 
interventions were observed from 1993 until 2011. 
 
 
3.2.3. Investigations activity 
 
The IAA is responsible for detecting: 
1. abuses of dominant position; 
2. agreements restricting competition; 
3. merger operations involving the creation or strengthening of dominant positions in 
ways that eliminate or substantially reduce competition on a lasting basis. 
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Table 10 summarizes the number of interventions by type of anti-competitive conducts 
per transport market. Detailed tables will follow in the respective sections.  
 
Table 10 - Number of investigation made in air and rail transport markets  
Type of anti-competitive conduct:  Number of investigations  
Air Transport  Rail transport  
Abs. 
value 
% Abs. 
value 
% 
Abuse of dominant position  15 36%  9 47%  
Merger 15 36%  6 32%  
Agreement restricting competition  7 17%  2 11%  
Non-compliance* 5 12%  2 11%  
Total:  42 100% 19 100% 
Source: own elaboration on IAA data (1980-2011) 
Notes: * Non-compliance with the notice/prohibition of merger, non-compliance with the prohibition of 
position abuse.  
 
 
3.2.3.1. Abuse of dominant position 
 
The AoDP investigations carried out in order to verify the held by air and rail transport 
operators constitute a large proportion of the overall IAA activities (47%), concentrated 
mainly in the air transport market (Table 10). In the 75% and 27% of all AoDP cases 
analyzed, the IAA found a violation of Art. 3 of Law 287/90, respectively, in the air and 
rail transport markets (Table 11). In the following sections an analysis of interventions 
by type of transport was point out. 
 
Table 11 – AoDP investigations: number of interventions  
Transport sector Violation No violation* 
Abs. value % Abs. value % 
Air 11 73%  4 44%  
Rail 4 27%  5 56%  
Total:  15 100% 9 100% 
Source: own elaboration on IAA data (1980-2011) 
 
 
AoDP in the air transport market 
With reference to the air transport market, the AoDP investigations have involved 
multiple actors. Airport operators and operators that provide services within the airport 
(handling service, safety service and supply of drinks and food) are mainly involved. 
Marginally, there are also different types of national Associations of consumers, airlines, 
airport operators and travel agencies.  
Actors subject of the IAA investigations have been identified as well. 56% of 
investigations have focused on the airport operators’25 conduct and the remaining 44% 
on the airlines26. 
With reference to the cases where an anti-competitive conduct was detected, 50% of 
these behaviours infringed the letter b)27, art. 3 of Law 287/90. In particular, airport 
                                                                 
25 Aeroporti di Roma Spa – AdR and Servizi Esercenti Aeroportuali di Milano, Spa. – SEA.  
26 In particular, for obvious reasons, to the Alitalia.  
27 Prevent or limit the production or market access, technical development as damage to consumers.  
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operators (AdR, SEA) and airlines (Alitalia) have abused of their dominant positions in 
their respective markets limiting production, markets access or technical development 
in order to prevent or limit production or market access, technical development 
harming both consumers and competitors . Moreover, 28% and 17% of the anti-
competitive conducts concerned the imposition of purchase price, sale or other 
contractual terms and conditions unduly burdensome28 and to the application of 
different contract terms to different subjects but for equivalent services, in order to 
determine unjustifiable competitive disadvantages. These behaviours are attributable to 
both airports (AdR, SEA) to airlines (Alitalia).  The last 5% of the AoDP violations related 
to the subordination of contracts’ conclusion to acceptance of supplementary obligations 
which have no connection with the subject of such contracts29. Again, it was ascertained 
such anti-competitive conduct by the airport operator (AdR) against airlines. 
With reference to the proposed remedies, the IAA, detected 11 cases of AoDP violation 
by operators present in the air transport market, 8 of them received a fine for a total of € 
32.560.255 (equivalent to an average fine of € 4.070.032 per operator). Of the 8 cases 
sanctioned only in two cases the IAA has undertaken to quantify the fine availing of the 
art. 15 of Law 287/90, which recall the determination of the penalty for serious 
infringements. 
 
 
AoDP in the rail transport market 
In the rail transport market the actors involved in the AoDP’s interventions were mainly 
the manufacturers of rolling stock and Consortia (45%), followed by  the FS Group30 
(28%) and rail transport operators (14%). Marginally, associations of logistics operators 
have also involved. Interventions to confirm the existence of AoDP have focused on FS 
Group (70%), a consortium of manufacturers of rolling stock (20%) and rail transport 
operators (10%). The IAA investigations revealed that in 60% of the operations which is 
found to assume an AoDP, anti-competitive conducts were directed to limit and prevent 
production, free market access and technical and technological developments. The 
remaining 40% focused on the application in the commercial transactions by the FS 
Group, objectively dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, causing undue 
disadvantage to the competition.  
60% of the AoDP’s interventions analyzed have not revealed any violation. In the 
remaining 40% of cases, the IAA has sanctioned with an economic fine only half of those 
under investigation for a total of € 3.255.498 (equal to an average fine of € 1.627.749). 
 
 
 
3.2.3.2. Mergers 
 
As provided by art. 6 of Law 287/90, mergers investigations carried verify whether the 
merger proposed by the firms could create or strengthen a dominant position in the 
market in order to eliminate or reduce (substantially and permanently) competition. 
This type of interventions, in addition to the previous one, is a large proportion of the 
overall IAA activities in both transport markets. With reference to the total number of 
                                                                 
28 Respectively Letter a) and c) of Law 287/90.  
29 Letter d) of Law 287/1980.  
30 The FS holding includes RFI and Trenitalia operators.  
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interventions (Table 12), 72% focused on air transport market, and the remaining 28% 
on rail market. 
 
Table 12 – Merger investigations: numbers of interventions  
Transport 
sector 
Merger Fusion De-merger Total 
Abs. 
Value 
% Abs. 
Value 
% Abs. 
Value 
% Abs. 
Value 
% 
Air 13 72%  1 100%  1 50%  15 71% 
Rail 5 28%  - - 1 50%  6 29% 
Total:  18 100% 1 100% 2 100% 21 100% 
Source: own elaboration on IAA data (1980-2011) 
 
 
Merger activity in air transport market 
The type of operator mainly involved is the airline (46%), followed by the airport 
operator (20%). The remainder are divided between operators of beverage 
administration, ground handling, aircraft manufacturers and energy producers. 
The analysis shows that all mergers have approved positively. Only in three cases, the 
release of this authorization has bounded by specific conditions. In most cases, these 
analysis point out mergers between airlines, in which it was often present Alitalia.  
 
 
Merger activity in rail transport market 
With reference to the mainly actors involved, clearly emerge a consistent presence of the 
FS Group (56%), followed by other marginal actors such as manufacturers of water and 
energy services, rolling stock manufacturers etc. For all cases investigated, the IAA 
positively  authorized the merger (or demerger) of firms and only in one case the 
Authority allowed the merger claiming compliance with specific conditions.  
 
 
 
3.2.3.3. Agreements restricting competition 
 
As provide the art. 2 of Law 287/90, investigations on agreements/cartels restricting 
competition  are a rather marginal proportion of the overall IAA activity (12%), 
concentrated mainly in the air transport market (Table 13). 
 
Activity relating to agreements restricting competition in air transport market 
 
Actors involved and affected by IAA interventions: airlines (45%), oil companies (25%), 
airport operators (13%) and operators that provide safety and security services (12%). 
In the 71% of interventions the IAA found the infringement of the art. 2 of Law 287/90, 
but has conceded, however, in two cases, the opportunity to continue their anti-
competitive conducts for a limited period of time (from 3 to 12 months). 
 
 
 
 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
53 
 
Table 13 – Investigations of cartel/agreement: number of interventions  
Transport 
sector 
Infringement No 
infringement  
Total 
Abs. 
value 
% Abs. 
Value 
% Abs. 
value 
% 
Air 5 100%  2 50%  7 78% 
Rail - - 2 50%  2 22% 
Total:  5 100% 4 100% 9 100% 
Source: own elaboration on IAA data (1980-2011) 
 
In the remaining 29% of cases no infringements were found. The total amount of 
economic fines given by the IAA was € 302.868.482. 
 
 
 
Activity relating to agreements restricting competition in rail transport market 
From 1980 to May 2011 the IAA has intervened in only two cases, relating to 
agreements between inter-modal transport operators and between FS Group with an 
operator of maritime passenger transport. For both cases no violations were detected. 
 
 
 
3.3. Analysis of the antitrust interventions on intermodal competition  
 
3.3.1.  The relevant market: definition and methods 
 
Market definition is instrumental to the assessment of market power and central to 
competition policy. Until recently, the assessment of market boundaries has been 
primarily a qualitative judgemental process. However, the past years have not only seen 
the development of new quantitative methods of defining markets, but also a growing 
demand for these econometric methods (Hildebrand, 2006). This is important because 
there is a growing concern over the lack of rigour and factual analysis by the European 
Commission and national competition authorities when defining markets and assessing 
market power (Harris & Veljanowski, 2003). Quantitative methods accompany then 
qualitative methods. Qualitative methods, for example, include an examination of 
product characteristics and the intended use of a product by consumers, whereas 
quantitative methods involve the examination of price trends or the estimation of cross-
price-elasticities. The European Commission’s Notice on the Definition of Relevant 
Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law31 describes the modern 
methodology for market definition in a very detailed way: According to the Notice, firms 
are subject to three main sources of competitive constraints: demand substitutability, 
supply substitutability and potential competition. Demand-side substitutability is used 
to measure the extent to which consumers are prepared to substitute other products or 
services for the product or service in question, whereas supply-side substitutability 
indicates whether suppliers other than those offering the product or services in question 
would switch their line of production or offer the relevant products or services without 
                                                                 
31 European Commission, Commission's Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of 
Community Competition Law, Official Journal C 272, 09/12/1997, pp. 5-13. 
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incurring significant additional costs. Thus, substitutability on the supply-side occurs 
when producers that are currently supplying a different product possess those skills and 
assets that make it possible to switch production in a short period of time if a price rise 
occurs. 
 
An analysis of the own and cross-price elasticities of demand is a common empirical 
approach to market definition. The own-price elasticity of demand is a measure of 
consumer price sensitivity. The cross-price elasticity of demand is a measure of the 
degree to which two products are close or distant substitutes. Estimates of the own and 
cross-price elasticities of demand can be used to implement the antitrust market 
definition test that is described in the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) Horizontal Merger Guidelines and to estimate the competitive 
consequences of a proposed merger or acquisition.  The elasticities of demand also can 
be inputs to a critical loss test and other analyses that are often applied when assessing 
market definition (Meyer, 2007). 
 
Consumers surveys are recognized as a source of evidence on market definition under 
EU and national market definition guidelines32.  
There are two types of survey approaches - those soliciting evidence on past consumer 
decisions and behaviour (revealed preferences) and those using consumer responses to 
hypothetical questions (stated preferences).  
Stated preference surveys have been used in competition law proceedings, but 
frequently in cost-benefit analysis to value so-called intangibles. It is therefore possible 
to draw on a well developed literature in the design and implementation of such 
surveys. 
There are three main types of stated preference survey approaches, which seem 
relevant market definition: 
1) Price Reaction Surveys: the EC Market Definition Notice states that survey evidence 
seeking to quantify the Hypothetical Monopolist Test is acceptable: ‘reasoned 
answers of customers and competitors as to what would happen if relative prices for 
the candidate products were to increase in the candidate geographical area by a 
small amount (for instance of 5% to 10%) are taken into account when they are 
sufficiently backed by factual evidence.’ For such  survey evidence to be useful, the 
consumers’ potential reduction in the quantity consumed must also be quantified. 
For some products this is not a problem since the consumption decision is a binary 
one i.e. whether or not to buy a ticket; or to subscribe to a specific pay TV package. 
These yes/no responses can be aggregated over the sample to give the percentage 
response for the group (market) as a whole. In other cases, some estimate of the 
reduction in the quantity demanded will need to be made, and reliable responses 
may be difficult to elicit from those questioned. If there are concerns about the 
reliability of responses to output effects, it is possible to use plausible assumptions 
together with sensitivity analysis, although this will be less satisfactory. 
2) Preference Surveys: it is not uncommon for consumer preference surveys to be 
submitted to competition authorities. This happened in BSkyB, and in EC, UK and US 
merger clearances of the Royal Caribbean/PO Princess/Carnival Cruises proposed 
transactions. Often these surveys show that a certain percentage of consumers in the 
sample have a strong or weak preference for a particular product or product 
                                                                 
32 E.g. EC 97/C 372/03, para 40-41; OFT 403, para 3.6.  
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grouping, or that the preferences overlap across statistical or marketing categories. 
In BSkyB the OFT stated that survey evidence which showed that consumers have 
strong preferences, while not conclusive proof of lack of substitutability, was ‘strong 
evidence’ that prices are likely to be above the competitive price, and that a separate 
relevant market could be defined. This was a rather strong conclusion, which is 
discussed further below. 
3) Conjoint Analysis: it is a marketing research technique, recently proposed and used to 
define markets in antitrust proceedings. It consists of first identifying the critical  
attributes/characteristics of the different products, and asking those surveyed to 
place ‘valuations’ on the different attributes. The individual preferences of each 
interviewee are then extrapolated using a preference model to estimate the 
probability of a consumer choosing a particular product (set of attributes). These are 
then aggregated to derive a demand curve for the product. Conjoint analysis 
constitutes an empirical method which is particularly well suited to estimate the 
effects of a hypothetical price increase on demand and hence on profits of a firm. It 
offers a well established econometric tool which can be applied in practice to 
implement the Hypothetical Monopolist Test in order to define the relevant product 
and geographical markets in accordance with the legal requirements. 
 
However, stated preference surveys raise some important issues. In fact, there are 
potential difficulties with consumer preference survey generally, and with stated 
preference surveys in particular (i.e. stated preferences do not accurately reveal true 
preferences and the choices consumers will make in practice)33. 
When relevant and reliable data on actual purchases are available, it may be possible to 
use econometric methods to estimate the elasticities of demand as part of a relevant 
market analysis. However, such data are often either not available or not specific enough 
to estimate the relevant elasticities of demand for the product(s) at issue. In this 
circumstance, a properly designed consumer survey that measures preferences over 
hypothetical products and alternatives - a stated preference survey - can be, and indeed 
has been, used to assess the nature of consumer demand and to  delineate the 
boundaries of the relevant market. 
Meyer (2007) listed the main nine criteria that can be used to determine whether a 
survey is trustworthy or not, adopted by professional associations and by the courts. 
Briefly: 
o The survey should contain screening questions to identify relevant respondents; 
o The instructions should be clear and not confusing; 
o The examiner should conduct a pre-test; 
o There should be a "sufficient" response rate; 
o The survey should address non response bias; 
o The survey should be designed to ensure that respondents were willing and able to 
devote the time to take the survey seriously; 
o The results must be replicable; 
o Standard errors should be calculable and presented; 
o The survey should be conducted in accordance with generally accepted survey 
principles and used in a statistically correct way (e.g. implement double-blind 
questioning, appropriately train and monitor interviewers, create ways to verify the 
accuracy of data coding and recording, and validate survey responses). 
                                                                 
33 For a complete explanation on the main weaks points see Hildebrand (2006) 
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The ability to design and develop a survey tool to inform relevant market definition or to 
assess the degree to which certain products are close or  distant substitutes is 
particularly important in circumstances where historical data are not available or 
sufficient. However, a survey must be carefully designed if it is to yield reliable and 
accurate data that are admissible as evidence. A properly designed discrete choice 
survey is a particularly valuable tool, and it is being used in merger analysis and 
antitrust litigation. Designing a discrete choice survey requires careful consideration of a 
number of complex factors such as the range of product options to be  included in the 
survey, respondent burden, and sampling, but if done properly, the result can be data 
that provide insight into the nature of consumer demand that otherwise would remain 
unobserved (Meyer, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2.  The European Commission Competition’s approach 
 
This section focuses on substitutability between high speed rail and air transport. As 
emerged from the literature review about EC competition cases, the substitutability has 
been identified always in cases of airlines merger. 
The review of the EC competition cases has identified the following cases: 
 COMP/M.3770 – Lufthansa-SIWSS (2005); 
 COMP/A.38.477/D2 - British Airways/SN Brussels Airlines (2003); 
 COMP/M.3280 – Air France/KLM (2004); 
 COMP/37730 – Lufthansa/Austrian airlines (2002); 
 COMP/M.3940 - Lufhtansa/Eurowings (2005); 
 COMP/M.6447 - IAG/BMI (2004); 
 COMP/M.5655 - SNCF/LCR/EUROSTAR (2004); 
 COMP/M.5830 - Olympic/Aegean Airlines (2004). 
Only the first four cases were reported in detail. 
 
 
3.2.3.4. Definition of the relevant market  
 
For airline merger: 
To establish the relevant market in air transport cases, the EC competition has 
developed the so-called “point of origin/point of destination” (O&D) pair appro ach. 
According to this approach, every combination of a point of origin and a point of 
destination should be considered a separate market from the customer’s viewpoint. To 
establish whether there is competition on an O&D market, the EC looks at the different 
transport possibilities in that market, that is, not only at the direct flights between the 
two airports concerned, but also, to the extent that they are substitutable to these direct 
flights, at other alternatives. These alternatives may be direct flights between the 
airports whose respective catchment areas significantly overlap with the catchment 
areas of the airports concerned at each end, indirect flights between the airports 
concerned, or other means of transport such as road, train (in particular, HSR) or sea. 
Whether one of those alternatives is substitutable to the direct route depends on a 
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multiplicity of factors, such as the total travel time, frequency and the price of the 
different alternatives. 
 
Time-sensitive vs. non-time sensitive passengers 
 
The EC further distinguishes between time-sensitive and non-time sensitive customers. 
The EC has found that passengers travelling on unrestricted tickets (time sensitive 
passengers with a need for flexibility) may be in a different market from passenge rs 
with restricted tickets (non-time sensitive), which are more interested in the price than 
the frequency and accept longer journey times. For the first group, time is of the essence, 
either as regards the need to ensure a minimum travel time or the need to travel at a 
precise time of the day and not at any other given moment, or both. Also, certain time-
sensitive passengers may need to book a flight at short notice or require flexibility (the 
possibility to miss one flight and book onto the next). Time-sensitive passengers are 
willing to pay a premium to have their requirements satisfied. On the contrary, for non -
time sensitive passengers, savings on the price of the trip have priority over time 
constraints and flexibility. The distinction between business and leisure travellers does 
not necessarily coincide with the difference between time-sensitive and non time-
sensitive passengers. For example, leisure travellers going to their destination for a 
week-end or city trip will prefer not to spend a substantial part of their leisure time 
travelling in more time consuming means of transport. Nevertheless, it can be used as a 
proxy. Therefore, the EC considers the existence of two distinct markets for time-
sensitive and non time-sensitive passengers when assessing the proposed merger’s 
impact on competition on the different routes. This can only be decided on a route -by-
route basis.  
 
Substitutability of indirect flight with direct flights on short-haul routes and long haul 
routes 
 
In the past, the EC has considered that on short-haul city pairs indirect flights do not 
provide a significant competitive constraint on direct services. However, this  has to be 
examined on a case-by-case basis. In exceptional circumstances, indirect flights could 
exert a certain competitive constraint over direct flights. This is the case of some of the 
routes affected by the present transaction where a significant number of time-sensitive 
passengers even prefer the indirect service to the direct one. This is due to the 
inadequacy of the direct flight to meet the specific requirements of time sensitive 
passengers, namely a high number of frequencies allowing the completion of a roundtrip 
in a day. 
 
 
Substitutability of airports 
 
Airport substitutability has to be looked at both from the demand and the supply side. 
From the demand side, passengers who begin or end their journey in a catchment area 
of two or more airports can choose from and to which airport they wish to fly. On the 
supply side, i.e. from the perspective of airlines providing the transport service, the 
substitutability of airports depends on their passengers’ needs, but also on the kind of 
service they wish to provide, on the particular ground services provided by the airport 
and on the airline’s existing activities. A network carrier which provides significant 
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connecting and feeder services has different needs at the airport than a low cost carrier 
providing mainly point-to-point services. 
 
 
3.2.3.5. Review of the EC cases 
 
 
COMP/M.3770 – Lufthansa-SIWSS (2005) 
 
Summary: 
The EC competition confirmed the substitutability between air transport and high speed 
rail on the Zurich-Frankfurt and Zurich-Munich routes only for non-time sensitive 
passengers. 
 
 
1) Zurich-Frankfurt route: 
 
Air transport system:  
Lufthansa airlines and SWISS airlines = 400.000/500.000 pax/year (400.000 L 
Lufthansa, 100.000 SWISS). 
They are the only two airlines to offer direct flight with a frequency of 7 and 5 return 
flight/day with a total travel time of 2 hours and 45 minutes (one way – city center to 
city center). 
 
HSR system: 
Deutsche Bahn=160.000 pax/year. 
Deutsche Bahn offered a frequency of 5 non-stop HSR/day and additional trains/day 
with a total travel time of 3 hours and 51 minutes (one way – city center to city 
center)34. 
 
Lufthansa and SWISS have argued that the Deutsche Bahn HSR service provided a 
competitive constrain for both time and non-time sensitive passengers on the route. 
However, the EC investigation has shown that DB may only be considered an effective 
competitor for non-time sensitive passengers. The EC Competition’s investigation has also 
shown that DB will continue to exert a competitive pressure on the parties post-merger 
for these passengers. The longer travel time by train may in such cases be outweighed 
by lower ticket prices. The situation for time-sensitive O&D passengers appears to be 
different. With regard to this passenger type, Deutsche Bahn’s competitive position is 
burdened by a travelling time which is one hour longer in each direction and due to a 
smaller number of daily non-stop frequencies (5 daily non-stop connections against 12 
hypothetical direct flights by the parties). Moreover, Deutsche Bahn service does not 
allow for a typical business return trip within the same day. If a time-sensitive 
passenger, for instance, has to attend a morning meeting in one of the two cities the 
earliest arrival time of a non-stop train in Zurich is 10:58 (at train station) compared to 
7:45 at Zurich airport. The respective arrival times in Frankfurt are 9:53 (train station) 
                                                                 
34 Assuming travelling time from Frankfurt city centre to Frankfurt airport of 25 minutes, 45 minute 
check-in time, flight time 55-65 minutes, clearing passport control and other terminal related procedures  
of 15 minutes and travelling of 25 minutes to Zurich city centre.  
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and 8:05 (airport). Lufthansa and SWISS argue that even if a certain number of time-
sensitive passengers would have a clear preference for early arrival times or certain 
peak hours, they would not be in a position to identify these customers 35 and hence 
could not price-discriminate against these passengers. This argument might be cogent, if 
at least a small but significant number of time-sensitive passengers would consider train 
services to be a competitive alternative on this route. 
A price comparison shows that whilst restricted economy class fares of the airlines are 
comparable to Deutsche Bahn’s second class fares, fully flexible tickets of Lufthansa and 
Swiss are more than twice as expensive as Deutsche Bahn’s first class tickets.  
The market investigation has further shown that other network carriers are not 
interested in operating any direct flights on this city pair in the short to medium term. In 
fact, there exist a number of entry barriers that prevent the emergence of competition 
from low-cost and regional carriers (i.e., Zurich and Frankfurt airports are slot 
constrained).  
 
 
2) Zurich-Munich route: 
 
Air transport system:  
Lufthansa and SWISS=200.000/300.000 pax/year. Pre-merger Lufthansa and Swiss offer 
6 and 5 daily frequencies. In April 2005 Denim Airways started 5 weekly services 
between Zurich and Augsburg Airport, which the Lufthansa and SWISS airlines consider 
substitutable to Munich airport. However, these services are no longer offered since 
June 2005. 
 
HSR system: 
Deutsche Bahn=80.000/120.000 pax/year. 
Deutsche Bahn offers 4 daily non-stop HSR connections and a number of one stop 
connections.  
 
The parties consider their services to be under significant competitive pressure from the 
HSR service offered by Deutsche Bahn. The market investigation has, however, clearly 
shown that the train is not an alternative to time-sensitive passengers. The fastest non-
stop HSR connection takes 4 hours 14 minutes compared to 55-65 minutes for a direct 
flight. In terms of total travel time HSR services take 4 hours 20 minutes compared to 3 
hours 20 minutes36 if flying (city-centre to city-centre). HSR services on this route also 
do not appear to cater for typical one day business return trips. In case a time -sensitive 
passenger has to attend a morning meeting in one of the two cities, the earliest arrival 
time of a non-stop train in Zurich is 12:28 compared to 8:40 (at airport) for air travel. 
The respective arrival times in Munich are 8:05 (airport) and 11:58 (train station).  
The market investigation has shown that as the case of Frankfurt-Zurich, time-sensitive 
passengers do not consider the train service offered by DB on this route to be a 
competitive alternative to the services offered by the parties. This despite significant 
                                                                 
35 It wasn’t possible for operators identify these passengers since unrestricted tickets can be used at any 
time.  
36 Assuming travelling time from Munich city centre to Munich airport of 50 minutes, 45 minute check -in 
time, flight time 55-65 minutes, clearing passport control and other terminal related procedures of 15 
minutes and travelling of 25 minutes to Zurich city centre.  
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differences in price. Again, the HSR service can be considered to provide a competitive 
constraint on the parties services for non-time sensitive passengers. Corporate customers 
and travel agents indeed assert that non-time sensitive business and leisure travelers 
are using Deutsche Bahn as well as air services on this city pair. 
Airport substitutability between Munich and Augsburg has also been argued by the 
parties37.  
According to the EC competition, since time-sensitive passengers did not consider HSR 
services to be a competitive alternative to air travel on the Munich-Zurich city pair and 
the airport of Augsburg is not an alternative to Munich for this type of passengers, the 
transaction leads to a merger to monopoly on the Munich-Zurich route. 
The airports of Munich and Zurich airport are slot-constrained at least during peak 
hours, which render market entry difficult. Moreover, potential entrants are confronted 
with a number of additional market entry barriers. The market investigation revealed 
that no international network carrier is interested in entering the route. Low-cost and 
regional carriers which showed an interest in starting operations on this route highlight 
a number of market entry barriers, particularly slot scarcity at both airports. 
 
 
 
 
COMP/A.38.477/D2 - British Airways/SN Brussels Airlines (2003) 
 
Summary: 
The EC competition confirmed the substitutability between air transport and high speed 
rail on the London-Brussels rout for both time and non-time sensitive passengers. 
 
 
1) London-Brussels route: 
 
Air transport system: 
– BA operated 7 frequencies a day on Brussels-LHR on weekdays (reduced service at 
weekends). It intended to add one frequency for summer 2003 as a result of the alliance 
(i.e. to accommodate an increasing number of connecting passengers originating in 
Brussels). It also intended to use larger aircraft. BA also operated 2 daily services on 
Brussels-LGW on weekdays (one on Sundays). 
– SN/Virgin Express: originally, SN was code sharing with Virgin Express on 9 daily 
frequencies (SN operated seven of these and Virgin the remaining two). The code share 
terminated in October 2002 and Virgin Express ceased operation as from 27 October.  
– SN/VLM: in March 2002, SN and VLM started code sharing on the Brussels-London-
City route, which was operated by VLM (5 daily frequencies on weekdays and 2 on 
                                                                 
37 The distance between Munich airport and Munich city centre is approximately 30 km, while Augsburg is 
67 km from Munich. Therefore, the parties maintain that Augsburg airport offers an attractive and 
competitive alternative for all non-time sensitive passengers and even for time-sensitive passengers.  
However, Augsburg airport only suits relatively small aircraft due to runway limitations. The market 
investigation has also shown that time-sensitive passengers  do not consider Munich as substitutabl e by  
Augsburg. For non-time sensitive passengers the question can be left open since the train provides  
competitive services on this route. Therefore, no conclusion is necessary as regards airport 
substitutability between Munich and Augsburg for these passengers. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
61 
 
Sundays). These arrangements terminated in 30 March 2003, as VLM has concluded a 
code-share agreement with Virgin express. 
– VLM/Virgin Express: on 31 January 2003, the two airlines reached a code share 
agreement on the Brussels-London City route, which is to enter into force on 30 March 
2003. 
– Bmi: as of May 2001, bmi code shares on this route with Lufthansa (and, to a lesser 
extent with Air New Zealand). It operates 7 daily frequencies (reduced service at 
weekends) from LHR. 
–Ryanair: it entered the route (London Stansted-Charleroi Brussels) South in April 2001. 
In summer 2001, Ryanair accounted for [between 15 and  25%] of all point to point 
airline passengers between London and Brussels and this with 18 weekly frequencies. It 
now operates 28 weekly frequencies. The parties consider that other no frills such as 
Easyjet/Go and Buzz are potential entrants on this route. 
 
HSR system: 
– Eurostar services: Eurostar operates 8 daily frequencies Brussels and London 
(Waterloo). The parties argued that over the last few years, Eurostar has been 
increasing its share of point-to-point leisure and business traffic to the detriment of 
airlines. The parties explain that since its opening in 1996, Eurostar has been increasing 
its share of point-to-point leisure and business traffic to the detriment of airlines (BA’s 
share of point-to-point business traffic has fallen from [25-35%] in 1996 to [15- 25%].  
 
The parties argue that it shows that Eurostar has competed with airlines for both 
business and leisure traffic. From the market test, the EC competition found that 
Eurostar was considered as a valid alternative to travel by air for non-time sensitive, as 
well as for a great majority of time-sensitive passengers.  
 
EC competition investigated whether there could be time windows where travel by air 
would be the only realistic option available. This could primarily affect business  
passengers travelling out of London. The first Eurostar indeed leaves London at 06:53 
and arrives in Brussels at 10:37, which makes early meetings in Brussels difficult. By 
comparison, the first SN flight leaves LHR at 06.45 and arrives in Brussels National 
airport at 08:50. The first BA flight leaves LHR at 07.10 and arrives in Brussels National 
airport at 09:30. As regards late finishes in London, the last Eurostar is equivalent to the 
last flight. The last Eurostar for Brussels indeed leaves London Waterloo at 19:27. By 
comparison, there is a SN flight leaving London for Brussels at 19:30.12. Timetables are 
more convenient out of Brussels, at least for departure in the morning. The first train 
leaves Brussels at 07:01 and arrives in London at 08:50, which allows early meetings.  The 
last train to leave Brussels for London is at 19:57, which remains quite early. By 
comparison, the last flights operated by the parties leave Brussels at 20:35 (SN) and 
21:30 (BA). 
 
In addition, a growing number of business passengers are using the services provided by 
Ryanair between London Stansted and Charleroi and the constraint they exercise on the 
parties is consequently increasing, even if it might be doubtful whether it is sufficient for 
the moment. 
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The parties stated: 
- they are not able to price discriminate against customers for whom this time-window 
is important. They charge a single price for unrestricted tickets, which by definition 
can be used at any time of day. They would therefore be unable to exploit any 
perceived advantage over Eurostar, as an unrestricted passenger pays the same price 
regardless of whether he wishes to travel in any time-window. Since most flights 
operate within time windows for which Eurostar is clearly equally convenient to the 
plane, the parties argue that that price is constrained by competition from Eurostar. 
- the parties explain that due to shorter transfer and check-in times38, the time-
windows are very short, or even non-existent, and critical only to a small number of 
passengers. Very few flights therefore offer any material timing advantage over 
Eurostar. In addition, the parties explain that in September 2003, the journey time 
between London and Brussels will be reduced by 20 minutes to 2 hours 25 minutes , 
thereby reducing further any time-window in which flights confer on passengers a 
material advantage over Eurostar. 
- the parties underscore that Eurostar could choose to operate trains within any time-
windows, as it can easy alter the times of its trains. Eurostar is therefore free to add 
an earlier departure from London or a later service from Brussels in the evening. 
They give the example of Eurostar’s service between London and Paris (which 
departs from London at 5:15 am and arrives at Paris Nord at 9:23).  
 
 
COMP/M.3280 – Air France/KLM (2004)  
 
Summary: 
The EC competition confirmed the substitutability between air transport and high speed 
rail on the Paris-Amsterdam route only for non-time sensitive passengers. 
 
1) Paris-Amsterdam routes: 
 
Air transport system: 
On this city pair, compete directly with each other Air France and KLM airlines 
connected the respective hubs operating seven daily frequencies. More than 1 million air 
pax/year (including transfer). Flight travelling time was about 3 h 20 minutes (city-
centre to city-centre). 
 
HSR system: 
Thalys carries several hundred thousand passengers between Paris Gare du Nord  and 
Amsterdam Central. Thalys, a joint-venture between the French and Belgian national 
railways SNCF and SNCB, operates 6 daily frequencies between Paris and Amsterdam 
with a travelling time of 4 h 9 minutes (one direction). As of 2007, it is expected that the 
new infrastructure of the High Speed Line between Brussels and Amsterdam will enable 
Thalys to reduce its overall travel time between Amsterdam and Paris to about 3 hours. 
The investigation has shown that for the time being, Thalys can be considered an effective 
competitor for non-time sensitive passengers. If one takes into account both air and rail 
travel, on the basis of data provided by Thalys and the parties for 2002, the combined 
market share of Air France/KLM for non-time sensitive O&D passengers is below [45-
                                                                 
38 Only 15 minutes for business passengers as from September 2002.  
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55%]. The situation appeared to be different for time-sensitive passengers. With regard 
to this passenger group, Thalys was handicapped due to a travelling time which is 
almost one hour longer in each direction and due to a smaller number of  frequencies (6 
daily frequencies against 14 operated by the parties). Even if one considered that all first 
class Thalys passengers were time sensitive, the parties still would had a very high 
market share for O&D time-sensitive passengers. Most likely, however, a significant part 
of Thalys first class passengers were not very time-sensitive as they can accept more 
than two hours additional travelling time (both directions) and less frequencies. For the 
time being, Thalys does not allow for a typical business return trip within the same day.  
Also a price comparison showed that the competitive constraint of Thalys was limited to 
non-time sensitive passengers. While the fares of the airlines were similar to those of 
Thalys for economy class, non-restricted tickets of Air France and KLM were more than 
twice as expensive as Thalys’ business class tickets. This conclusion was also supported 
by the market investigation, in particular by corporate customers and travel agencies,  
which do not consider Thalys to be a competitor for time-sensitive customers at this  
stage. However, this may change with the possible introduction by 2007 of a new high-
speed link between Brussels and Amsterdam, which will result in a reduction in  the total 
journey time of one hour, and if Thalys adds additional frequencies. 
The market investigation had furthermore confirmed that other network carriers were 
not interested in operating on this city pair. As regards competition from low-cost and 
regional carriers, there exist a number of entry barriers. 
 
 
COMP/37730 – Lufthansa/Austrian airlines (2002)  
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement 
 
Summary: 
The EC competition confirmed the substitutability between air transport and high speed 
rail on the Paris-Amsterdam route only for non-time sensitive passengers. 
 
1) Salzburg-Munich & Linz-Munich routes: 
 
The Parties have argued that on the Austrian-German market, road and rail offer 
alternative transport options for distances of up to 600 km. 
 
The Table below shows a series of factors that are relevant for the routes involved in 
this case. According to these data, the travelling time from city centre to city centre by 
car or train is comparable to the time taken by air only for the Salzburg-Munich and 
Linz-Munich routes. For Vienna-Munich, the time difference is more than two hours and 
car or train travel increases the travelling time by more than 70%. In the case of a return 
trip, the additional travelling time would be more than four hours. This did not seem to 
be an alternative for time-sensitive customers. It can be an alternative only for a limited 
number of non-time-sensitive travellers. 
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Moreover, a prices comparison showed the extent of competition between the different 
modes. A comparison of a business-class air ticket with a first-class rail ticket and an Air-
PEX ticket with a second-class rail ticket reveals that air travel in general was more than 
twice as expensive as travelling by train (the difference in price was also significant if 
the comparison was between air travel and car travel). This conflicted with the Parties’ 
assertion that alternative transport modes compete with air transport. If this were the 
case, one would expect prices to converge or, if prices of alternative transport modes 
were too low for airlines to match, no air transport to be offered. A price comparison did 
not, therefore, supported the Parties’ view that air transport and other means of 
transport form one and the same market. 
It can therefore be concluded that, as a rule, other means of transport do not offer an 
alternative for time-sensitive travellers on direct routes between Austria and Germany. 
Apart from considerations of journey time and comfort, however, they may do so for 
non-time-sensitive travelers (Salzburg-Munich and Linz-Munich routes). On short-haul 
routes between Austria and Germany, competition can also be promoted to a limited 
extent by intermodal services for non-time-sensitive travelers.  
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At the request of a railway or other surface transport company, the Parties must enter 
into an intermodal agreement whereby they provide passenger air transport on their 
services between Austria and Germany as part of an intermodal service. 
 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The investigation power f the IAA is an essential tool for an ex-post intervention in the 
market. In both transport markets analyzed, the IAA has been more active especially 
during and after the liberalization transport market (and mainly in the aviation market). 
This is due mainly to a different market structure and dynamism compared to rail 
transport. Given the monopolistic characteristics of both markets, the IAA has focused 
primarily their interventions against AoDP and merger anti-competitive conducts. 
Agreements/cartels restricting competition played a marginal role for both transport 
markets.  
This analysis shows that often are the same operators (frequently with a dominant 
position in the market – i.e., FS Holding, AdR, SEA, Alitalia, etc.) to keep an anti-
competitive behaviour. Moreover, IAA investigations have highlighted additional critical 
aspects in prevent competition, summarizing mainly in:  
 the process of slot allocation; 
 the regulatory uncertainty (i.e., “delibera CIPE n. 86/2000”); 
 the fee of centralized air services are defined by airport operator in a non-
transparent way; 
 Extra-long airport concessions. 
The second part of this chapter reported a review of the EC competition intervention on 
substitutability between HSR and air transport. Several cases are detailed, highlighting 
the differences between the two types of transport services. Overall, according to the EC 
these two modes are substitute mainly for non-time sensitive passengers, while the 
excessive travel time and low frequency of HSR services and the difference in price of 
the first class ticket, make substitutability more complicated for time-sensitive 
passengers.  
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4. Modelling air and rail transport competition 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the theoretical model of air and HSR competition for long-distance 
passenger market is presented. Before going into the details, a synthetic overview of the 
main air and HSR characteristics is reported.  
In order to characterize the type of operator for each transport market, their profit 
functions (which consist of revenues less costs) was defined. The revenues depend on 
market share, which is a function of several items such as price (price to travel from i   to 
j  ), frequency of service, and average travel time from origin city center to destination 
city center of the individual operator and all competitors in the market.  
 
 
4.2. Air and HSR advantages 
 
Janić (1993) reported a detailed list of advantages for each transport mode considered. 
In particular, respect to air travel, HSRs provide mainly a better frequency for transport 
units with larger capacity, an high level of regularity (minimal delay), an high degree of 
reliability in realizing schedules (no sensibility to weather conditions), a high physical 
accessibility to its passengers (locations of HSR station in the city centre), a better and 
more complete in-journey service (comfort, friendliness, food & drink services, 
possibility to socialize etc.), a high probability to find an available seat, an high degree of 
safety and competitive fares. Moreover, HSR system reduces total costs due to scope and 
scale economies (Adler, 2001). On the contrary, airlines offer a better capacity on 
specific routes (greater frequency in a given time unit using larger aircraft), improve 
traffic regularity (scheduled flights), better cabin service and competitive fares. 
Passengers can chose between different transport mode alternatives. This choice is 
based on the importance  of specific attributes (related to the features of transport 
service and operators). Travel time and cost are the main factors affecting users’ choice. 
They are macro-attributes and it is possible to separate them, respectively, in waiting 
time, access time, egress time, in-vehicle travel time, out-of-vehicle travel time, and for 
fare, access cost, egress cost and ticket cost. Moreover, a different importance is due to 
the type of users: business or leisure. Usually, business passengers are time sensitive, 
while leisure passengers are cost sensitive.  
 
4.3. Costs function 
 
Cost functions are presented for both air and HSR transport operators, passenger and 
for the whole system of connections. The cost element is a function of plane or train size, 
measured in the number of seats
kaS  , frequency, distance and other parameters, such as 
infrastructure charges and taxes. 
Swan and Adler (2006) found that great circle distance, 
ijGCD , and the number of seats 
on an aircraft, 
kaS , are the two main factors affecting aircraft trip costs.  The following 
equation gives the cost function for short and medium-haul markets.  
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ij
ij
$0.019 (GCD 722)( 104)
$0.0115 (GCD 2200)( 211)
  
  
short
ka ka
long
ka ka
C S
C S   
Low cost carriers save money due to faster turnaround times and lower airport charges 
due to the use of smaller and secondary airport and lower marketing costs due to 
greater reliance on online services. HSR operators enjoy greater freedom and serve 
more markets but suffer from a higher cost structure than low cost carriers competitors. 
The HSR cost function consists of a rolling stock cost, operating cost per train kilometre 
and access charge for infrastructure use per train kilometre: 
Eq. 2: 
 
 
 
 
where:  
 
r , is the HSR operator; 
S , is the number of seats per train; 
RS , is the fixed cost of purchasing a single 450 seat train amortized; 
oc
k , is the operating cost per train kilometer per leg k ;  
ac
k , is the access charge per train kilometer per leg k . 
 
The first part of the formula computes the rolling stock capital investment, while the 
second one determines the variable costs of running an high speed train as a function of 
the distance travelled (in terms of operating costs and access charges). 
Janić (1993) reports that passenger’ cost function on the routes ij  for both transport 
modes considered could be computed in two different ways depending of the type 
connections. 
The passenger’ cost function for a system characterized by nodes ( i  and j ) directly 
connected is computed in the following way: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where: 
T  , is the time interval; 
TM  , is the transport mode; 
 , is the average unit-time value of passenger schedule; 
 , is the average unit-time value of passenger line-haul schedule (i.e., in-vehicle travel 
time); 
 ,  F T TM , is the frequency of service in the time interval T and for the transport mode 
TM ; 
 L TM  is the length of route for transport modes TM ; 
  S L TM  is the average speed of transport unit en route  L TM ; 
( )
( , ) ( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )
,
  
                 
 
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 ,  D T TM  is the delay for each departure (F(T, TM)) en route  L TM ; 
   Fare L TM  is the average one-way fare on route  L TM . 
 
In the case with indirectly connections between nodes, instead, the passenger’ cost 
function is summarized as follows: 
 
 
 
From an engineering point of view, Janić (1993) suggests also a system cost function. 
This approach take into account the network structure of both air and HSR system. He 
assumes that each transport mode is composed by a number of nodes i  and links 
between them.  
 
 
 
 
 
where 
 
1, ;
( , )
0, ;

 

ij
if thenodes i j aredirectly linked
T TM is
if thenodes i j areindirectly linked
   
 
 
 
 
4.4. Profit function 
 
The following equation shows the generalized profit function for the different operators 
(a). 
 
 
 
 
where 
Mijsa  is the market share of demand between  ,i j  for traveler type s  with operator a  ; 
TTTija  is the total trip time from center of city i  to center of city j with operator a ; 
TPijsa  is the total price to travel from center of city i to that of city j for traveler type s ; 
with operator a ; 
dij  is the maximum potential demand from i to j ; 
a  is the environmental charge paid by operator a  to government; 
a  is the 100 - tax % on profits paid to government by operator a , if profits are positive.  
 
 Market share, the maximal Origin-destination demand matrix and prices determine 
revenue function. In particular, market share is a function of the frequency, generalized 
trip time and total price of the various alternatives available from origin i to destination 
j . 
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
, , ,
 
   
ij ih hjU T TM U T TM U T TM
for i j i h j h ij N
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4.5. Market share model 
 
Passengers choose between different alternatives of transport modes, evaluating, for 
instance, the total travel time, the total travel price and the frequency of services that 
maximize their utility. Utility is composed by a deterministic and random part. The 
passenger’s utility function, based on Maximum Utility Theory, is reported in following 
equation. 
 
 
where:  
n  are the coefficients estimated of the different attributes considered; 
TTT  is the total travel time from city center i  to city center j  with operatora ; 
TTC   is the total travel cost from city center i  to city center j  with operatora ; 
kaF  is the frequency of service on leg k via operator a ; 
min ( )kaLn F  is the logarithmic form of the service frequency. 
 
Logarithmic form of the service frequency is preferable because “one would expect 
diminishing returns with respect to the gain in service  attractiveness from adding 
additional flights” (Hansen, 1990)39. 
Detailed evaluation of the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model is provided in Moshe Ben-
Akiva and Lerman (1985). In fact, depending on the assumption made on the error 
component of the utility function the market share could be calculated in different ways 
using different models: MNL, NMNL, ML (Moshe Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985).  
The simplest and most used case is reported below. The modal share is calculated with a 
MNL model: 
 
 
 
 
 
Small and Rosen (1982) provide a detailed methodological account of welfare economic 
computation with respect to discrete choice modelling. 
 
 
 
 
where: 
 
kaE   are the environmental costs produced per flight/train trip on leg k  per operatora  ; 
k  is an exogenous access charge paid by rail operator to infrastructure manager per leg 
k ; 
kK  are the maintenance costs to maintain rail track per leg k ; 
kFC  is the ficed cost upgrading track to high speed standards. 
 
                                                                 
39 For further details see Adler (2005) 
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4.6. Conclusion 
 
The theoretical model of competition between air and HSR passenger is detailed.  
Generally, to analyze market competition the supply and demand sides should both be 
considered in order to recover equilibrium outcomes. However, because of the 
impossibility of collect data on the supply side for researchers, only market demand is 
usually analyzed, as in this research. In fact, these data are gathered through time 
demanding and costly questionnaire surveys, each of them being specific to the city-pair 
under consideration, as well as the category of consumers. Market demand is derived 
from a general class of discrete choice models of consumer behaviour. This chapter 
reports an overview of the cost function, the profit function and the market share model 
for both type of transport modes considerate.  
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5. Discrete choice analysis of air-rail transport competition: a literature review   
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5.1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of modal choice is a consolidate topic of transport issue that since the '70s 
has attracted the attention of many researchers. The liberalization and deregulation 
process, growing need for environmental sustainability, transport infrastructure 
congestion and the HSR development, have increased the relevance of this topic 
(Barrett, 2000; Valeri, 2010a). There is a well-established literature that analyses many 
aspects of transport choice (both for passengers and for freight). 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the most important studies carried 
out to analyse air and rail transport mode choice. Behavioural and disaggregate choice 
models are considered. These disaggregate models are ideally suited to the analysis of 
competition between modes, because they are based on individuals’ choices between competing 
alternatives, and choice models that have examined competition between rail and air are 
reviewed. These models provide cross-elasticities showing how improvements to rail services 
impact on air travel, and vice-versa, and they can also be used to forecast rail and air market 
shares under a variety of future scenarios (Wardman et al., 2002).  
A description of each case study is not provided. This literature review was given with 
reference to the most important aspects for the definition and implementation of a SP 
and RP survey. Instead, this strategy was adopted in order to collect relevant useful 
elements to plan the Ro-Mi case study (chapter 7). 
 
As reported in others studies (Capon, Longo, & Santorini, 2003; Wardman, Bristow, 
Toner, & Tweddle, 2002), the literature review is developed on the following key 
aspects: 
 Type of data collected; 
 Geographical area of study; 
 Modes covered; 
 Attributes covered; 
 Place and method of administration of the interviews; 
 Number of interviews administered; 
 Econometric model used. 
 
In the international literature it is possible to find different types of studies: numerous 
peer-review papers published in the international journals that present a single case 
study or a literature review, PhD thesis (Cokasova, 2006; Khan, 2007; Miyoshi, 2007), 
and different types of reports (European Commission, 1996; European Commission DG 
TREN, 2006; Wardman, et al., 2002). 
Table 14 and Table 15 show two examples of a literature review about disaggregate mode 
choice models. For a focus on a recent and selected literature review on intercity mode 
choice see Valeri (2010b). 
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Table 14 - Example of mode choice literature review: Barff, Mackay, and Olshavsky (1982) 
 
Source: Barff, et al. (1982) 
 
Table 15 - Example of mode choice literature review: Capon, et al. (2003) 
 
Source: Capon, et al. (2003)  
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5.2. Research aspects reviewed 
 
5.2.1. Type of data collected 
 
The attractions and shortcomings of RP models based on actual choices and SP models 
based on hypothetical choices were discussed in section 6.1.  
The analysis of the competition between rail and air transport is one area where RP 
models has maintained a strong presence. The main reasons for this are: 
 The availability of data on travellers’ actual choices from routinely conducted 
surveys of long distance travel; 
 The projects being evaluated, such as high speed lines and new fixed links, are  
sufficiently important to warrant the resources necessary for extensive RP 
modelling. 
Indeed, such large scale investments demand that the revenue projections have the 
firmest possible basis in what individuals actually do.  
However, SP has had an important role to play, leading not only to the standalone SP 
models typical of urban and inter-urban mode choice studies but also to an atypical 
proportion of joint RP-SP models. The attractions of SP in this context are: 
 In many cases, new competition to air stems from an essentially new alternative, such  
as a HSR which offers journey times not currently experienced or what is effectively a 
new service resulting from significant infrastructure improvements such  as a new 
fixed link. Therefore, RP data does not exist or is far from ideal for modelling strong 
competition between rail and air; 
 The SP methods collect more data per person. This means more precise estimates can 
be obtained for a given data collection cost or data collection costs can be reduced for 
a given level of precision; 
 The SP approach is better suited to the analysis of complex attributes, such as travel 
time reliability, and to what are termed ‘secondary’ variables which are aspects of 
service quality not directly related to the timetable (such as comfort, on-board and at-
terminus facilities and services, safety and security);  
 The RP approach requires the users of all the modes in question to be surveyed. If  the 
study is being conducted for a rail operator, or a sponsor interested in examining  the 
potential for HSR to abstract traffic from air, it is quite understandable that airport 
authorities and airlines are reluctant to allow access to air passengers. The costs of 
contacting sufficient air users to develop robust RP models can then be prohibitive. 
There is a general feeling that SP data validates reasonably well against RP data in terms 
of the implied values of time in a number of different contexts (J.J. Louviere, Hensher, & 
Swait, 2000). However, most experts feel that using SP models as standalone forecasting 
tools is less strong and powerful than RP models (this is can due for instance to the scale 
factor problem). In the  air and rail competition context, Oscar Faber (1995) used both 
RP and SP data to analyses mode choice. He found that the SP coefficients were, on 
average, half of RP coefficients and hence the SP model would produce forecasts 
somewhat nearer to 0.5 (in this binary choice context) than would the RP model. Given 
that the RP model was in this context based on a sound choice context, where travellers 
were aware of the two alternatives and the choice between them offered trade -offs 
amongst attributes, and hence can be taken as a reliable guide to business travellers 
actual preferences, it is a little alarming that the SP model would produce somewhat 
different forecasts. In contrast, however, the study reported by J.J. Louviere, et al. (2000) 
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finds the scale of coefficients in RP and SP models to be broadly similar and hence there 
would be essentially no difference between RP and SP based forecasts. 
 
 
5.2.2.  Geographical area of study 
 
With reference to the area analysed the literature review shows that UK, Spain, Canada 
and Australia have been the most studied areas. To a lesser extent studies are found also 
in the following areas: Japan, Sweden, Taiwan and Chile. 
 
 
5.2.3.  Modes covered 
 
Mode choice models effectively take two forms. They are either comprehensive in 
nature, covering all the modes available, or else they deal just with those modes which 
are of interest to the study (hich here would be the choice between rail and air  
transport).  
The former type of model is necessary where demand forecasts are required for all 
modes, as would be the case if a broader social cost-benefit appraisal of a transport 
scheme is being conducted. There is also a need in RP models to consider all modes in 
order to obtain a satisfactory explanation of choices, particularly if air users are not just  
choosing between air and rail and rail transport modes. 
If, however, the objective is only in say how many travellers can be abstracted from air 
by a HSR service, an SP exercise can be presented which offers choices between rail and 
air options and, unlike RP models, these can be focussed on the users of one particular 
mode.  
From Table 14 emerges that studies based on SP data report almost exclusively a binary 
choice form (containing just air and rail). Instead, studies based on RP data generally 
include three modes or more due to the need to deal all the alternatives in the choice set. 
However, SP models deal with just the two interactions of primary interest 
 
 
5.2.4.  Attributes covered 
 
Each modal alternative is characterized by a set of specific attributes which, appearing 
in the respondents’ utility function of, measure the benefits and costs of a specific 
alternative (Capon, et al., 2003). Generally, attributes are features classified of the level 
of transport service (time, cost, frequency, etc.). As emerge in Table 14 and Table 15, the 
range of variables used is fairly standard. In the context of behavioural patterns related 
to mode choice between air-rail transport, the type of variables considered is pretty 
standard. Most of the studies are based on variables “classic” such as travel time, travel 
cost and the frequency of service. 
As regards the socio-economic variables, income, gender and the size of the city or the 
family who travels are sometimes included in the utility function, but only in the case 
where the database available to allow such a level of detail (Bhat, 1995, 1997, 1998). 
Finally, the most recent studies, especially in the case of SP surveys, there is a growing 
interest in investigating the effects on mode choice of secondary variables (e.g. comfort, 
service reliability, environmental impact) (Carlsson, 1999; Ortúzar & Simonetti, 2008; 
Swait, 2001). For instance, Halcrow Fox (1998) examined whether the award of air 
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miles influenced the choice between rail and air. He found that allowing rail users to be 
accredited with air miles led to a 6.2% increase in the number forecast to switch from 
air to rail.  
 
 
5.2.5.   Place and method of interview administration  
 
The majority of studies carried out their interviews on-board or inside railway 
stations/airports. In these cases, the administration methods were paper and pen 
interviewing (PAPI) and/or computer assisted personal interviewing. However, other 
methods have used over time: Internet electronic survey, computer assisted telephone 
interviewing, electronic mail survey. Finally, Ekbote and Laferrière (1993)Ekbote and 
Laferrière (1993) adopted an innovative method to administer the questionnaire: an 
Interactive Video Interview System. 
 
 
5.2.6.  Number of interviews administered  
 
Sampling strategy depends on many aspects (e.g. objective of the study, the size of the 
population analyzed, the use of specific type of experimental design, the type of data 
used). However, the literature review could be classified in two groups. Those studies 
with the highest number of interviews administered are supported by a large national 
transport operator, Institution or consulting firms40 that financially support the 
investigation. Conversely, where this does not happen, the number of interviews 
conducted was considerably lower, often borne by the researchers themselves. 
 
 
5.2.7.  Econometric model used 
 
The transport mode choice has extensively studied thanks also to the different 
modelling procedures used. In particular, the approach has shifted from aggregate 
approach, to the “unbundled” or “behavioural” one (Abdelwahab, Innes, & Stevens, 
1992; Barff, et al., 1982). Since the ‘70s the behavioural modelling approach has 
attracted the attention of many researchers and has applied to travel behavio ur analysis. 
Initially, this approach has been applied to the study of urban mobility, and only later to 
the study of medium and long-distance travel. 
Kitagawa, Saratchai, and Terabe (2005) analysed the mode choice between HSR and the 
air system in the corridor Keihanshin-Fukuoka (Japan), using the binary logit model. This 
type of model has used to analyse the mode choice between only two modes of 
transportation. To model more than two transport modes, the multinomial logit model  
(MNL) has strongly used. This model has important advantages but requires, however, 
also important restrictions as, for example, those arising from the assumption of the 
properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Ennio Cascetta, 1998). In the 
literature to avoide these restrictions the nested logit model (NL) was proposed. Also 
this type of model has widely used in mode choice studies (García, 2008; Ortúzar & 
Simonetti, 2008; Wen & Koppelman, 2001). A very interesting example  is reported in 
the study of  Romàn, Espino, and Martìn (2007). Recent studies have proposed the use of 
                                                                 
40   For instance the Hague Consulting Group or KPMG. 
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other types of models, such as the heteroscedastic extreme value model  and further 
variations of the model NL (Bhat, 1995; Hensher, 1997). With reference to the 
mentioned models, Bhat (1995) offers an interesting comparison between the estimates 
obtained by these different models, showing that the use of the MNL and NL models 
provide forecasts over optimistic, stressing, therefore, the substantial limitations of 
these models against the use of the HEV model. Finally, Swait (2001) introduces a new 
model belonging to the family of models called GEV choice generation model. 
A theoretical description of these models is reported in section 6.4. 
 
 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter reports a literature review of previous behavioural mode choice studies. 
Different type of studies (paper, PhD thesys, report) and aspects have highlighted. With 
reference to methodological issue specific elements have been highlighted in order to 
plan the Ro-Mi case study. In particular, type of data, attributes and econometric models 
used are detailed.  
The results of this chapter led to: i) the development of a classification framework for 
mode choice studies; ii) the creation of guidelines necessary for the implementation of a 
mode choice survey, and iii) the identification of interesting issues for future analysis. 
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6. Discrete choice analysis of air-rail competition: models and data collection 
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6.1. Introduction 
 
Transport modelling plays a crucial role for transport operators, policy maker and 
transport authorities. Discrete choice models, of the Random Utility Models’ family, have 
been extensively used to analyse travel behaviour for over thirty years.  
The aim of this chapter is to focus on methodological issues, highlighting both models 
and data collection. Particular emphasis is paid on SP data due to the constraints arising 
from their planning process with respect to RP data. 
First of all, a comparison between SP and RP data is detailed, underling respective 
(dis)advantages. Afterwards, the theory of discrete choice models is shown in section 
6.4 (with special attention to the most widely used models), the theory of the 
experimental design in section 6.5, and the methodological guidelines in section 6.6.  
 
 
6.2. Stated and Revealed Preference data 
 
As mentioned in section 5.2.1 there are two types of data used under discrete choice 
investigation: RP and SP data. While RP data contain information on actual choices made 
by individuals, SP data are obtained through an ad hoc interview in which respondents 
are directly asked about their hypothetical choices. 
A synthetic comparison between SP and RP’s (dis)advantages is reported in Table 16. 
Figure 12 shows graphically the difference between SP and RP data. 
 
Table 16 – (Dis)advantages of using SP and RP data 
 
Source: adapted by Sanko (2001) from M. Ben-Akiva (2008) 
 
 
In contrast to RP data, SP data are not obtained from real-life situations but through 
experimental designs with hypothetical situations created by the analyst and 
administered with the questionnaire. Therefore, analysis of SP data overcomes some of 
the problems associated with the analysis of RP data (i.e., measurement errors of 
attributes, multicollinearity, narrow attribute level ranges and the restriction of the 
alternatives to existing alternatives). On the other hand, with SP experiments, the 
alternatives and attributes have to be defined in advance. Therefore, the right definit ion 
of them is crucial to the quality of the model results (Kroes & Sheldon, 1988).  
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Figure 12 – Example of SP and RP data 
 
Source: Sanko (2001) 
 
 
The main advantage of the SP approach is that hypothetical and non-existent 
alternatives can be included in the experiment. Therefore, new methods and inno vations 
can be included in the alternatives and the model results can be used for predictions and 
calculation of future market shares. Furthermore, the personal and environmental 
limitations that might exist in real-life situations from which RP data are collected, can 
be broadened. RP data are observed choices representing the actual behaviour of 
respondents. They can be collected by observing the market, noting down the 
alternatives available to individuals and the choices that are made. The choices that can 
be observed are restricted to the alternatives that are available to the decision maker 
and only choices between existing alternatives can be observed. Hypothetical choice 
situations cannot be tested or analysed with the RP approach. Furthermore, in RP 
survey the individual is restricted by his/her environment and personal constraints. 
Moreover, attribute-level ranges of the alternatives are often quite limited or sometimes 
attribute-levels do not vary between the alternatives at all in real-life choice situations. 
Another important drawback is that some RP attributes (qualitative features: e.g. 
comfort) are perceived by respondents in different ways that cannot be perfectly 
measured. Attributes of RP data are also sometimes correlated; this correlation can be 
avoided by using SP data. 
Finally yet importantly, RP data collection might be difficult. Often, RP data are owned 
by the transport operators that hardly make them available. Finally, only one choice per 
respondent can observed in real-life situations. 
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6.3. Combining Stated and Revealed Preference data sources 
 
A sophisticate analysis for practitioners is to combine a number of datasets (in 
particular, SP and RP combination) when estimating models of discrete choice. However, 
this analysis is not often carried out.  
SP data has several advantages over RP method in the analysis of travel behaviour. The 
main draw-back is that individuals’ SPs may not correspond closely to their actual 
preferences (so called hypothetical bias). However, SP analyses are very powerful to test 
goods or services not yet present in the market.  
Skepticism toward SP data increases when SP data are used to identify market shares. 
The ASCs estimated from the SP data are likely to be behaviourally meaningless while 
those obtained from RP data sources are likely to be substantive behavioural value. In 
fact, for SP data the choice shares will be obtained over a number of hypothetical choice 
sets derived from some underlying experimental design, each of which is given to 
multiple individuals. On the other hand, ASCs acquired from RP data (assuming that the 
sample was randomly drawn and the data itself correctly collected) with or without 
other attributes or socio-economic features should reflect the true choice shares 
observed over the population. 
An important step in combining SP and RP data sources is to verify the magnitude of the 
SP and RP scale parameters (or IV values). If there is difference between the two scale 
parameters, to pool the data is necessary to scale SP data (constructing a new variable in 
RP data by weighting estimated coefficients of X from SP-MNL model). Otherwise, if no 
difference exists (scale parameters are both equal to 1), SP and RP datasets could be 
pooled and used to estimate other choice models. 
 
 
 
6.4. Theory of discrete choice models 
 
Over the past 30 years, discrete choice analysis has played an important role in the 
process of modelling the transport sector’s issue. Discrete choice models have their 
bases in the theory microeconomic consumer and the principle of random utility 
maximization . The random utility models are the most used models for the estimation 
of transport demand  (E. Cascetta & Pappola, 2001). The user’s choice is a “discrete 
choice”, as it is carried out between a finite set of transport alternatives (Domenich & 
McFadden, 1975). Anderson, Palma, and Thiesse (1992) and Jordan J. Louviere, Swait, 
and Hensher (2000) show that the concept of utility is a convenient theoretical device 
that allows to associate an index to specific level of satisfaction to the consumption of a 
particular good/service. The attractiveness of an alternative can be quantitatively 
measured with a set of attributes (Lancaster, 1966). In particular, the user associates, 
for each alternative available, a utility function that translates the level of satisfaction 
generated by the specific alternative (Cherchi, 2003). A rational user with perfect 
discrimination capacity and unlimited capacity of information processing, will choose 
the alternative which possesses the highest degree of utility (Lancaster, 1966). 
McFadden (1981)McFadden (1981)  and Manski (1977b), criticizing the perfect power 
of discrimination and the unlimited capacity of information processing introducing the 
concept of random utility to explain phenomena that might otherwise seem irrational 
claim. In fact, that it is possible that the decision maker changes its choice over time. It is 
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more realistic, therefore, to assume that the choice of an individual, given a specific 
choice set of alternatives, is not unique, but follow a distribution of probability, since it is 
not possible to know and represent precisely the utility perceived by the decision 
maker. It follows that the utility must be specified not only as a function of a 
deterministic component, but also in function of a stochastic component, which 
represents the set of unknown variables (and/or non-observable) of the utility function. 
The probabilistic choice model is reasonably the most suitable to represent the choices 
of individuals. Manski (1977a) identifies four different sources of uncertainties which 
are respectively related to the following issues: attributes are not always observable, 
changes in individuals’ tastes cannot be observed, measurement errors and 
instrumental variables (proxy). Luce (1959) introduced the Independence and Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) axiom, to facilitate the experimental measurement of choice 
probabilities. Combining the ideas of Marschak (1960) and Luce (1959) in a model, 
McFadden (1974) proposed the Multinomial Logit Model (MNL). Discrete choice model 
is a big family.  
In the remainder of this section, the main models used are highlighted and their 
applications to the case study are shown and applied in section 7.4. 
Discrete choice analysis are used to analyse the choice of different actors: consumers, 
households, firms, group of stakeholders etc. Each respondent chooses between 
different choice profiles. Each alternative i  is characterized by a series of attributes jX , 
which in turn are characterized by a range of attribute-levels. Trading-off between 
attributes, the respondent chooses the alternative that maximizes its utility. The utility 
function could be represented as: 
 
 
 
It is also report the previous equation as follows: 
 
 
 
where: 
tmiU  is the net utility for transport mode tm  of the individual i ; 
tmiV  is the systematic component of utility for transport mode tm  of the individual i ; 
tmiE  is the error component of utility for transport mode tm  of the individual i . 
 
With more than one transport mode: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where: 
1tmUA  is the utility of travelling with mode 1tmA ; 
2 3( )tm tmU B C  is the utility of any other travelling mode 2 3( )tm tmB C  in the choice set. 
 
i 1 1 k kU β X .... β X  
tmi tmi tmiU V E 
 
 
 
 
tm1 tm1 tm2
tm2 tm1 tm2
tm3 tm1 tm2
tm1 tm2 tm3
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U
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In term of probability, the probability of person n  choosing transport mode 1 tm1 is: 
 
 
and the probability of choosing alternative 
tm2
is: 
 
  
 
 
6.4.1.  Multinomial Logit model 
 
A decision-maker, labeled n , faces J  alternatives. The utility that the decision maker 
obtains from alternative j  is decomposed into a systematic part labeled Vnj , known by 
the researcher up to some parameters, and an unknown part nj that is treated by the 
researcher as random: Unj  Vnj  nj  j   . The logit model is obtained by assuming 
that each nj  is independently, identically distributed extreme value. The distribution is 
also called Gumbel and type I extreme value. The density for each unobserved 
component of utility is  
 
 
- nj
nj- -
njf
     
 
and the cumulative distribution is  
nj
njF( )= .

 
  
 
The difference between two extreme value variables is distributed logistic. That is, if 
nj and ni  are iid extreme value, then nj ni       follows the logistic distribution 
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The probability that decision-maker n chooses alternative i is 
 ni ni nj njPni  Prob V V   j I i        
  
As  ni is not given, the choice probability is the integral of  |ni niP  over all values of  ni   
weighted by its density:  
 
( )V Vni ni nj ni
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Some algebraic manipulation of this integral result in a succinct, closed form expression: 
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j
e
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which is the logit choice probability.  
 
)U(UPr)(P tm2tm1tm1i 
)(P1)(P tm1itm2i 
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The representative utility is usually specified to be linear in parameters: 
  '  nj njV x , where njx   is a vector of observed variables relating to alternative  j . With 
this specification, the logit probabilities become: 
 
'
'
ni
nj
ni x
j
e
P
e




 
 
Under fairly general conditions, any function can be approximated arbitrarily closely by 
one that is linear in parameters.  
 
The power/limits of the logit models to represent choice behavior can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
1. Logit can represent systematic taste variation (that is, taste variation that relates to 
observed characteristics of the decision maker) but not random taste variation 
(differences in tastes that cannot be linked to observed characteristics).  
2. The logit model implies proportional substitution across alternatives, given the 
researcher’s specification of representative utility. To capture more flexible forms of 
substitution, other models are needed. 
3. If unobserved factors are independent over time in repeated choice situations, then 
logit can capture the dynamics of repeated choice, including state dependence. 
However, logit cannot handle situations where unobserved factors are correlated 
over time. 
The logit model enjoys the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives. For 
any two alternatives i and k , the ratio of the logit probabilities is: 
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/
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This ratio does not depend on any alternatives other than i  and k . That is, the relative 
odds of choosing i over k are the same no matter what other alternatives are available 
or what the attributes of the other alternatives are.  
 
 
6.4.2.  Nested Logit model 
 
 
A Nested Logit model is appropriate when the set of alternatives faced by a decision-
maker can be partitioned into subsets, called nests, in such a way that the following 
properties hold (Train, 2002): 
1. For any two alternatives that are in the same nest, the ratio of probabilities is 
independent of the attributes or existence of all other alternatives. That is, IIA holds 
within each nest. 
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2. For any two alternatives in different nests, the ratio of probabilities can depend on 
the attributes of other alternatives in the two nests. IIA does not hold in general for 
alternatives in different nests. 
 
Williams (1977), in Daly and Zachary (1978), and two studies McFadden (1978); (1981) 
showed that the Nested Logit model is consistent with utility maximization. Let the set 
of alternatives j  be partitioned into K non overlapping subsets denoted 
1,  2,...,  B B BK and called nests. The utility that person n obtains from alternative j  in nest 
Bk  is denoted, as usual, as     Unj Vnj nj  , where Vnj  is observed by the researcher and 
nj is a random variable whose value is not observed by the researcher. The nested logit 
model is obtained by assuming that the vector of unobserved utility,    1,...,   n n nj   , 
has cumulative distribution 
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This distribution is a type of generalized extreme value distribution and it is a 
generalization of the distribution that gives rise to the logit model. This distribution for 
the unobserved components of utility gives rise to the following choice probability for 
alternative   ki B : 
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6.4.3.  Mixed Logit model 
 
The random parameters logit model, also called mixed logit model, is illustrated by 
several authors, including among the most important McFadden and Train (2000). 
Assume each user faces a choice among J  alternatives in each of T choice situations. 
J and T can vary over users. The utility of alternative i  as faced by user n in situation 
t is modelled as:  
 
nitnitnnit XU  
'  
 
where nitX is vector of independent, non-stochastic variables that are observed by the 
researcher, such as the attributes of the alternative i in choice situation t . By contrast, 
the terms n  and nit are not observed by the researcher and considered stochastic. 
Adopting the random utility model hypothesis, customer n is assumed to choose 
alternative i, in choice situation t , having the highest utility or, equivalently, it is 
assumed that the shipper knows the value of his own n  and nit ’s for all j and chooses 
alternative i if and only if  
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
87 
 
ijUU njni  , . 
The coefficient vector, 
n  is assumed to be distributed, independently with distribution 
equal to )/( f where   are the parameters of the distribution in the population, e.g. 
the mean and covariance. Note that the use of the subscript n  indicates that parameters 
are allowed to vary across individuals. Such a specification is useful to capture variation 
in preferences among shippers. Several distributions can be assumed: typically, normal, 
lognormal, triangular, uniform, etc. Instead, the error term 
nit  is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (iid) extreme value type I (also called 
Gumbel).  
If the researcher observed n , then the choice probability would be a standard logit. 
That is the probability conditional on n is: 



J
j
njn
nin
nni
X
X
L
1
'
'
)exp(
)exp(
)(


  
However, the researcher does not know n . The unconditional choice probability is 
therefore the integral of )( nniL   over all possible variables of n   
  dfLP nnini )|()(  
which is consequently called a Mixed Logit model or Random Parameter Logit. A Mixed 
Logit probability is the integral of standard logit probabilities over a density of 
parameters, or, in other terms, a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated at 
different values of  , with the weights given by the density function )|( f . If the 
density of  can be specified to be normal with mean b and covariance W , the choice 
probability is 

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These probabilities cannot be solved analytically but can be approximated through 
simulation (Train, 2002). Having the researcher specified the functional form, for any 
given value of  : (1) draw a value of   from )|( f , and label it r with the 
superscript 1r  referring to the first draw; (2) calculate the logit formula with this 
draw; (3) repeat steps 1 and 2 many times and average the results. This average is the 
simulated probability: 
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where R is the number of draws. The simulated probabilities are inserted into the log-
likelihood function to give a simulated log likelihood: 
nj
N
n
J
j
nj PdSLL
ˆln
1 1

 
  
 
where 1njd if n  chose j and zero otherwise. The maximum simulated estimator is the 
value of   that maximises SLL. 
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The researcher estimates the parameters  , e.g. b and W , which describe the density 
function. The parameters  are integrated out. Thus, the  ’s are similar to the  ’s, in 
that both are random terms that are integrated out to obtain the choice probability.  
But this procedure is unsatisfactory if we want to study the variation of preferences 
among shippers. In this case, we want to obtain information about the  ’s for each 
sample decision maker, as well as the parameters   that describe the distribution of 
 ’s across shippers. Train (2003, chapter 11 and 12) explains how such information 
can be obtained via classical estimation and Bayesian procedure. We will concentrate on 
the former. 
In order to understand the derivation it is important to distinguish among two 
distributions: the distribution of tastes in the population described by )|( g , and the 
distribution of tastes in the subpopulation of people who make particular choices, 
described by ),,|(  xih to indicate the people who choose alternative i  in a choice 
situation consisting of several alternatives described collectively by variables x . Let 
 nTnn yyy ,......1  denote the shipper’s sequence of chosen alternatives. The probability 
of the shipper’s sequence of choices is the integral of  ,| nn xyP  over the distribution 
of   
       dgxyPxyP nnnn |,|,|   
which is a Mixed Logit model. ),,|(  nn xyh can be derived by the Bayes’ rule 
      |,|,|),,|( gxyPxyPxyh nnnnnn   
stating that the joint density of   and ny can be expressed as the probability of ny times 
the probability of  conditional on ny (which is the left-hand side), or with the other 
direction of conditioning, as the probability of   times the probability of ny conditional 
on   (which is the right-hand side). Rearranging 
   
 


,|
|,|
),,|(
nn
nn
nn
xyP
gxyP
xyh   
All the elements on the right-hand side are known. Note that the denominator is the 
integral of the numerator. As such it is a constant which makes h integrate to 1, as 
required for any density. h is therefore proportional to the numerator and can be 
interpreted as follows: the density of  in the subpopulation of shippers who would 
choose sequence ny when facing nx is proportional to the density of  in the entire 
population times the probability that ny  would be chosen if the shipper’s coefficients 
were  . 
The model can be solved via simulated maximum likelihood methods The likelihood 
function is: 
 
),(),( WbLWbL nn   
where  
 
),|(),( WbyPWbL nn    
is the probability of customer n ’s sequence of choices given b  and W . 
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6.4.4.  The Latent Class model 
 
If the mixing distribution )(f is discrete, that is, it takes a finite set of distinct values, 
the Mixed Logit becomes a Latent Class model. The utility function can be specified as 
nitnitcnit XU  
'  
where 
c  is the class specific parameter vector. Within each class, choice probabilities 
are assumed to be generated by the MNL model. 
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Class probabilities are also specified by the MNL form 
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where tz  is an optional set of person, situation invariant characteristics, which may be a 
set of fixed constants if no such characteristics are observed. In this case, the class 
probabilities are simply function of C  parameters, c , the last of which is fixed to zero 
(Nlogit 3 Manual, 2003, p. N9-1). 
For any given individual, the joint probability of chosen alternative j  and being part of 
class c  is equal to 
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Similarly to the Mixed Logit using Bayes’ formula it is possible to derive the posterior 
estimate of the individual specific class probability and, hence, the individual specific 
posteriors estimate of the parameters. 
 
 
 
6.5. The theory of the experimental design 
 
Stated choice experiments are widely applied around the world but the first studies date 
back to the early eighties: J.J. Louviere and Hensher (1983a); J.J. Louviere and 
Woodworth (1983). Experimental design theory spans the set of techniques that allow 
data sets to be designed that will provide some optimal constraints on a model of 
interest. Using choice experiments, researchers try to determine the influence of the 
various attributes used in the design, on the users’ choices during the interviews’ 
administration process.  
A detailed explanation of the evolution of this theory in the transport sector is reported 
in Sanko (2001) (pp. 10-11). A summary is reported in Figure 13. 
Regarding the type of decision rule used in a choice experiment, in the first applications,  
ranking and rating options were used. However, J.J. Louviere and Hensher (1983b) 
showed how a preference experiment could be extended to incorporate choice option, 
subsequently widely used. 
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Figure 13 – The development of SP research in the Transport sector  
 
Source: Sanko (2001) 
 
Some researchers dealt with the SP design issues (i.e., how to make alternatives 
combining attributes and levels). Originally, orthogonal design was a basic idea of create 
a experimental design. Full factorial design and fractional factorial design have also used 
and some other methods are based on these types of design. Recently, some methods, 
which are against orthogonal design, have appeared (Fowkes, Wardman, & Holden, 
1993). Respect the Figure 13 a recent development has to be highlighted. In fact, efficient 
experimental design is progressively developed; this new approach tries to link the 
statistical stated choice properties to the econometric models. In particular, Huber and 
Zwerina (1996) stated that by relaxing the orthogonality conditions of the design can 
contribute to reduce the asymptotic standard errors of the parameter estimates. The 
“NGENE” software (Choice Metrics)41 is one of the best software to create efficient 
experimental design.  
Morikawa (1989) introduced the combining method to analyze jointly SP and RP data in 
order to eliminate the respective limits of the two types of data (Morikawa, Ben-Akiva, & 
Yamada, 1991). 
The use of computer in the administration of SP survey has a great impact42 .  
 
In the following sections each type of experimental design is synthetically described. 
 
 
 
6.5.1. Orthogonal Design 
 
An experimental design is defined orthogonal when it satisfies attribute level balance 
and all parameters are independently estimable. In particular, orthogonal design 
ensures that the attributes-levels are spread over all choice experiments, and that 
attribute level combinations do not exhibit a certain (positively or negatively correlated) 
pattern (M. C. J. Bliemer & Rose, 2011) (Figure 14). 
 
 
                                                                 
41 http://www.choice-metrics.com/.   
42 Some examples of software developed to create an experimental design are: “The Game Generator” 
(Steer Davies Gleave), “MINT”(Hague Consulting Group), “LASP” (Institute for Transport Studies, Leeds),  
“SP_ASK” (Peter Davidson Consultancy) and “ACA” (Sawtooth Software).  
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Figure 14 – Example of a OD 
 
Source: NGENE 1.0 (2009) 
 
If an orthogonal design is too large, using the blocking function is possible to split the 
original design into smaller designs. It is important to underline that each block is not 
orthogonal by itself; only the combination of all blocks is orthogonal.  
An orthogonal design with the blocking function included is shows in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 – An orthogonal design in three blocks  
 
Source: NGENE 1.0 (2009) 
 
The main reasons for using orthogonal design are three: 1) allow for an independent 
estimation of the influence of each design attribute on choices, 2) are easy to construct 
even if only for a limited number of combinations of attribute levels, 3) are historically 
linked to the estimation of linear models where orthogonality prevents multicollinearity 
and minimizes the variance of the parameter estimates.  
 
 
6.5.2. Full and Fractional Factorial Design 
 
A full factorial design considers each possible combination of attributes-levels. For 
instance, if there are 2 alternatives (transport mode 1 and 2), with 5 attributes and 3 
attribute-levels, the total number of possible combinations is (3*3*3*3*3) * (3*3*3*3*3) 
= 32*5 = 50.049. Figure 16 shows an example of a full factorial design. 
 
Figure 16 – Example of a full factorial design  
 
Source: NGENE 1.0 (2009) 
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The full factorial design is useful to select the fractional factorial design. In fact, a 
fractional factorial design is a sub-set of a full factorial design. The selection of the sub-
set of combinations is often random. Both design options can lead to biased outcomes 
(i.e.  a respondent may face only low or only high values of a specific attribute). It is 
possible to avoid it by choosing the subsets in a way that attribute level balance 
propriety is satisfied. 
 
Figure 17 - Example of a FrFD 
 
Source: NGENE 1.0 (2009) 
 
 
 
 
6.5.3. Efficient Design  
 
An experimental design is defined efficient if the design yields data that enables 
parameters estimation with as low as possible standard errors. An efficient design, 
assuming specific a priori for the parameters, calculates the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix (AVC) (the roots of the diagonal of this matrix are the asymptotic 
standard errors). Also for efficient design it is possible to use the blocking function. 
An orthogonal design could be also efficient when there is no data or information about 
the parameters. When there is some knowledge, the design could be improved. 
There are different forms or measures of efficiency. Below are reported only three: D-
error, A-error and the Size error. 
The most widely used measure is called the D-error, which takes the determinant of the 
AVC matrix, assuming only a single respondent. A design with the lowest D -error is 
called D-optimal. However, in practice is very difficult to find the design with the lowest 
D-error. Therefore, a sufficiently low D-error is sufficiently satisfactory (called D-
efficient). Different types of D-error have been proposed in the literature, depending on 
the available information on the prior parameters. 
D-error is mathematically calculated as: 
 
 
 
where: 
 
H  is the number of parameters to be estimated;  
X  is the experimental design; 
0   is the parameter value (a priori value) when there are no information about it. 
1/
1det ( ( ,0))  
H
zD error X
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Another efficiency measure is the A-error that only looks at the variances and not at the 
covariances. The experimental design with the lowest A-error is called A-optimal.  
The formula to calculate this type of error is: 
 
 
 
where: 
 
H  is the number of parameters to be estimated;  
X  is the experimental design; 
  is the parameter value (a priori value). 
 
 
M. C. Bliemer and Rose (2005) proposed a efficiency measure related to the sample sizes 
required to estimate each parameter significantly. By spreading the information 
obtained from each choice situation in the design over all parameters, the design can be 
optimized for sample size: S-optimality (M. C. Bliemer & Rose, 2005; M. C. Bliemer, Rose, 
& Hensher, 2010). 
An interesting literature review of the different types of experimental design used in the 
transport sector is carried out by M. C. J. Bliemer and Rose (2011). Table 17 highlights a 
portion of the literature review proposed by M. C. J. Bliemer and Rose (2011). About 61 
papers analysed, they identified that 66% of cases utilized an orthogonal design, 20% 
used the D-efficient designs, 11% randomly assigned attribute levels shown to 
respondents and 5% used an adaptive design approach, alternating the levels shown to 
respondents based on the respondents previous answers. With reference to the number 
of alternatives, the range is between 2 and 6 and several of these studies included a 
current or reference alternative (status quo option). The number of attributes per 
alternative varied from 3 to 46 and the number of levels per attribute goes from 2 to 30. 
The number of observations ranged from 60 to 46.632. The average number of 
observations of these studies is 2.688. 
Limited attention has paid on the impact generated by different types of design on 
models’ results. In this direction, an important study is carried out by Hess, Smith, 
Falzarano, and Stubits (2008). They compared the results of three different types of 
experimental designs (an orthogonal design with randomized choice set assignment, an 
orthogonal design with an orthogonal blocking column and an efficient design) . They 
found that the efficient design performed only marginally better than the orthogonal 
design with blocking, but that the design with random assignment of choice tasks to 
respondents performed significantly worse than both the efficient design  and 
orthogonal design with blocking. In fact, they concluded that the blocking of the choice 
experiments is far more important than the underlying experimental design itself. 
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Table 17 – Literature review of SP studies from the experimental design point of view  
 
 
Source: M. C. J. Bliemer and Rose (2011) 
Notes: J = # of al ternatives; K = # of attributes; N = # of respondents; N -S = # of observations  
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6.6. Methodological guidelines  
 
With respect to RP data, with SP data one deals with an experiments instead of real 
observations. This implies that the process of setting up a SP is more complex than a RP 
survey. Moreover, SP survey’s results are affected by the quality of the survey’s planning 
and realization. Furthermore, time need to spent into the preparation and execution of 
choice experiments. In fact, setting up a SP survey requires a number of stages and 
important decisions that affect the result. 
The aim of this section is highlight the process of setting up a SP experiment. First, a the 
whole process to set up a SP experiment is provided and reported in Figure 18; secondly, 
a focus on specific stages regarding design and operational aspects are highlighted as 
well. In the following section this planning process is applied to the Ro-Mi case study.  
 
Figure 18 – Guidelines to set up a SP experiment  
 
Source: own elaboration on Hensher, Rose, and Greene (2005) 
 
 
Problem definition/Research aim (stage A): 
First, the research objectives have to be clearly identified. An optimum clarity and 
knowledge of the research problem constitutes a preferential element to ensure the 
realization of a valid survey tool. 
 
Methodology and models (stage B): 
After defining the research issue, a methodology and model that fit the research needs to 
be selected. Among the discrete choice models’ family, the most widely applied at the 
mode choice and market share analysis are: MNL, NL, ML (see section 6.4). 
 
Generation of the experimental design (stage C): 
This stage implies a series of important decision:  
 Identification and selection of the alternatives, attributes, attribute-levels and range 
of the attribute-levels; 
 Labelled or unlabelled alternatives in the choice experiments; 
 Type of design (FuFD, FrFD, OD, EF); 
 Full profile or partial profile design; 
 Definition of the number of choice tasks for respondent; 
 Answer modes (rankig, rating, choice) 
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With reference to the identification and selection of attributes to include in choice 
experiments, these decisions are of extreme important because all subsequent analyses 
focus on the attributes previously selected. Typically, the attributes are not more than 
four or five (Aaker & Day, 1990), while for the attribute-levels should be limited to three 
or four. In mode choice literature, most studies select attributes just reviewing others 
studies. In a limited case, a focus group is realized. Following the approach most widely 
used, although the attributes in the modal choice issue are fairly standard, the lack of 
attention toward attributes such as comfort, on-board services etc. could affect 
negatively survey’s results. In section 3.4. there are more details on which attributes are 
more important in the mode choice between HSR and air transport. 
Another important aspect to take in consideration is the alternative types of choice 
experiment: labelled or unlabelled. Not always this aspect is specified in mode choice 
literature. Unlabelled choice experiments require the estimation of general parameters 
which are the same for any choice profiles. On the contrary, labelled experiments may 
also require the estimation of an Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) that could be 
different for each alternative. Therefore, ASC should not be included in unlabelled 
experiments (Bates, 2011). 
To decide the type of experimental design suitable with the research problem is another 
important decision. A review of the design with the main proprieties is shown in section  
6.5. If in a survey many attributes are included and could be difficult to make a decision  
for the respondent, a partial profile design could be applied. In fact, respondents often 
are non-compensatory in their choice behaviour, choosing based on one or a limited 
group of attributes. Therefore, to prevent this so-called lexicographic behaviour the 
attributes shown to the respondents should be limited (Green, 1974). Generally, due at 
the limited number of attributes used in the transport choice literature a full profile 
design could be implemented. 
There are three different type of choice task’s answer: rating, ranking and choice. This 
decision is very important. According to the type of answer chosen, the technique of data 
analysis and the reliability of the results obtained varies (Aaker & Day, 1990; Johnson & 
Desvousges, 1997; J.J. Louviere, 1988). With the choice option, the respondents have to 
pick one of the two, three or more alternatives available in the choice experiment. A 
main critical aspect could be due to the low level of information obtainable but it is 
nevertheless well as being the fastest and easiest to implement, and more realistic 
reproducing the real decision-making processes of the respondent. In the ranking 
option, the interviewee orders the proposed alternatives according own preferences 
from best to worst. In contrast with the choice, this option implies that the respondent 
constraints own preference in a final choice. Moreover, before we get to give their 
preference, the respondent must examine all the qualities of all the profiles, and this 
makes the choice exercise more complex and time-consuming. On the other hand, 
however, it has the undeniable advantage of obtaining a high level of information. Lastly, 
in the rating option, very similar at the ranking option, the interviewee order s each of 
the available choice profiles and assigns to each of them a scalar value according to own 
preferences.  
The decision of the answer type for choice experiments is affected by some aspects 
summarizing in: 
 number of attributes and levels to be investigated; 
 type of experimental design used; 
 maximum number of choice exercises that will be submitted to each respondent; 
 type of econometric analysis the analyst want to do with the collected data. 
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Questionnaire design (stage D): 
Usually, a questionnaire is composed by different sections. The first one is almost always 
an introductory section where socio-economic data are collected. Follows RP and/or SP 
data that is the core of the questionnaire. The penultimate section deals with attitudinal 
aspects of respondents toward the research problem and/or specific aspects such as the 
perceived complexity of the questionnaire. A very limited case of studies include a 
further section where the interviewers answers at some questions on the perceived 
attention and interest of respondents and other general comments provided during the 
interviews administration. 
 
Data collection (stage E):  
An important decision is the place to administer the interviews. Generally, most of the 
studies reviewed focus on sites associated with the transport modes studied (such as 
inside or outside HSR/airplane or rail station/airports etc.). Few studies capture 
information from places not related to transport (such as shopping centres and waiting 
rooms of banks, dentists, beauticians etc.) to capture also potential demand. 
How emerge in the literature review, there are different methods to collect RP and SP 
data ranging from pencil and paper instrument (PAPI), computer assisted telephone 
interview (CATI), to computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). The most used and 
suitable with RP and RP data is the CAPI technique. Sarasua and Meyer (1996) provide a 
list of the main advantages of using CAPI method: interesting and flexible presentation 
format; consistent format across the interviewers and the respondents; automatic and 
updating questions; automatic data coding and storage; speed up the recording times of 
the answers; possibility to insert checks to avoid wrong input answers; reduce the 
percentage of non-responses (in particular those caused by errors in the registration 
phase). If choice experiments present a limited number of attributes a telephone survey 
could be suitable. Therefore, it is appropriate avoid telephone interviews for survey with 
more complex choice tasks unless it is sent previously to respondent by post some 
information in preparation for the telephone interview. In doing so, a mixed mode of 
interviews administration is requested. However, this takes long time to administer 
interviews. With the computer and internet supports there are others methods to 
administer interviews less used: computer assisted self-interviewing (CASI), disk by mail 
(DBM), electronic mail survey (EMS), internet electronic survey (IES). For a detailed 
analysis see Leeuw, Hox, and G.Snujkers (1995). 
After checking the main characteristics of the various types of interview administration, 
it is important remember that their choice depend on: 
 the phenomenon analysed; 
 the sampling: size sample and sampling strategy; 
 the type of sample investigated; 
 the experimental design used; 
 the response mode used; and 
 the constraints of time and cost of the investigation.  
 
Another important decision is the sampling strategy. Sampling is the process of selecting 
a relatively small group of people from a specific population to be analysed. In applied 
research, a complete census is often impracticable, while the goal of sampling is to 
assess clusters efficiently and effectively by designing and executing representative 
sample plans. In fact, to consider a selection of people, contrary to census, has numerous 
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advantages such as time and cost savings, more in-depth information, lower total error 
and greater practicality. Although different types of errors might occur (sampling error, 
sample bias, and non-sampling error), there are two main different sampling methods: 
probabilistic and non-probabilistic43 method. A focus is provided for the most applied 
method in discrete choice analysis, the probabilistic sampling strategy. The most 
commonly used probabilistic  samples are: simple random (each element of the 
population an equal and known chance of being selected for inclusion in the sample), 
stratified (it is a modified type of random sample, often used when sub-groups of the 
population are of special interest to the researcher), cluster (similar to the previous one, 
the difference refers to the selection of a random sample of subgroups rather than a 
random sample from each subgroup) and systematic (it is initiated by randomly 
selecting a digit, n, and then selecting a sample element at every nth interval, depending 
on the size of the population and the sample size requirement).  
In the exploratory survey, 30-60 individuals are sufficient, and if you do not want to 
make comparisons between homogeneous subgroups of the whole sample, 300 
respondents are enough. However, for a segmentation analysis, 200 individuals for each 
subgroup are needed (Orme, 1998). According to the number of observations from the 
literature review proposed by M. C. J. Bliemer and Rose (2011), the number of 
observation of 61 paper analysed ranged from 60 to 46.632, with a median number of 
2.688. 
 
Model estimation and interpretation (stage F): 
The collected data have to be subsequently estimated with specific discrete choice 
models (see section 6.4) and interpreted model’s results. It could be appropriate 
compare own model’s results with the results obtained from the literature. 
 
 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter methodological issues are explored. In particular, models and data 
collection are detailed from a theoretical point of view. Discrete choice analyses are 
widely used to model travel behaviour. The aim of this chapter is to focus on models and 
data collection. Particular emphasis is paid on SP data due to the constraints arising 
from their planning process with respect to RP data. First, a comparison between SP and 
RP data is detailed, underling respective (dis)advantages. Afterwards, the theory of 
discrete choice models is shown in section 6.4  (with special attention to the most widely 
used models - e.g. MNL, NL, ML, LC models) and the theory of the experimental design in 
section 6.5. The planning and realization phases of the Ro-Mi case study are illustrated 
in section 6.6. 
 
 
                                                                 
43 The most commonly utilized non-probability sampling techniques are:  convenience, judgment, quota. 
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7. The Case Study Of The Rome-Milan Corridor: a discrete choice approach 
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7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reports an application of theoretical and methodological issues detailed in 
the previous chapters. A discrete choice analysis has applied at the long-distance Ro-Mi 
corridor. 
Objectives, past studies and description of the study area introduce the case study (see 
section 7.1.1). The planning of the questionnaire is provided in section 7.2 detailing, in 
particular, the choice set definition and the deployment of work (interviewers’ 
management). Moreover, descriptive statistics and econometric results are reported, 
respectively, in sections 7.3 and 7.4. 
 
 
7.1.1. The Ro-Mi corridor 
 
7.1.1.1.  Objectives  
 
The overall aim is to analyse competition and travellers’ preferences between HSR and 
air transport in the Ro-Mi corridor. Motivations to support this analysis are reported in 
section 1.1.  
The following objectives are defined: 
1. to determine both which attributes mainly influence the Ro-Mi mode choice; 
2. to calculate the VOT for business and non-business passengers; 
3. to estimate own and cross-point elasticities measures; 
4. to estimate market share Ro-Mi structure and test hypothetical policy changes 
through simulated scenarios; 
5. to create a Decision Support System. 
 
Both RP and SP data were collected. The transport alternatives considered for the SP 
choice experiments are four: two HSRs operators, a FSC and a LCC. Econometric 
analyses are focused on both RP and SP data. Different econometric models (MNL, NL, 
ML with and without socioeconomic and behavioural data) are calibrated using the 5 th 
version of NLogit software44 (Econometric Software Inc., 2009). These models allow the 
identification of attributes that are most important in the Ro-Mi mode choice and 
analysis of travellers’ preferences to determine transport competition  and the relevant 
market (see section 8.3). WTP-VTTS and elasticities measures were calculated. In fact, a 
common objective in the use of discrete choice models is the derivation of measures to 
determine the amount of money that individuals are willing to pay in order to obtain as 
a counterpart, a benefit. These measures are called willingness to pay (WTP). An 
interesting measure of the WTP is the value of the travel time saving (VTTS). The VTTS is 
defined as the amount of money an individual is willing to outplay in order to save a unit 
of time spent travelling (Hensher, et al., 2005). In linear models, WTP and VTTS 
measures are computed as the ratio between two parameters where the denominator is 
the monetary attribute (in this case, total travel cost). Both variables have to be 
statistically significant otherwise, no meaningful WTP measures can be calculated. The 
VTTS’ formula is: 
 
                                                                 
44 NLogit is produced by the Econometric Software Inc. (http://www.limdep.com/).  
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Another important analysis is the calculation of the elasticity, that it is a relevant concept 
in the economic theory.  Hensher, et al. (2005) report the definitions of the two type of 
elasticity measures stated by Jordan J. Louviere, et al. (2000): “A direct elasticity 
measures the percentage change in the probability of choosing a particular alternative in 
the choice set with respect to a given percentage  change in an attribute of that same 
alternative. A cross elasticity measures the percentage change in the probability of 
choosing a particular alternative in the choice set with respect to a given percentage 
change in a competing alternative.” The aggregate elasticities, using the probability 
weighted sample numeration (PWSE) technique45, are calculated with the following 
formula: 
 
 
 
 
where: 
iP  refers to the aggregate probability of choice alternative i , 
iqPE  is an estimated choice probability.  
 
Furthermore, models’ results have allowed simulating different potential policies to 
analyze the users’ and transport operators reactions. 
 
 
7.1.1.2. Past analysis  
 
In section 1.3 an overview of the main studies carried out considering the Ro-Mi 
corridor are reported and described. In particular, this corridor is well suited to the 
study of intermodal competition. However, the methodologies used in the previous Ro-
Mi studies not appear to be very clear and robust (except for the paper of E. Cascetta and 
Coppola (2012)). Recent events recorded in the Italian rail/HSR and air transport, as 
reported in chapters 2 and 3, have stressed the need to implement this type of analysis. 
 
 
7.1.1.3. Description of the study area 
 
Ro-Mi corridor connects the two most populated Italian cities: respectively, 2.663.666 
and 1.274.31146. Along this link, other important cities are connected by HSR services 
(Florence and Bologna). In this corridor there are more business travellers. An overview 
of the case study context is shown in Figure 19.  
This link is currently operated by 3 airlines (CAI47, Easyjet, Ryanair)48 and two HSR 
operators (Trenitalia with Frecciarossa and NTV with Italo). The HSR system provides 
                                                                 
45 PWSE allows non-uniform cross-elasticities for each individual.  
46 http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/65070.  
47 Before 2008, there were 2 different Airlines: Alitalia and Airone.  
48 In the last years, Meridiana in 2008 and Lufthansa in 2010 went out of business.  
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an overall frequency of day-trips of 115 trains (79 for Trenitalia and 36 for NTV), while 
the air system provides a decrease of day-flight frequency occurred recently. In 
particular, Alitalia-Cai reduced its day-flight frequency from 45 to 25. Overall, the air 
system provides 33 day-flight frequency (25 for Alitalia-Cai, 5 for Easjyet and 3 for 
Ryanair). 
 
 
Figure 19 – Overview of the case study context 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes:  
In the Milan context: MXP: Malpensa airport; LIN: Linate airport; BGY: Bergamo airport; ROG: Rogoredo 
HSR station; CEN: HSR central station; PGA: Porta Garibaldi H SR station; In the Roman context: FCO: 
Fiumicino airport; CIA: Ciampino airport; TER: Termini HSR station; TIB: Tiburtina HSR station; O ST: 
Ostiense HSR station.  
 
 
In the last years, some important trends have occurred in both air and HSR transport 
industries. In the air transport, in particular with reference to airlines market the most 
important event was the redeeming in 2008 of the ex-flag carrier Alitalia with of the 
creation of a new airline (called Alitlia-Cai). This operation was based on a merger 
between Alitalia and AirOne airlines. Moreover, due at the Alitalia’s crisis, its business 
model (based on two hub, one in Rome and one in Milan) has been modified, eliminating 
the Milan hub with important implications on the national air system.  
In the Ro-Mi context there are 3 air routes. Linate-Fiumicino air route, characterized by 
an high level of business passengers. After the merger between Alitalia and AirOne in 
2008, an unregulated monopoly has created (due also at the market exit of the only 
competitor in this route, Meridiana airlines). Due also to administrative and legislative 
constraints creating a shortage of slot in this air route, the IAA imposed a set some 
behavioural measures to Alitalia-Cai, setting at the 3 December 2011 the last term to 
eliminate any monopoly positions. Recently, the investigation carried out by the IAA 
founding that the concentration of Alitalia-AirOne have generated and consolidated 
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overtime a monopolistic position for Alitalia-Cai. Only recently with the entrance in the 
LIN-FIU route of a new airline (Easyjet49), Alitalia-Cai’s monopoly has been removed. In 
the other air routes there are 3 airlines in the MXP-FIU and only Ryanair in the 
Ciampino-Bergamo route50. An overview of the all Ro-Mi air routes and traffic data in the 
period 2007-2011 has reported in Table 18. 
In the HSR market, the new entrance of NTV with Italo is the first case in the world of 
competition in a HSR market operating in particular in the Ro-Mi corridor. 
Rome has two airports: Fiumicino and Ciampino. Fiumicino is an international airport, 
located at 35 km from the city center, that has the highest number of passengers carried 
and is the only hub for the Alitalia-Cai airlines. This airport is connected at the city 
center by train (Leonardo express) in 31 minutes, by bus (Terravision) in 55 minutes, 
and by car/taxi51 in 45 minutes. From 30 km to the city center, Ciampino airport is 
characterized mainly by the presence of LCCs. In fact, since 2001, without a strate gic 
planning this airport the traffic volume has increased fivefold with important 
implication to the surrounding area because of its proximity to populated areas. In the 
last year, politicians have spoken, due at the particular situation of Ciampino airport, of 
the possibility of building another airport in the suburban area of Rome.  
Milan has three airports: Malpensa, Linate and Bergamo. Malpensa is an international 
airport in particular for feeder traffic, located at 50 km from the city center that has the 
second highest number in term of passengers carried. Malpensa is connected to the city 
center by bus (Malpensa shuttle) in 25 minutes, by train in 57 minutes and by car/taxi in 
36 minutes. Linate is a city airport, subject to a specific national legislation (Ministerial 
Decrees March 3, 2000 and January 5, 2001, called the “Bersani Decree”), which 
regulates the maximum number of frequencies that a carrier is authorized to operate on 
a routes with the origin (or destination) in this airport. Linate is connected by bus (Air 
Bus Linate) in 25 minutes and by car/taxi in 36 minutes. 53 km ways from the city 
center there is the Bergamo airport, characterized mainly by the LCCs’ presence. This 
airport is not connected to Milan with a high speed transport service (by bus – Orio 
shuttle – in 50 minutes, by train in at least 48 minutes, by car/taxi in 1 hour). 
As shown in Figure 20, a gradual increase of the number of passengers took place, except 
for Malpensa due since 2008 to the Alitalia’s hub issue. The traffic increased 
progressively for Bergamo airport due to the Ryanair entrance. 
With reference to the ranking “Top 50” carried out by the Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione 
Civile (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2011), based on the total traffic operated by each Ro-
Mi airport, has emerged that FCO, MXP and LIN airports maintain a stable position 
(respectively as first, second and third), while Ciampino worsens its position at the 
contrary of Bergamo airport (Figure 21). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
49 Easyjet is a low cost airlines.  
50 Due at the particular low tickets, the presence of just an airline (Ryanair) up to date seem not to be a 
problem for consumers. 
51 All the simulations for the car mode are carried out at the following web site: 
http://www.viamichelin.it/.  
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Figure 20 – Trend of the Ro-Mi airports’ traffic (2007-2011) 
 
Source: (Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2011) 
Notes: LIN: Linate airport; MXP: Malpensa airport; CIA: Ciampino airport; FCO: Fiumicino airport; BGY: 
Bergamo airport. 
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Table 18 – Overview of the Ro-Mi Airlines and air routes by number of departures (2007-2011) 
Ro-Mi routes 
IATA 
code 
Airlines R.T.50 2007 R.T.50 2009 R.T.50 2010 R.T.50 2011 Total 
Total 
% 
Milano Linate 
Roma Fiumicino 
LIN-
FIU 
Alitalia-
Cai  
1 1.243.429 2 844.250 4 749.966 5 749.266 3.586.911 32%  
Roma Fiumicino 
Milano Linate 
FIU-
LIN 
Alitalia-
Cai  
2 1.176.685 1 876.701 3 772.851 3 772.918 3.599.155 32%  
Milano Malpensa 
Roma Fiumicino 
MXP-
FIU 
Alitalia-
Cai, 
Easyjet, 
Lufthansa 
15 380.445 20 333.957 18 339.016 24 334.306 1.387.724 12%  
Roma Fiumicino 
Milano Malpensa 
FIU-
MXP 
Alitalia-
Cai, 
Easyjet, 
Lufthansa 
16 359.863 19 337.439 17 344.065 19 340.530 1.381.897 12%  
Bergamo Roma 
Ciampino 
BGY-
CIA 
Ryanair 44 166.534 36 203.534 17 159.553 47 163.668 693.289 6% 
Roma Ciampino 
Bergamo 
CIA-
BGY 
Ryanair 52 150.821 37 202.797 19 158.176 48 163.046 674.840 6% 
   
Total:  3.477.777 
 
2.798.678 
 
2.523.627 
 
2.523.734 11.323.816 100% 
Source: own elaboration on (Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2011) 
Notes: 2008 miss from ENAC data; R.T.50: ranking of the Top50 airlines by traffic in Italy. 
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Figure 21 – Trend of the Ro-Mi airports’ position in the ranking “Top 50” by traffic (2007-2011) 
 
Source: (Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2011) 
 
In Rome there are 3 HSR stations (Termini, Tiburtina and Ostiense) as well as in the 
Milan area (Centrale, Porta Garibaldi, Porta Rogoredo). 
As shown in Figure 22, Italy has invested overtime consistently to implement an HSR 
network. After, Spain, France and Germany, Italy has currently 9.991 km of lines. With 
respect the rail transport, in 2010 HSR has a share of around 25%. 
 
Figure 22 – Evolution of the HSR network in Europe (1981-2011) 
 
Source: EUROSTAT database (2012) 
http://www.googl e.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&ved=0CDYQFjAD
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Ftransport%2Fpublications%2Fstatistics%2Fdoc%2F2012%2Fp
b_2012_25_infr.xlsx&ei=nbBYUNHvM8yB4ATstIDgBw&usg=AFQjCNGrm-
TCqPcdwFbUdSdysr00_3E_Cw&sig2=lRD0MwYUO_0rlDeAl E29cg  
Note: Length of lines or of sections of lines on which trains can go faster than 250 km/h at some point 
during the journey. 
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Figure 23 – Share of HSR transport in total pax-km in rail industry 
 
Source: EUROSTAT database (2012)  
http://www.googl e.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http
%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Ftransport%2Fpublications%2Fstatistics%2Fdoc%2F2012%2Fpb_20 12_23
_pkm.xlsx&ei=lLZYUPXCCMrV4QTT8oHgDA&usg=AFQjCNE5zc1EnI1b5rUaavgq1sQ9Capx_A&sig2=WhcY
MbZm88bpYo8qYsUDuw.  
 
 
With reference to the Italian rail market, section 2.2.2.2 describes its structure. This 
market is dominated by the Ferrovie dello Stato Spa. (FS). FS has about 74.000 
employees that work on 16.701 km of lines. Its owner is the Italian Ministry of Economy 
and Finance. Particularly relevant is the composition inside the FS holding . In fact, Rete 
Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI) and Trenitalia are controlled for the 100% by FS and are, 
respectively, the manager of the entire Italian railway network and the main Italian 
railway operator (that holds a share of about 95% of the whole national market). FS 
structure is shown in Figure 11. Overtime the IAA has paid particular attention at the 
vertical separation between the rail management network (operated by RFI) and the rail 
transport operator (Trenitalia). In particular, the Italian Authority Antitrust (2003) 
highlighted the failure of separation adopted by FS, both in term of form and substance, 
between RFI and Trenitalia and between the latter and the FS holding52. No substantial 
change was made on this aspect in the last years. 
NTV is the first private HSR operator in the Italian rail network with a fleet of 25 
trains53. This company was founded in the December 2006 for the 33.5% by Italian 
entrepreneurs (Diego Della Valle, Luca di Montezemolo, Gianni Punzo), with the 
subsequent inclusion of other actors (Intesa SanPaolo S.p.A. for a 20% and SNCF 
Voyages Développement S.a.S.54 for a 20%). Because of some difficulties to start, only at 
the 28 April 2012 NTV started to operate on the Milan Porta Garibaldi - Naples Central 
station corridor.  
                                                                 
52 For a detailed analysis see Benacchio (2004) 
53 Source: http://www.ntvspa.it/it/nuovo -trasporto-viaggiatori/123/3/ntv-viaggio-italiano-treno-alta-
velocita.  
54 SNCF is the French HSR public operator.  
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As a result of an alert55 issued in September 2008 by NTV, the Italian Authority Antitrust 
(2009b) set up an investigation to verify the existence of an abuse of dominant position 
by FS and RFI against the market entry by NTV. No anti-competitive conduct was found 
by the IAA investigation. However, with reference to the “Case – A389” between Rail 
Traction Company56 and RFI & FS, the Italian Authority Antitrust (2009a) found 
competitive concerns for the market access of Rail Traction Company. The IAA accepted 
undertakings by RFI offering a choice between two possible solutions: 1) lump-sum 
payment of 5.7 million euro waiving litigation, or, alternatively, 2) obtained 
contributions of a technical nature and engineering services to operate with outstanding 
train driver57. Moreover, a further investigation has to be highlighted. In fact, recently 
the Italian Authority Antitrust (2012a) found another anti-competitive conduct detected 
by RFI and Trenitalia (of the FS group) for putting in place a complex and unified 
strategy to prevent and limit the market entry of Arenaways58 in the rail passengers 
market.  
 
After describing the Ro-Mi air-rail operators, summary results of the price ticket 
strategy are reported below. For further details on this survey, see Annex  5. In 
particular, the Price Ticket System, the Average Ticket Price, the Average Travel Time 
and the Price Correlation analysis of the Ro-Mi transport operators are detailed. These 
results are useful to better evaluate transport competition and to evaluate travellers’ 
preferences.  
Considering the limited number of simulations carried out in the respective websites of 
the Ro-Mi operators59 and the complex reservation system and its constraints, these 
results should be considered as preliminary. Unfortunately, no integration with data 
provided by operators was possible due to the non-cooperation of some  operators.  
 
With reference to the Average Ticket Price, from preliminary results have emerged as 
reported in Table 19. 
 
Simulations results have shown about travel time issue another important aspect. In 
particular, the Average Travel Time to perform the Ro-Mi corridor is calculated. Overall, 
from 122 simulations/departures-arrivals: 
 not relevant differences are found between outward and return journey between all 
transport operators; 
 more than 20 minutes were found between Trenitalia and NTV, to the detriment of 
the latter; 
 no difference is found for Alitalia and Ryanair operators. 
Considering that travel time is one of the most attribute to determine Ro-Mi mode 
choice, the Average Travel Time’s difference between Trenitalia and NTV is pretty 
important and consistent. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
55 In Italian, is “segnalazione”.  
56 RTC is a railway company operating in the freight rail transport market.  
57 In Italian, is “circolazione a macchinista unico”.  
58 Arenaways is a rail operator that operates in the passenger transport market.  
59 Respectively, Trenitalia: http://www.trenitalia.it/; NTV: http://www.ntvspa.it/it/index.html; CAI: 
http://www.alitalia.com/IT_IT/; Ryanair: http://www.ryanair.com/it.  
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Table 19 – Overview of the average ticket price (return) by operator and by type of service class 
Transport operator: 1st class 2nd class 
Trenitalia   
1 week 178 € 135 € 
2 weeks 172 € 120 € 
4 weeks 149 € 101 € 
NTV   
1 week 272 € 103 € 
2 weeks 321 € 93 € 
4 weeks 324 € 80 € 
Alitalia-Cai   
1 week 384 € 204 € 
2 weeks 384 € 205 € 
4 weeks 360 € 104 € 
Ryanair   
1 week  - 106 € 
2 weeks  - 74 € 
4 weeks  - 53 € 
Source: own elaboration on data from Ro-Mi operators’ web sites 
Notes: 1, 2, 4 weeks: ticket purchase 1, 2 and 4 weeks before the departure date.  
 
 
Figure 24 – Average of the Ro-Mi door-to-door travel time by operator 
 
Source: own elaboration on data from RO-MI operators’ web sites  
  
The Price Ticket System and the Price Correlation analysis are detailed in Annex 5. 
 
 
 
7.2. Data collection and sampling  
 
The interviews are administered mainly in Rome between January 2010 to November 
2011 time period (from 08:30 a.m. to 23:00 p.m.).  
1.386 interviews were collected in order to gathering both RP and SP data.  
The following phases allow identifying the most important aspects in order to 
implement a RP and SP survey. Different modes of questionnaire administration are 
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customized for each interviewer. An example of SP choice task is reported in Table 33; it 
considers 4 transport alternatives: two HSRs, a FSC and a LCC. For the RP data, the 
respondent described 2 transport services: the chosen transport mode and the 
alternative considered (for instance, an HSR service and a FSC service o r an HSR service 
and a LCC service). 
With reference to the sampling strategy, a clarification is needed. Initially, a stratified 
probabilistic sampling method was adopted but not without difficulties. Initially, data on 
the main characteristics of the typical Ro-Mi traveller have requested several times to 
transport operators (Trenitalia and Alitalia-Cai) in order to segment the sample on the 
main socio-economic and behavioural characteristics. However, not receiving data by 
the operators, the sample was stratified controlling the only (public) parameter 
available: a significant level of business passengers.  
Questionnaires are administered not only in places related to transport such as 
shopping center, hospital, post, gym, on the road etc. (Table 32). 
 
 
 
7.2.1. The experimental design 
 
In this section, the Ro-Mi experimental design strategy is reported. Thanks to the 
numerous advantages and their increased use in transport field, efficient designs were 
adopted. 
Detailed information on choice set definition is provided in the following section. A 
nutshell precise: 
 4 alternatives (2 high speed rail operators, a full service airline and a low cost 
airline); 
 5 attributes for each alternatives; 
 2 attributes (total travel time and total travel cost) have 5 attribute-levels and the 
remaining 3 attribute are detailed with 3 attribute-levels. 
In order to generate a full factorial design, using NGENE software (NGENE 1.0, 2009), the 
total number of possible combinations is: 
(5*5*3*3*3) * (5*5*3*3*3) * (5*5*3*3*3) * (5*5*3*3*3) * =  
52 * 52 * 33 * 33 * 33  
= 12.301.875. 
 
Given the enormous number of possible combinations, a fractional factorial design has 
created. NGENE generated a design selection as a part of the full factorial design. After 
checking possible dominant alternatives in the proposed choice experiments, the 
selected design has used for the “Wave 1 – pilot test” (Table 20).  
After some interviews60, a MNL was calibrated and used its results to input a priori for 
the creation of an efficient design. Efficiency measures utilised to select the design were: 
D-efficiency, level balance (the levels of each attribute appear equally often) and utility 
balance (the options in each choice set have similar probabilities of being chosen). Given 
the design complexity in terms of number of alternatives, attributes and attribute-levels, 
the blocking function has been used (3 blocks are produced with each 5 choice 
exercises). Table 20 shows an overview of the evolution of the different types of 
experimental design used in the Ro-Mi case study.  
                                                                 
60 More details are provided in the following section. 
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Table 20 – Overview of the RO-MI design  
Waves of the design  
Type of 
design 
N. interviews Nobs. % 
Wave 1 – Pilot test FrFD  6 40 1% 
Wave 2nd FrFD  102 510 7% 
Wave 3th ED 1.278 6.390 92%  
Total:  1.386 6.940 100% 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The main decisions related to the Ro-Mi experimental design were: 
 4 alternatives (2 HSR operators, 1 FSC, 1 LCC); 
 5 mode-specific attributes (total travel time, total travel cost, delay, flexibility, on-
board services); 
 the number of attributes-levels (5 for the time and cost attributes, 3 for delay, 
flexibility and on-board services attributes); 
 the range of the attributes-levels (reported in Table 21); 
 unlabelled alternatives in the choice experiments; 
 a full profile design (thanks to the limited number of attributed considered); 
 5 choice tasks for respondent (using the blocking function); 
 the choice option for the choice experiment; 
 the process of design definition: 1st wave with a fractional factorial design, 2nd wave 
with an efficient design. 
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An overview of the attributes, attribute-levels and their range is show in Table 21. Their explanation is provided in the following section. 
 
Table 21 – Overview of alternatives, attributes, attribute-levels and their range for the Ro-Mi survey 
N. 
attribute
Name of 
the 
attribute
Unit
N. 
attribute 
levels
Descriptive 
attributes
plus plus plus
Status 
Quo
minus
minus 
minus
plus plus plus
Status 
Quo
minus
minus 
minus
plus plus plus
Status 
Quo
minus
minus 
minus
1
Total 
travel time
h:mm 5
plus/minus 10%, 
plus/minus 20%
5h 50min. 5h 20min. 4h 50min. 4h 20min. 3h 50min. 5h 30min. 4h 35min. 4h 10min. 3h 45min. 3h 20min. 5h 30min. 4h 35min. 4h 10min. 3h 45min. 3h 20min.
2
Total 
travel cost
euro 5
fare ticket 
(plus/minus 
40%, plus/minus 
60%) + cost 
access
€ 135 € 125 € 85 € 55 € 35 € 220 € 195 € 150 € 105 € 80 € 50 € 70 € 100 € 135 € 150
3 Delay min. late 3
like the current 
(also litterature)
20 min. 
delay
10 min. 
delay
not delay
30 min. 
delay
10 min. 
delay
not delay
30 
minutes 
later
20 min. 
delay
not delay
4
Flexibility 
(booking)
descript
ive
3 like the SQ
5
On-board 
services
descript
ive
3
like the SQ/from 
previous survey
Internet&
mobile 
phone
Internet
mobile 
phone 
(stable 
use)
LCC
Internet, mobile phone, Internet&mobile phone Internet, mobile phone, Internet&mobile phone
Elements
not change, change until the departure, change booked 
ticket until 1 hour after the parture
not change, change  until 2 days before the departure 
with ticket supplement (60€), change booked ticket until 
2 days before the departure without ticket supplement
not change, change  until 4 hours before the departure 
with ticket supplement (40€), change booked ticket until 
4 hours before the departure without ticket supplement
OVERALL ATTRIBUTES AND LEVELS
HSR AIR
HSR1-2 FSC
 
Source: own elaboration 
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7.2.2. The choice set definition 
 
As mentioned in the theoretical section, the selection of attributes, attributes-levels and 
their range for SP choice experiments is a very important phase. They should be 
perceived as real by respondents and match the attributes most important to them in 
relation to the transport mode choice for a hypothetical trip in the Ro-Mi corridor. In 
order to do this, particular attention was paid in the following phases related to the 
definition of the choice set elements (choice profiles, attributes, attributes-levels and 
their range): 
 Phase 1: identification,  
 Phase 2: selection, and 
 Phase 3: definition. 
 
CHOICE PROFILES 
Due to the irrelevant competition, in term of time and cost, of the car alternative, the 
following transport modes are used in the SP choice tasks: 
 HSR, 
 FSC, 
 LCC. 
In particular, to simulate the real-world context, two HSR service profiles are included. 
This decision is in line with the considerations provided by the European Commission 
DG TREN (2006) in their survey, that exclude both car and coach modes. 
 
ATTRIBUTES 
To identify which attribute include in the SP exercises a mix approach of existing 
techniques was adopted. With reference to the phases 1 and 2, an ad hoc survey has 
planned and realized. Phase 3 has the result of meticulous simulations in the Ro-Mi 
operators’ websites or other micro ad hoc surveys. 
First, an in-depth analysis of the literature was necessary to identify attributes more 
used (see section 5.2.4). Based on attributes found in the literature review and analysing 
the Ro-Mi operators’ websites to detect particular services features, an ad hoc survey 
was set up in order to select the most important attributes for the Ro-Mi corridor’s 
users. A total of 27 attributes were split in two different group61 and further tested. The 
first group included standard and common mode choice attributes. The second one, 
instead, reported the innovative or operator-related attributes. These groups were 
organized in two different Tables and insert in an ad hoc questionnaire. This 
questionnaire was composed of four parts. The first one was related to the identification 
of the socio-economic information of the respondents’ behaviour in the Ro-Mi corridor; 
the second one was focused on the selection of standard attributes by respondents; the 
selection of the innovative/specific attributes was inserted in the third part. The last 
part was dedicated to test service quality of the rail operator. 
Even in this case, a manual as a support during the interviews process was crated and 
provided to interviewers (in particular with reference to the explanation of each 
attribute meaning62). 
 
                                                                 
61 This is due thanks to the pilot phase of the questionnaire where several respondents underlined the 
complexity to evaluate to much attributes contemporarily. 
62 In some cases, is not a banal issue and could be very important. For instance, differently to English, the 
Italian language uses only one term to identify security and safety issues (“sicurezza”).  
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Table 22 – Questionnaire to identify attribute importance: Standard attributes 
Macro-attribute Micro-attribute To select attributes most 
important 
To assign a maximum 
score f 100% to the 
selected attributes 
Total travel time 
In-vehicle travel time     
Out-of-vehicle travel time     
Access time  x 15 
Waiting time x 15 
Total travel time x 15 
Total ravel cost       
Frequency of use 
      
Accessabilty 
Access time x 25 
Access cost     
Total access     
Comfort   x 10 
Services 
Internet     
Mobil phone     
Possibility to rent a car with driver   2 
Reliability       
Flexibility        
Safety/Security 
safety     
security     
Parking   x 20 
Other:  …………………………………………….      
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Table 23 - Questionnaire to identify attribute importance: Specific attributes  
Macro-attribute Micro-attribute To select attributes most 
important 
To assign a maximum 
score f 100% to the 
selected attributes 
Environmental 
impact of the 
transport mode 
      
Possibility to 
socialize 
      
Class of the service 
(1st, 2nd) 
      
Transport 
availability after the 
point of arrival 
  x 100 
Privacy confidentiality in conversations     
possibility to travel without 
provide personal data 
    
Arrival hour of the 
first morning 
train/flight 
      
Other: 
 …………………….      
Source: own elaboration 
 
In Table 22 and Table 23, complex attributes were included such as travel time and 
accessibility. In this case, respondents’ preference could be specified or for the aggregate 
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attribute (i.e. total travel time) or for only a specific component of it (i.e. in-vehicle travel 
time or/and waiting time). With reference to the attribute related to the hour of the first 
HS train/flight in the morning, an explanation needs. In 2009, analyzing the departure’s 
hour of the two transport modes, due to the high number of business passengers 
travelling from Rome to Milan, the first train scheduled arrived in Milan for 09:30. This 
hour could be too late, also respect to air transport that in the early hours of the 
morning provides a high frequency service. It should be noted that since 2012 the HSR 
departure time has changed allowing the users to get to Milan starting from 08:55. 
To elicit respondents’ preferences with reference to the previous tables, first, it is 
necessary to select which attributes are most important in the mode selection for a 
hypothetical trip in the Ro-Mi corridor; second, a total score of 100% had to be assigned 
at the selected attributes based on their importance to determine mode choice. 
However, before selecting the most preferred attributes the interviewers could add 
other attributes not included at the end of the table.  
Results of the ad hoc survey on attributes’ importance are summarised as follow. 
In 2009, 412 interviews are administered at both rail-HSR station and at the airport 
with a random probabilistic sampling.  
The average profile of the respondent is identified as follow: 
 male; 
 aged 18-70 years (with an average of 39 years of age); 
 working employee (45%): 
 monthly net income between 1.500-2.500 €; 
 arriving at the rail station 10-20 min. before the departure hour; 
 from Rome to Milan; 
 average fare of the ticket (one way): 100€ for airline and 75€ for HSR – see Figure 25 
and Figure 26 for air and HSR’s fare distributions of the respondents; 
 purpose of the travel: business 51% – see Figure 27 for the overall scenario; 
 using the HSR (38%) – see Figure 28 for the overall scenario. 
Other descriptive statistics are provided. 
 
Figure 25 – Overview of the air fares’ of the sample  
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure 26 – Overview of the HSR fares’ of the sample  
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 27 reports an overview of the respondents’ purposes for the last trip in the Ro-Mi 
corridor. The percentage is more consistent for business purpose. Moreover, the type of 
transport mode most used is the HSR (38%) and the FSC (32%). A not negligible 
percentage is due to the LCC’s use (19%) (Figure 28). 
 
 
Figure 27 – Attribute selection survey: purpose of the last Ro-Mi travel 
Purposes % 
business 51%  
leisure 11%  
other 2% 
study 10%  
visiting family, friends and relatives  27%  
Total:  100%  
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Figure 28 - Attribute selection survey: transport mode chosen in the last Ro-Mi travel 
Transport modes % 
car 4% 
fsc 32%  
hsr 38%  
intercity 6% 
lcc 19% 
night regional train  1% 
Total:  100%  
Source: own elaboration 
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Focusing on the transport mode used in the last Ro-Mi travel emerged that (Figure 29 and 
Figure 30): 
 FSC and HSR are used mainly by respondents with a medium-high level of income; 
 Mainly respondents with a low-level of income use LCC. However, a considerable 
portion of respondents with a income ranging between 1.500€-2.500€ uses LCC 
services; 
 HSR is used by the respondents with all types of income’s levels 
 Business is the main purpose for FSC and HSR modes. However, more limited 
portion is present in all the other transport modes (LCC, car, intercity train, night 
regional train); 
 Visiting friends-family-parents purpose is consistent for the HSR mode, with limited 
portion for LCC, intercity train and FSC; 
 Leisure and study purposes are mainly satisfied by the LCC and HSR modes. 
 
 
 
Figure 29 - Attribute selection survey: mode used in the last Ro-Mi travel per respondents’ income 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 30 - Attribute selection survey: mode used in the last Ro-Mi travel per respondents’ purpose  
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure 31 shows the total score obtained for standard attributes. As it might be expected, 
travel time and cost attributes have received the highest score. However, reliability 63 
and comfort attributes are important as well. A good score has obtained from on-board 
services (i.e. internet and mobile phone). With reference to the average score obtained 
by each attribute, Figure 32 shows that accessibility had the highest score (50%), 
followed by the “other” category64, total travel time and travel cost. Going into detail, 
Figure 33 reports the overall score obtained for each standard attribute by type of travel 
purpose in the last Ro-Mi trip. This figure shows interesting results. In fact, the total 
travel time received the highest score for FSC passengers (time sensitive) than LCC 
passengers that are affected mainly by the total travel cost attribute (cost sensitive).  
With reference to the total score received per specific/innovative attributes, a 23% of 
the sample left empty this table due to the secondary and irrelevant importance of these 
types of attributes respect the previous category. Transport availability after the point of 
arrival received the highest score, followed by the environmental impact and the arrival 
of the first morning train attributes. Social and privacy aspects are not particularly 
relevant (Figure 34). No difference is found with the average score by attribute (Figure 35). 
From Figure 36 emerges that the transport availability after the point of arrival is more 
important for LCC passengers due to the distance from LCC airport to the city center. 
The environmental impact is most important for HSR passengers, being the “cleanest” 
mode of transport. FSC passengers are sensible to the arrival time of the first morning 
train. The class of service is important only for FSC and HSR, as well as confidentiality of 
conversations.  
Subsequently, a comparison between the results of the literature review and those of 
this survey has made in order to select the final attributes to include in the SP 
experiments. This comparison shows strong similarities, but adding useful indication 
towards innovative attributes often neglected and not tested (i.e. comfort, on-board 
services - such as internet and mobile phone -, security/safety, privacy and social 
aspects).  
Finally, the selected 5 attributes were: 
 Total travel time – TTT (including the time spent from home/office to arrive to the 
station/airport – access time, the in-vehicle travel time, the out-of-vehicle travel 
time – waiting time, and the egress time); 
 Total travel cost – TTC (including the access and egress cost and the single ticket),  
 Delay – DEL (numbers of minutes of delay); 
 Flexibility – FLEX (possibility to change the ticket bought before the departure 
date); 
 On-board services – SERV (possibility to use on-board services during the travel). 
 
 
 
                                                                 
63 Reliability was described to respondents as the number of minutes of delay.  
64 This category includes all attributes not included in the table but added by the respondents as it is 
considered important.  
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
119 
 
Figure 31 - Standard attributes: total score received 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure 32 - Standard attributes: average score received  
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure 33 – Standard attributes: overall score per transport mode used in the last RO-MI travel 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure 34 – Specific/innovative attributes: total score received  
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Figure 35 - Specific/innovative attributes: average score received  
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure 36 - Specific/innovative attributes: average score per transport mode used in the last Ro-Mi travel 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
ATTRIBUTES-LEVELS AND RANGE 
 
After attributes selecting, their levels have to be determined as well. For TTT and TTC, 5 
levels are considered and formulated, using the information obtained with the attribute 
selection survey and with further data obtained by the website of the Ro-Mi air-HSR 
transport operators.  
For each attributes, a status quo level was calculated, and also positive and negative 
percentage variations. 
 
Total Travel Time 
 
TTT components for HSR alternative were computed in the following way (Table 24): 
 Station to station: data obtained from the Trenitalia website 65; 
 Access and egress time: average data obtained by a simulation model provided by 
the Department of Engineering of the Roma Tre University; 
 Waiting time: data obtained from the attribute selection survey. 
 
TTT components for AIRLINES were computed in the following way (Table 25): 
 Airport  to airport: data obtained from both Alitalia-Cai and Ryanair website66; 
 Access and egress time: average data obtained by a simulation model provided by 
the Department of Engineering of the Roma Tre University; 
 Waiting time: data obtained from the analysis of the literature review. 
 
 
                                                                 
65 In two years this data was further reduced. Currently the faster journey is provided by Trenitala (2 
hours and 55 minutes). 
66 There are not differences for this component of travel time.  
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Table 24 – Attribute-levels definition: TTT for HSR 
TTT for HSR  
TTT components:  data value   
station to station 3h 30 min.   
access time 20 min.    
egress time 1 h   
waiting time  5 min.   
Total:  4 h 50 min.   
     
% used=10 and 20  min. Levels round off 
++ 5h 48min. 5h 50min. 
+ 5h 19min. 5h 20min. 
SQ 4h 55min. 4h 50min. 
- 4h 21min. 4h 20min. 
-- 3h 52min. 3h 50min. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Table 25 - Attribute-levels definition: TTT for FSC and LCC  
TTT for FSC and LCC 
TTT components:  data value   
airport to airport 1 h 10 min.   
access time 50 min.    
check-in and boarding time  1 h   
egress time 1 h   
waiting time (bagagge and passport) 20 min.    
Total:  4 h 10 min.   
     
% used=10 and 20  min. levels round off 
++ 5h 28min. 5h 30min. 
+ 4h 36min. 4h 35min. 
SQ 4h 10min. 4h 10min. 
- 3h 44min. 3h 45min. 
-- 3h 18min. 3h 20min. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Total Travel Cost 
 
TTC components for HSR were computed in the following way (Table 26): 
 Ticket price: data obtained from the attribute selection survey and compared with 
simulations carried out in the Ro-Mi operators’ websites; 
 Access and egress cost: these data are calculated with a simulation model provided 
by the Department of engineering of Rome Tre University, computing an average 
distance simulating a journey by car from 18 different points of the city to Termini 
and Fiumicino airport. Same method was used to quantify the access/egress for 
public transport always to Termini and Fiumicino. These data are calculated for 
both Roman and Milan context and then calculate the average value. 
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Table 26 - Attribute-levels definition: TTC for HSR 
TTC components:  SQ: 80 euro; % used=40 and 60 
 --   SQ + ++ - SQ + ++ 
ticket price (single way)  €          130   €         115   €         80   €         50   €         30  
access/egress cost   €              5   €             5   €           5   €           5   €           5  
Total:   €          135   €         120   €         85   €         55   €         35  
Source: own elaboration 
 
TTC components for FSC and LCC were computed separately in the following way 
(respectively, Table 27 and Table 28): 
 Ticket price: data obtained from the attribute selection survey and compared with 
simulations carried out in the Ro-Mi operators’ websites. Simulations were carried 
out 2 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, and 1 month before the departure date. Since ticket 
prices vary greatly depending on much time before it is boo ked and the type of 
ticket, for the following air routes (LIN-FCO, MXP-FCO, BGY-FCO, BGY-CIA) and 
operators (Alitalia, AirOne, Easjyet, Ryanair) a minimum and maximum prices have 
been collected one day, one week, two weeks, one month before the departure date. 
 Access and egress cost: these data are calculated with the same simulation model67 
used for the HSR mode. 
 
 
Table 27 - Attribute-levels definition: TTC for FSC  
TTC components:  SQ: 125 euro; % used=40 and 60 
 --   SQ + ++ - SQ + +  
ticket price (single way)  €  50   €  75   € 125   € 175   € 200  
access/egress cost   €  25   €   25   € 25   €  25   € 25  
Total:   €  75   €  100   € 150   € 200   € 225  
round off  €  80   € 105   € 150   € 195   € 220  
Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 28 - Attribute-levels definition: TTC for LCC  
TTC components:  Attribute-levels 
 --  - SQ + ++ 
ticket price (single way)  € 30   €  50   €  80   €  110   € 130  
access/egress cost   € 25   €  25   €  25   €  25   € 25  
Total:   € 55   €  75   €  105   €  135   €  155  
round off  € 50   €  70   € 100   € 135   €  150  
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Delay 
 
This attribute was differentiated between FSC and LCC because LCC are often more in 
delay respect FSC. DEL for HSR was computed with a micro-survey carried out at the 
Termini rail station where the delay was observed for all HSRs for 8 days from 06:15 to 
19:30.  
                                                                 
67 Aspects changed: simulated only 9 trip from the city center to Central rail station and Linate airport.  
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DEL for FSC and LCC was obtained from both Aeroporti di Roma 68 (ADR) website and 
data from the literature. ADR website provides data of the flights delay. It was possible 
to calculate an average flight delay. Available data were reference to the following air 
routes and airlines: 
 Routes: LIN-FCO, MXP-FCO, BGY-FCO; 
 Airlines: Alitalia, AirOne, Easyjet, Lufthansa. 
No data of Ryanair’s delay are available. In this case, data from the literature is used. An 
overview is reported in Table 29. 
 
Table 29 - Attribute-levels definition: DEL for HSR, FSC and LCC  
DEL per mode Attribute-levels 
  - SQ  + 
HSR 
minutes of delay on time 10 min.  20 min.  
FSC 
minutes of delay on time 10 min.  30 min.  
LCC 
minutes of delay on time 20 min.  30 min.  
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Flexibility 
 
Data were obtained from the Ro-Mi operators’ website (respectively, Trenitalia, Alitalia-
Cai and Ryanair). The attributes-levels for FSC and LCC are different. An overview is 
reported in Table 30. 
 
Table 30 - Attribute-levels definition: FLEX for HSR, FSC and LCC  
HSR 
ticket change until the departure date 
ticket change until 1 hour after the departure date  
ticket change not allowed 
FSC 
ticket change until 2 days before the departure date without a supplement  
ticket change until 2 days before the departure date with a supplement of 60 euro 
ticket change not allowed 
LCC 
ticket change until 4 hours before the departure date without a supplement  
ticket change until 4 hours before the departure date with a supplement of 40 euro 
ticket change not allowed 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
68 ADR is the airport operator of the Roman airports (FCO, CIA).  
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On-Board Service 
 
No substantial differences there were for its attribute-levels. Only for HSR, a clarification 
for the “mobile phone” option is provided to respondents69 (Table 31). 
 
Table 31 - Attribute-levels definition: SERV for HSR, FSC and LCC  
HSR 
mobile phone (stable use even through the tunnels)  
internet 
mobile phone (stable use even through the tunnels) and internet  
FSC and LCC 
mobile phone 
internet 
mobile phone and internet 
Source: own elaboration 
 
7.2.3. The RP and SP questionnaire  
 
Questionnaire sections are summarized in 5 point  (Figure 37). The questionnaire was 
differentiated by number of choice experiments and by type of support used to 
administer interviews (paper and file). Using word and excel office packages, 12 
questionnaires per each interviewer were created and delivered. After an intensive 
tutorial phase on how to manage these questionnaires and to administer personal 
interview and which procedure and rules they must to follow, the interviewers were 
able to choose the type of questionnaire based on the specific situation in which they 
were. When the paper solution was chosen, a subsequent data entry phase was 
necessary. In the other case, interviews were automatically summarized in an excel file. 
As a result, a mix of techniques was used to collect data: PAPI, CAPI, EMS.  
1.380 questionnaires were administered. 
Questionnaire were administered not only in places related to transport such as 
shopping center, hospital, post, gym, on the road etc. (Table 32). 
 
Table 32 – Places of the interviews administration  
Places % of int.  
At home/work 2% 
Ciampino airport (outside)  6% 
Fiumicino airport (inside) 21%  
Fiumicino airport (outside)  16%  
Hospital, post, gym  6% 
Metro 1% 
On the road 2% 
HSR station 36%  
Shopping center 7% 
University 3% 
Total:  100% 
                                                                 
69 Due to the numerous unwired tunnel in the Ro-M corridor, the mobile phone use was possible but 
unstable. Over time Trenitalia has taken steps to stabilize the use of this service.  
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Source: own elaboration 
 
 
 
Figure 37 – Sections of the Ro-Mi questionnaire 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
The first part (pre-interview) highlights the specific information regarding socio -
economic status and frequency of air- HSR use in the Ro-Mi corridor. 
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The second part concerns RP choice experiment. The description of the last trip in the 
Ro-Mi corridor (also the “not chosen alternative” has required). Moreover, other data 
are collected in order to perform also segmentation analysis (i.e. purpose of the travel, 
other transport mode considered, who choose the transport mode to travel, place of 
departure, representativeness of the described travel with the typical one etc.) 
Figure 38 shows the questionnaire section that the respondent had to fill in. It contains 
the same attribute than the SP choice tasks (except for on-board services because was 
not present at the time of the administration of the interviews in the real-life context). In 
the test phase of the questionnaire, aimed to check for clarity and comprehensibility of 
all questions included, important feedback have obtained with reference to the 
flexibility attribute. In fact, an open question was not the right choice involved the 
obtaining of numerous responses slightly different. For this reason, in order to avoid this 
critical point and to compare RP with SP data, a selection of the most representative 
attribute-levels are carried out and provided to the final version of the questionnaire. 
A specific legend and the interviewer supported respondents in this phase, and also for 
the description of the transport alternative “not chosen” but considered. 
 
Figure 38 – Part 2 of the Ro-Mi questionnaire: RP choice task  
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
The third part of the questionnaire focused on SP choice exercises. An example of SP 
task is shows Table 33. In addition, a legend with the description of the attributes was 
provided. 
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Table 33 – SP choice task 
Characteristics 
of the transport 
service:  
HSR1 HSR2 
FULL SERVICE 
CARRIER 
LOW COST 
CARRIER 
Total Travel 
Time: 
5 h 50 min. 4 h 20 min. 4 h 10 min. 3 h 45 min. 
Total Travel 
Cost:  
€ 35 € 70  € 150  € 100 
Delay:  10 min.  not delay  30 min.  not delay  
 
of delay  
 
of delay  
 
Flexibility 
(booking):  
change ticket until 
1 hour after the 
departure 
not change ticket 
change ticket until 
2 days before the 
departure 
(without pay a 
extra-fee) 
not change ticket 
On-board 
Service: 
internet 
mobile phone 
(stable use) 
mobile phone 
internet and 
mobile phone 
I WOULD 
CHOOSE: 
? ? ? ? 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Each respondent have to answer at minimum 5 and maximum 15 choice tasks. 99% of 
respondents answered at 5 exercises. Just a limited case of the sample belongs to the 
latter case because of the excessive length of the questionnaire.  
In the fourth part (post-interview) some questions about respondent attitudes or 
questions related at the choice tasks’ answers are requested. In particular, attribute 
attendance by each attribute and by each transport mode; cut-off by each transport 
mode; complexity of the questionnaire; environmental and safety/security importance 
etc. 
In the last fifth part (post questionnaire quality controls) the interviewers’ evaluation of 
the difficulty and of the level of attention of the respondents during the interview 
process are collected. These types of data are very useful for the interpretation of the 
models’ results. 
After the creation of the questionnaire, a preliminary testing phase was necessary. 
 
 
 
7.2.4.  The management of the data collection  
 
Recruitment and instruction of interviewers 
Due to the no financial support to engage professional interviewers to administer 
interviews, another strategy was found. The most economical solution in terms of cost 
but not in terms of time is the use of university students. Reasons for this choice are not 
only economic, but also, and primarily, linked to the needs related to the administration 
of these activities. In fact, due to the research methodology adopted not only in term of 
experimental design strategy, a relevant need for direct and timely feedback from  the 
interviewers is an essential feature. 
9 interviewers were employed. The training phase of the interviewers was very 
important because that affect both data quality and, subsequently, models’ results. 
Tutorial and questionnaires content explanatory meetings for each interviewer were 
performed. Moreover, a manual was provided to help the interviewer in preparation of 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
131 
 
the interview administration phase (Annex 3). Moreover, another manual was created 
and provided for the data entry phase (Annex 4). In particular, the “Manual of the good 
interviewer”70 highlighted the main aspects that should be considered during the 
interview by the interviewer (Ferrini, 2005): 
 understanding of the research problem by the interviewer; 
 knowledge of the sampling technique used; 
 knowledge of the geographical area of investigation; 
 willing to listen and to communicate with the respondent. 
 
Figure 39 – Content of the “Manual of the good interviewer” 
 
Source: Filippi (2010) 
 
 
Supervision of the interviewers 
 
Interviewers were supervised in different ways: 
 SMS and e-mail; 
 Information and communication platform and information exchange (a creation of a  
Google Group entitled “Progetto Ro-Mi”) in order to share files and discussions; 
 Helpline during interviews. 
 
Table 34 – Distribution of the interviews administered by each interviewer 
Interviewers’ code % N. of interviews administered  
AB 8% 
AF 20%  
AS 8% 
GG 5% 
AG 8% 
SI 24%  
LP 8% 
GT 8% 
VP 10%  
Total: 100%  
Source: own elaboration 
                                                                 
70 This manual was created by the Roma Tre Reaserch Unit that collaborates at the Report VOLVO (Filippi, 
2010) and adapted to the RO-MI questionnaire.  
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7.3. Descriptive results 
 
With reference to socio-economic data collected with the Ro-Mi survey emerged as 
follow summarized (Table 35). Most of the respondents were male (57%), with less of 40 
years of age (62%) and with a university education (46%). As expected, related to the 
current employment, the most significant percentage is attributable to employees 
(37%). Consistent percentages of freelances and managers were detected (respectively, 
21% and 12%). Related to the per capita net income the 33% of respondents earns an 
income between 501€ and 1.500€, followed by a 23% who earns an income level 
between 1.501€ and 2.500€. However, 26% of sample earns more than 2.501€. 
 
Focusing on respondents’ income, Table 36 shows the distribution of the sample by type 
of transport mode used in the last trip in the Ro-Mi corridor. In particular, respect to LCC 
and HSR, for FSC mode there are more respondents with upper income-levels. However, 
between HSR and LCC there are not significant differences.  
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Table 35 – Overview of the socio-economic dat a 
Socio-economic data:    
 Gender:  Men Female               
 57%  43%                
 Age: 16-40 
years old 
41-60 
years old  
> 61 years old              
 62%  30%  8%             
 Education: Primary Secondary High school University Post-
University 
        
 0% 6% 40%  46%  8%         
 Employment: Employee Manager Freelance Student Student-
worker 
Retired Housewife Unemployed  Other 
 37%  12%  21%  12%  7% 5% 1% 4% 1% 
 Per-capita net 
income:  
< 500€ 501€ - 
1.500€ 
1.501€ - 
2.500€ 
2.501€ - 
3.500€ 
3.501€ - 
4.500€ 
> 4.500€       
 17%  33%  23%  13%  7% 6%       
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 36 – Per-capita net income of respondents per transport mode used in the last Ro-Mi travel 
Levels of income Transport mode used  
in the last Ro-Mi travel 
HSR FSC LCC Total: 
< 500€ 17% 4% 28% 14% 
501€ - 1.500€ 32% 23% 35% 29% 
1.501€ - 2.500€ 24% 31% 19% 26% 
2.501€ - 3.500€ 13% 22% 9% 16% 
3.501€ - 4.500€ 9% 11% 3% 9% 
> 4.500€ 5% 10% 6% 7% 
Total:  100% 101% 100% 101% 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
With reference to the frequency of HSR and air transport use in the last Ro-Mi travel, 
respondents’ responses are very similar. In fact, almost half of the sample has never 
made a trip (respectively, 48% and 41%) or occasionally (respectively, 45% and 51%). 
Nobody makes this trip every day. 
 
 
Table 37 - Frequency of use of the HSR/AIR transport modes in the Ro-Mi corridor  
 
Every day 
More than once 
per week  
Once a week  Occasionally Never 
Frequency of 
use of the HSR 
mode  
0% 2% 5% 45%  48%  
Frequency of 
use of the AIR 
mode 
0% 2% 7% 51%  41%  
Source: own elaboration 
 
An important section of the questionnaire was dedicated at the description of the last 
Ro-Mi trip. Table 38 details it. The travel profile of an average respondent for a Ro-Mi trip 
is characterized as follow: 
 travel for business; 
 using a HSR; 
 buying in autonomy own ticket; and 
 during the transport mode choice, not considering any other transport mode. 
 
Focusing on the transport mode used in the last Ro-Mi trip by type of travel purpose 
(Table 39), a high concentration of the business was found (overall, 54%). However, 
differentiating by transport mode used this percentage is in all modes consistent, but in 
particular for FSC (72%). 
Furthermore, a detailed analysis, reported in Table 40, provides interesting information 
about the transport modes considerate during the transport mode choice process but 
“not chosen”. In fact, almost the half of the sample not considers any other transport 
mode (overall, 46%). However, this percentage is less for LCC (33%) than for other 
modes (HSR – 55%, FSC - 41%), meaning that respondents that have chosen  in the last 
Ro-Mi trip a LCC are more willing to consider other modes (in particular, only HSR – 
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28% and only FSC – 27%). Moreover, respondents travelled by FSC have considered 
mainly only HSR (36%), while for HSR, even slightly, only LCC (18%) represent the main 
choice alternative. 
 
Table 38 – Description of the last Ro-Mi trip  
Description of the LAST Ro-Mi trip:  
 
Travel purpose:  Tourism Business Study 
Visiting 
friends, 
relatives, 
parents 
Other 
  
 
18%  54%  6% 21%  2% 
  
Transport mode 
used: 
HSR FSC LCC 
    
 
43%  40%  17%  
    
Decision of the 
transport mode 
used: 
Respondent  Employer Other 
    
 
80%  18%  3% 
    
Transport modes 
considered in the 
mode choice:  
only HSR  only FSC only LCC 
HSR + 
FSC 
HSR + 
LCC 
FSC + 
LCC 
None 
 
19%  11%  15%  2% 3% 5% 46%  
Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 39 – RO-MI purpose per transport mode used in the last Ro-Mi travel 
Travel purpose 
Transport mode used in last Ro-
Mi travel 
Purpose:  HSR FSC LCC Total:  
Tourism 21%  10%  28%  18%  
Business 42%  72%  43%  54%  
Study 6% 4% 6% 6% 
Visiting friends, relatives, parents  27%  13%  21%  21%  
Other 3% 1% 2% 2% 
Total:  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 40 – Transport modes considered in the choice by transport mode used in the last Ro-Mi trip 
Transport modes combination  
Transport mode used in last 
Ro-Mi travel 
Listo f combination:  HSR FSC LCC Total:  
Only HSR  0% 36%  28%  19%  
Only FSC 15%  0% 27%  11%  
Only LCC 18%  17%  0% 15%  
HSR + FSC 0% 0% 12%  2% 
HSR + LCC 0% 0% 0% 3% 
FSC + LCC 12%  0% 0% 5% 
None 55%  41%  33%  46%  
Total:  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: own elaboration 
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With reference to the questionnaire’s post-interview, cut-off by transport mode, 
attributes attendance, level of complexity of the questionnaire, and 
environmental/safety-security importance are collected and below reported. 
Cut-off analysis reports, with reference to the unwilling to use a transport mode, a 
limited percentage for HSR (8%) and more consistent percentage for FSC (27%) and LCC 
(25%) (Table 41).  
In the questionnaire attributes attendance are place after all SP choice tasks. In 
particular, attributes attendance are collected for each transport mode (HSC, FSC, LCC) 
and for each attribute (TTT, TTC, DEL, FLEX, SERV). Table 42 shows an overview of 
attributes attendance’s results, highlighting consistent percentages of “not considered” 
for the following attributes: flexibility and on-board services. 
Related to the willingness to pay an extra-fee to reduce the environmental impact 
generated with own travel, there are not differences by transport mode used, underling 
an overall and positive willingness to pay an extra-fee (see five-point Likert scale in Table 
43). 
Safety issue in transport industry is very important and it seem that not substantial 
differences are found between transport modes (HSR and AIR) (Table 43). 
Table 44 reports the perception of the respondent’s difficulty during the questionnaire 
administration. In particular, for almost 70% of the sample, the questionnaire retained 
not complex. However, the section that requires a greater respondent’s effort was, as 
expected, the description of the last Ro-Mi travel (in particular for those respondents 
who had not yet never travelled in this corridor and for which it was asked a greater 
effort to define specific attributes).  
 
Table 41 – Cut-off on transport mode 
Cut off on transport mode: 
Transport modes:  selectable not selectable 
HSR 92%  8% 
FSC 73%  27%  
LCC 75%  25%  
Source: own elaboration 
Note: Question: “what transport mode would not you choose never?”.  
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
137 
 
Table 42 – Attributes attendance by transport mode 
Attributes attendance by transport mode:  
Transport modes Total Travel Time Total Travel Cost Delay Flexibility On-board Services 
considered not 
considered 
considered not 
considered 
considered not 
considered 
considered not 
considered 
considered not 
considered 
HSR 86%  14%  82%  18%  78%  22%  45%  55%  41%  59%  
FSC 87%  13%  81%  19%  79%  21%  49%  51%  42%  58%  
LCC 86%  14%  82%  18%  79%  21%  47%  53%  41%  59%  
Source: own elaboration 
Note: Question: “which attributes have you not considered in the previous choices? There are differences by type of transport?”.  
 
 
Table 43 – Respondents’ opinions on environmental and safety issues  
Question 1: Willingness to pay an extra-fee to reduce the environmental impact generated with own travel: 
Transport modes Very willing       not willing at all 
1 2 3 4 5 
HSR 28% 18% 26% 11% 17% 
AIR 28% 18% 26% 11% 17% 
            
Question 2: Importance of the safety in the transport sector: 
  Very important       not important at all 
  1 2 3 4 5 
HSR 78% 9% 9% 1% 3% 
AIR 80% 8% 8% 1% 2% 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: Question 1: “Would you be willing to pay an extra-fee on your ticket to reduce the environmental i mpact generated from your travel?”. Question 2: “In your 
opinion, how important is the guarantee of a high level of safety in the transport sector?”.  
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Table 44 – Complexity of the questionnaire administered 
  Sections of the questionnaire  
Complexity of the 
questionnaire:  
1 2 3 4 5 
68%  19%  10%  2% 1% 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: Question: “In your opinion, what is the part of the questionnaire where the respondent has 
encountered any particular difficulties?”.  
Section 1: any particular difficulty in any part of the questionnaire; Section 2; description of the last Ro-Mi  
trip (RP data) and question of the frequency of use of transport mode in the Ro-Mi corridor; Section 3: SP 
choice tasks; 4: socio-economic, environmental and safety questions etc.  
 
Table 45 and Table 46 reported the interviewers’ evaluations of respondents’ behaviour 
during the interview. No particular difficulties are perceived by interviewers in the 
almost 80% of the sample. Only the RP data description was perceived in the 11% of 
cases difficult for the respondents. This result matches with the previous consideration 
reported Table 44. 
With reference to the level of respondents’ attention, great results are found (Table 46). 
 
 
Table 45 – Respondents’ difficulties perceived by the interviewers 
 Socio-economic, 
environmental 
and security-
safety questions 
SP choice 
tasks 
Transport 
modes use, 
description of 
the last Ro-Mi 
trip 
No particular 
difficulties 
Respondents' difficulties  4% 9% 11%  76%  
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Table 46 – Respondents’ attention perceived by the interviewers 
Respondents' attention  
 very high level    very high level 
 Levels of attention  1 2 3 4 5 
Respondents’ attention  39% 43%  14%  3% 0% 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
 
7.4. Econometric results 
 
7.4.1.  Models 
 
In this section the econometric analysis with maximum likelihood estimates are reported 
and detailed. An overview of the all variables used in the estimation process is reported 
in Annex 6. The aim is to provide for RP, SP and combined SP-RP data sources different 
econometric models in order to analyze travellers’ preferences between HSR operators, 
a FSC and a LCC. These analyses intended to simulate the real passenger transport 
market in the Ro-Mi corridor.  
First, separate RP and SP models were estimated (MNL, NL, ML models). Below is 
reported just a synthetic description. All the RP and SP models’ outputs are attached 
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respectively in Annex 7 and 8. However, the joint RP-SP models were reported and 
described in section 7.4.1.3. 
For each model the utility function, log-likelihood function as well as some measures for 
the goodness-of-fit (AIC71, BIC72, R2 and R2-adj.73) are shown.  
 
 
7.4.1.1.  RP models 
 
With the questionnaire also the RP data was collected for each respondent. Each of them 
has described the last (or current) trip in the Ro-Mi corridor. However, even people who 
have never made a trip had no difficulty in describing their possible Ro-Mi choicest as it 
is a very common and no strange and incoherent values were found in the dataset. A 
total of 1.275 observations were used to calibrate RP models. Interview of the ‘Wave 1’ 
(pilot test) and of the ‘Wave 2’ were excluded. Respondents had to fill in a table in which 
they had to describe a high speed rail service and an airline. For the air transport option, 
they specified if the described air transport service was a full service carrier or a low 
cost carrier. 
To explore the RP data, different choice models were estimated (MNL, NL, ML models).  
Figure 40 and Figure 41 report the main goodness-of-fit measures used to indicate if a 
model improve the previous one or not. On this point, it is important stress the attention 
in particular on AIC and BIC measures rather than on R2 and R2-adj. However, show 
these measures for all estimated RP models. 
 
 
A brief summary of 6 RP-models’ results: 
 
RP-M1 
RP Multinomial logit model: 
A generic MNL model shows an improved goodness-of-fit of the model (in term of AIC 
and BIC measures) respect the only-constant MNL. Moreover, all coefficients have the 
expected sign and are significant (except for delay attribute). 
 
 
RP-M2 
RP Multinomial logit model with coefficients mode specific: 
A further step was to explore the possible difference in the coefficients’ sensitivity of 
respondents between the two transport modes. The goodness-of-fit of this model is 
further enhanced. Also in this model the sign of the coefficients is correct and significant. 
Consistent differences between the magnitudes of the coefficients’ values were found for 
the following attributes: total travel time, total travel cost and flexibility. On the 
contrary, the coefficients of the delay attribute were quite similar (and for this reason, 
                                                                 
71 Akaike’s Information Cri terion (AIC):  2*  –  LogL K . 
72 Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC):   2*   ( * /LogL K Ln n n  , where K  is the number of 
parameters estimated and n  is the number of observations.  
73 McFadden Pseudo-R2 : 
0
1 ( )
LogL
LogL
  . 
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this attribute was not specified by transport mode). For instance, the total travel time 
coefficient for the air transport option (-0.01137) is greater of the HSR transport option 
(-0.00421). This means that for respondents there is a different sensitivity towards the 
total travel time attribute between air and rail transport modes. 
However, the delay attribute has a right sign but in this case became significant. 
 
 
RP-M3 
RP Multinomial logit model with socio-economic and behavioural data: 
An important objective was to investigate if there is an important impact of socio-
economic data on the mode choice. The goodness-of-fit of this model is improved. All 
coefficients have the correct sign and are significant (except for delay). In addition, the 
coefficients of the socio-economic variable tested (income dummy coded for the air 
transport option) have a positive sign (as expected) and are significant. That means that 
an increase of income level has a positive impact in choosing the air transport option .  
 
 
RP-M4 
RP Nested logit model: 
A generic NL model was also estimated. The goodness-of-fit of this model is worse than 
the previous model and similar to that of model with constants only. Moreover, IV 
parameters are found as fixed and equivalent to 1.0., and such should collapse into a 
single branch, which is equivalent to a MNL model. This suggests preferring a MNL 
model rather than a NL model. 
 
 
RP-M-5 
RP Mixed logit model: 
Also in the case of a generic ML model in which total travel time and cost were tested as 
random variables (with triangular distributions), the overall goodness-of-fit was not 
particularly good. However, this model highlights heterogeneity for travel time and cost 
attributes, founding the total travel cost is the most heterogeneous variable. 
 
 
RP-M6 
RP Mixed logit model with socio-economic data: 
A further step respect the previous ML model was to include socio-economic data. The 
goodness-of-fit is improved respect the only-constant MNL. Also in this case total travel 
time and cost were introduced in the utility function to take in consideration 
heterogeneity. The average sensitivity of total travel time and cost depend mainly on 
income variables introduced as dummy variables. Lastly, also in this model the total 
travel cost is the most heterogeneous variable. 
 
Also a Latent class model (LCM) was estimated but their results are not reported. 
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Figure 40 – Overview of the goodness-of-fit for RP models: AIC and BIC measures  
 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: RP-M0= only-constant MNL; RP-M1=generic MNL; RP-M2= MNL with mode specific coefficients ; 
RP-M3= MNL with socioeconomic data; RP-M4= generic NL; RP-M5= generic ML; RP-M6= ML with 
socioeconomic data.  
 
Figure 41 – Overview of the goodness-of-fit for RP models: McFadden R
2
 and McFadden R
2
–Adj. measures 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: RP-M0= only-constant MNL; RP-M1=generic MNL; RP-M2= MNL with mode specific coefficients ; 
RP-M3= MNL with socioeconomic data; RP-M4= generic NL; RP-M5= generic ML; RP-M6= ML with 
socioeconomic data.  
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7.4.1.2. SP models 
 
A total of 6.390 observations were used to calibrate SP models. Four alternatives (HSR1, 
HSR2, FSC, LCC) were proposed in each choice experiment. Also in this case, to explore 
the SP data, different choice models were estimated (MNL, NL, ML models).  
Figure 42 and Figure 43 report the main goodness-of-fit measures used to indicate if a 
model improve the previous one or not. On this point, it is important stress the attention 
in particular on AIC and BIC measures rather than on R2 and R2-adj. However, show 
these measures for all estimated RP models. 
 
A brief summary of 6 SP-models’ results: 
 
SP-M1 
SP Multinomial logit model: 
A generic MNL model shows an improved goodness-of-fit of the model (in term of AIC 
and BIC measures) respect the only-constant MNL. Moreover, all coefficients have the 
expected sign and are significant (except for flexibility attribute – that it is not significant 
– and for service on-board attribute – that it is significant but with a wrong sign). Total 
travel cost and time have an important t-statistic value (respectively, of -33.308 and -
24.937). 
 
 
SP-M2 
SP Multinomial logit model with coefficients mode specific: 
A further step was to explore the possible difference in the coefficients’ sensitivity  of 
respondents between the two transport modes. The goodness-of-fit of this model is 
further enhanced. Also in this model the sign of the coefficients are as in the previous 
MNL model. Consistent differences between the magnitudes of the coefficients’ values 
were found in all attributes (except for total travel cost). This means that for 
respondents there is a different sensitivity towards the total travel time attribute 
between air and rail transport modes. The attribute most important for air transport 
option is the total travel time, while for the high speed rail option id the total travel cost.  
 
 
SP-M3 
SP Multinomial logit model with socio-economic data: 
An important objective was to investigate if there is an important impact of socio-
economic data on the mode choice. The goodness-of-fit of this model respect the only-
constant MNL is improved. All coefficients have the correct sign and are significant 
(except for flexibility and service on-board as in SP-M1). In addition, the coefficients of 
the socio-economic variable tested (income dummy coded for the air transport option) 
have a positive sign (as expected) but only the “high income level” variable is significant. 
That means that moving from a “low income level” basic-variable to a “medium income 
level” variable, there is no impact in choosing the air transport option. However, moving 
from a “low income level” basic-variable to a “high income level” variable, there is a 
strong w positive impact in choosing the air transport option. 
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SP-M4 
SP Nested logit model: 
A generic NL model was also estimated. Respect the previous models, the goodness-of-fit 
of this model is worse. Moreover, are found differences in the IV parameters. 
 
SP-M5 
SP Mixed logit model: 
Estimating a generic ML model in which total travel time, total travel cost and service 
on-board were tested as random variables (with triangular distributions), the overall 
goodness-of-fit is rather improved. However, this model highlights heterogeneity for all 
the attributes tested as random variables, founding the service on-board is the most 
heterogeneous variable. 
 
SP-M6 
SP Mixed logit model with socio-economic data: 
A further step respect the previous generic ML model was to include socio-economic 
data. The goodness-of-fit is consistently improved respect the only-constant MNL. Also 
in this case total travel time, cost and service on-board were introduced in the utility 
function to take in consideration heterogeneity. The socio-economic data tested in order 
to explain the heterogeneity were: income, gender, age and level of instruction. Results 
show that the average sensitivity of total travel time depend mainly on income, sex, age 
and instruction, while the average sensitivity of total travel cost depends on income and 
age of respondents. Lastly, service on-board’s sensitivity depends on income and level of 
instruction. The most heterogeneous variable is the service on-board attribute. 
Also a Latent class model (LCM) was estimated but their results are not reported. 
 
Figure 42 – Overview of the goodness-of-fit for SP models: AIC and BIC measures 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: RP-M0= only-constant MNL; RP-M1=generic MNL; RP-M2= MNL with mode specific coefficients ; 
RP-M3= MNL with socioeconomic data; RP-M4= generic NL; RP-M5= generic ML; RP-M6= ML with 
socioeconomic data.  
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Figure 43 – Overview of the goodness-of-fit for SP models: McFadden R
2
 and McFadden R
2
–Adj. measures 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: RP-M0= only-constant MNL; RP-M1=generic MNL; RP-M2= MNL with mode specific coefficients ; 
RP-M3= MNL with socioeconomic data; RP-M4= generic NL; RP-M5= generic ML; RP-M6= ML with 
socioeconomic data.  
 
 
7.4.1.3.  Joint SP-RP models 
 
Because the main aim of this research is to identify the current market shares and 
simulate different policy changes, the RP data has been collected. The ASCs estimated 
from the SP data are likely to be behaviourally meaningless while those obtained from 
RP data sources are likely to be substantive behavioural value. For further details on SP-
RP merging, see section 6.3. 
 
Below the three different joint SP-RP models estimated: 
1- Joint 1: “Tricky” Nested Logit Model: 
2- Joint 2: Joint SP-RP Multinomial logit model 
3- Joint 3: Joint SP-RP generic Mixed logit model 
4- Joint 4: Joint SP-RP Mixed logit model with socio-economic data. 
 
In pooling SP and RP data sources, the most common and recent practice is to use a two-
level Nested Logit model with one branch including all the RP alternatives and a second 
branch for SP alternatives. Figure 44 shows this. This model structure allows also 
analysing the scale parameters74 of the two datasets. 
                                                                 
74 The scale parameter, or IV parameter, scales the coefficients to reflect the variance  of the unobserved 
portion of utility. 
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Figure 44 - Pooling RP and SP data sources 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: HSR: high speed rail, FSC: full service carrier, LCC: low cost carrier  
 
Moreover, usually RP parameters and SP constant terms (ASCs) are discarded while the 
remaining parameters to form composite utility functions. After estimating the NL 
model, a MNL model on only RP data was calibrated replacing by the SP parameters 
estimates obtained from the initial SP-RP NL model while the remaining components are 
left as are. With this operation, fixing the SP parameters, the RP constant terms of 
alternatives (ASCs) are calculated. 
The following section reports the initial SP-RP NL model and the subsequent reports the 
NL model results. 
 
 
 
7.4.1.3.1.  Nested Logit models 
 
The overall goodness-of-fit is very good (AIC=17629.4, R2-adj.=0.4155). With reference 
to the parameters’ sign, all parameters show the expected sign (except SERVICE – 
service on-board). TIME, COST and DELAY are negative and significant at 1%, meaning 
that an increase of these parameters correspond a decrease in the utility. F LEX has the 
correct sign but is not significant for SP data. A particular situation is for the SERVICE 
coefficient. Its expected sign is positive, because an increase of SERVICE provided during 
own travel correspond an increase of the own utility. However, this coefficient reports a 
negative sign and it is significant at 1%.  
The ASCs (taking HSR as the reference) turned out to be significant  and with positive 
sign for FSC, indicating that it would be preferred to the reference mode, however, for 
LCC mode the sign is negative meaning that respondents prefer the reference mode 
(HSR) to this transport option. However, the RP ASCs are not significant while the SP 
ASCs are significant. 
A comment is due to the SP and RP scale parameters. These results shown that the IV 
parameters for the branches both equal to 1 highlight not differences in the scale 
parameters between SP and RP datasets. 
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Table 47 - Tricky NL model 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. z |z|>Z 
Attributes in the Utility Functions (beta)  
TIME_SP -0.00877***  0.00035 -24.94 0.0000 
COST_SP -0.01347***  0.00040 -33.31 0.0000 
DELAY_SP -0.00698***  0.00129 -5.42 0.0000 
FLEX_SP 0.00631 0.01641 0.38 0.7007 
SERVICE_SP -0.11564***  0.01734 -6.67 0.0000 
ASC_FSC 0.20283*** 0.03965 0 0.0000 
ASC_LCC -0.15244***  2,403472222 -4.40 0.0000 
TIME_RP -0.00435***  0.00079 -5.51 0.0000 
COST_RP -0.00434***  0.00084 -5.17 0.0000 
DELAY_RP -0.00404 0.00253 -1.59 0.1108 
FLEX_RP 0.40472*** 0.06782 5.97 0.0000 
ASC_FSC 0.10217 0.09577 1.07 0.2860 
ASC_LCC -0.03615 0.10458 -0.35 0.7296 
IV parameters, RU2 form = mu(b|l),gamma(l) 
SP 1.00000*** 0.02542 1,647917 0.0000 
RP 1.00000*** 0.10458 9,79 0.0000 
Underlying standard deviation = pi/(IVparm*sqr(6))  
SP 1.28255*** 2,264583333 1,627083 0.0000 
RP 1.28255*** 0.13107 0,429861 0.0000 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-879.970.442 
   
AIC:  17629.4 
   
R2-adj.: 0.4155 
   
Nobs.: 7.650 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
As mentioned above, the subsequent step was to estimate a RP-MNL with fixed SP 
parameters in order to identify the RP constant terms. The following MNL allows 
identifying the ASCs to perform policy simulations. This analysis was carried out in Excel 
software. 
 
Table 48 – RP MNL model with fixed SP parameters 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. z |z|>Z 
TIME_RP -0.00877              …..(Fixed Parameter)…..      
COST_RP -0.01347               …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
DELAY_RP -0.00698              …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
FLEX_RP 0.00631               …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
ASC_FSC 0.38087*** 0.08154 4.67 0.0000 
ASC_LCC -0.40786***  0.09930 -4.11 0.0000 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-9.064.412 
   
Nobs.: 1.275 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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7.4.1.3.2.  Joint SP-RP Multinomial Logit model 
 
 
After checking the scale parameter between SP and RP data sources, these data are 
jointly used to estimate a MNL model (Table 49). A total of 7.650 number of observations 
were used. Luckily, due to same scale parameters between these two types of data, no 
coefficients’ adjustments were necessary. RP ASCs were fixed to the value estimated 
with the “trick” NL and the following MNL model reported in the previous section.  
Overall, the goodness-of-fit of the joint SP-RP MNL model is improved respect the only-
constant MNL model. Moreover, all coefficients adjusted their magnitude and have 
strengthened their significance. In fact, all attributes have the correct sign and are 
significant at 1%. S attribute is specific of only SP data. 
 
 
Table 49 – Joint SP-RP MNL model 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. z |z|>Z 
TIME -0.00750***  0.00031 -24.37 0.0000 
COST -0.01120***  0.00034 -32.70 0.0000 
DELAY -0.00733***  0.00112 -6.53 0.0000 
FLEX 0.04563*** 0.01577 2.89 0.0038 
SERVICE_SP -0.11428***  0.01701 -6.72 
 
ASC_FSC 0.38087*** …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
ASC_LCC -0.40786***  …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
Log likelihood 
function:  
-8876.5443 
   
AIC:  17763.1 
   
Nobs.: 7.650 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
7.4.1.3.3.  Joint SP-RP generic Mixed Logit model 
 
A generic ML model is reported in Table 50. Overall, respect the previous MNL model the 
goodness-of-fit measures are consistently improved. Furthermore, equal considerations 
can be done for both sign and significance of attributes, except for FLEX that become not 
significant. TIME and COST, as random parameter in the utility function, show 
preference heterogeneity. It is important to underline similar scale of values of the 
standard deviation between these attributes. SERVICE coefficient is specified only in the 
utility function of the SP alternatives. 
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Table 50 - Joint SP-RP ML logit model 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. Z |z|>Z 
Random parameters in utility functions  
 
TIME -0.01970***  0.00059 
-
33.40 
0.0000 
COST -0.01258***  0.00044 
-
28.51 
0.0000 
Nonrandom parameters in utility functions  
 
DELAY -0.00747***  0.00120 -6.24 0.0000 
FLEX 0.00400 0.01683 -0.24 0.8121 
SERVICE_SP -0.06032***  0.01794 -3.36 0.0008 
ASC_FSC 0.38087 …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
ASC_LCC -0.40786 …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
Distns. of RPs. Std.Devs or limits of triangular  
 
TsCOST 0.01970*** 0.00059 33.40 0.0000 
TsTIME  0.01258*** 0.00044 28.51 0.0000 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-8480.1176 
   
AIC:  16972.2 
   
R2-adj.: .38132 
   
Nobs.: 7.650 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
7.4.1.3.4.  Joint SP-RP Mixed Logit model with socio-economic data 
 
 
After discovered preference heterogeneity in the previous ML model, with this choice 
model different sources of heterogeneity were tested, using socio -economic and 
behavioural data (Table 51).  
The goodness-of-fit measures are further improved. Equal considerations can be done 
for both sign and significance of attributes. The following socio-economic and 
behavioural data were tested: income, gender, instruction and travel purpose. 
The average sensitivity of the total travel cost depends on respondents’ income and 
travel purpose. In particular, respondents with a high income level or who travel for a 
business purpose are less sensitive to travel cost. Instead, respondents with a high 
income level or who travel for a business purpose are more sensitive to travel time. 
Moreover, the total travel time attribute is also affected by gender and level of 
instruction of respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
149 
 
Table 51 - Joint SP-RP ML model with socio-economic and behavioural data  
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. z |z|>Z 
Random parameters in utility functions  
COST -0.03697***  0.00151 -24.54 0.0000 
TIME -0.02599***  0.00153 -17.03 0.0000 
Nonrandom parameters in utility functions  
DELAY -0.011177*** 0.00131 -8.97 0.0000 
FLEX -0.00028 0.01812 -0.02 0.9877 
SERVICE_SP -0.03987***  0.01918 -2.08 0.0377 
ASC_FSC 0.38087 …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
ASC_LCC -0.40786 …..(Fixed Parameter)…..  
Heterogeneity in mean, Parameter:Variable  
COST:INCOME  0.00499*** 0.00052 9.55 0.0000 
COST:GENDER -0.00065 0.00128 -0.51 4,243056 
COST: INSTRUCTION -0.00030 0.00046 -0.65 3,601389 
COST: 
PURPOSE_BUSINESS 
0.01124*** 0.00143 0,35 0.0000 
TIME:INCOME  -0.00101**  0.00041 -2.45 0,098611 
TIME:GENDER 0.00416*** 0.00101 4.13 0.0000 
TIME: INSTRUCTION 0.00535*** 0.00048 11.26 0.0000 
TIME: 
PURPOSE_BUSINESS 
-0.01170***  0.00118 -9.90 0.0000 
Distns. of RPs. Std.Devs or limits of triangular  
TsCOST 0.03697*** 0.00151 24.54 0.0000 
TsTIME  0.02599*** 0.00153 17.03 0.0000 
Log likelihood function:  -7816.800 
   
AIC:  15659.6 
   
R2-adj.: .42972 
   
Nobs.: 7.650 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
7.4.1.4.  Comparing SP, RP and joint RP-SP models to determine market shares 
 
All the choice models estimated in the previous sections allowed comparing models’ 
differences in term of different (or similar) market shares. Table 52 shows an overview of 
the estimate market shares, adapting the different choice models’ results on the 
different Ro-Mi transport operator currently present in this corridor. 
This phase allows identifying the most reasonable Ro-Mi market shares distribution in 
order to perform hypothetical policy changes. Policy simulations’ results are reported in 
the next chapter (8).  
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Table 52 - Overview of the SP, RP and joint SP -RP models for market shares identification  
Type of 
data 
Type of 
model 
Market shares distribution  
Treni talia  NTV Alitalia-Cai  Ryanair Total  
SP MNL 39%  23%  23%  14%  99%  
SP ML 49%  20%  20%  10%  99%  
RP MNL 30%  24%  25%  20%  99%  
RP ML 31%  24%  25%  20%  100%  
Joint 1:  
SP-RP  
Tricky NL 39%  23%  28%  11%  101%  
Joint 2:  
SP-RP 
MNL 36%  23%  29%  12%  100%  
Joint 3:  
SP-RP 
ML 45% 20% 25% 9% 0% 
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: The ‘Total’ column is not always 100%; that is due to rounding of the individual market shares.  
 
Using the last joint SP-RP model’s results, two different respondents’ profiles were 
created and estimated their relatives market shares distributions.  
 
Table 53 – Profile of a business men 
Profile n. 1 – Business man 
Man 
> 4.500 €  level of income 
University level of education 
Purpose of the travel: Business  
Source: own elaboration 
 
The Ro-Mi market shares distribution based on Individual Profile number 1 is: 
Trenitalia: 2% 
NTV: 3% 
Alitalia-Cai: 94% 
Ryanair:1% 
 
Table 54 - Profile of a leisure woman  
Profile n. 2 – Leisure woman 
Woman 
Between 500€ and 1.500 €  level of income  
University level of education 
Purpose of the travel: Not business 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The Ro-Mi market shares distribution based on Individual Profile number 2 is: 
Trenitalia: 46% 
NTV: 21% 
Alitalia-Cai: 25% 
Ryanair: 8% 
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7.4.2.  Own and cross-point elasticity measures 
 
An own and cross-point elasticity using the Probability Weighted Sample Enumeration  
technique (as suggested by Hensher, et al. (2005)) is computed based on SP MNL and ML 
models’ output. Table 55 and Table 56 report an overall mode choice elasticity evaluation 
for, respectively, Total Travel Cost and Total Travel Time attributes and for each 
alternatives. Moreover, a segmentation analysis based on the types of passengers 
(business and non-business pax) is reported in Table 57 and Table 58. 
In these tables, the own-point elasticity measures are indicated with an asterisk (*).  
Table 55 highlights the overall own and direct-point elasticity for TTC calculated with 
both MNL and ML models. With reference the elasticity for the attribute TTC on HSR1 
alternative, the own effect is calculated as -0.8086. This suggests that 10 percent 
increase in the HSR1 travel cost will decrease the probability of selecting the HSR1 
alternative by 8 percent, ceteris paribus. Moreover, also the cross-point elasticity is 
carried out. In fact, the 10 % increase of TTC on HSR1 produced an increase in the choice 
probability for all the other transport alternatives (HSR2= +2.7%, FSC=2.6%, 
LCC=2.9%). 
 
Without segmentation (‘overall’ scenario), the own-point elasticity measures for an 
increase of 10% of TTC ranges from 6.2% (HSR2) to 12,8% (FSC) based on MNL model, 
while on ML model it ranges from 12.4% (HSR2) to 19,9% (FSC). Regarding a 10% 
increase of TTT, own-point elasticity values are more consistent: they range from 15% 
(HSR2) to 18,1% (HSR1) based on MNL model, while on ML model they range fro m 
24.2% (LCC) to 28.1% (FSC). 
 
With reference to the cross-point elasticity measures to a TTC variation, for the MNL and 
ML models their values range, respectively, from 2.4% (FSC) to 3.3% (HSR1), and from 
3.1% (FSC) to 4.8% (HSR1). Cross-point elasticity values for TTT are higher than for 
TTC. They range from 2.4% (FSC) to 3.3% (HSR1) – MNL, and from 5% (FSC) to 10.9% 
(LCC) – ML. 
 
Overall, as emerged in the literature, these results confirmed that elasticity measures of 
a non-linear models are higher that the simple MNL one. In both models own and cross-
point elasticity values for TTT are higher than for TTC, highlighting a greater sensitivity 
to the travel time. As expected, respect the own-point the cross-point elasticity 
measures reported values more limited. 
 
Differences between business and non-business passengers are highlighted Table 57 and 
Table 58, respectively for TTC and TTT attributes. Than the corresponding ‘Overall’ 
scenario, the different impact between these two types of passengers of the variation in 
the mode choice probability for a 10% increase of TTC or TTT can be seen. In fact, while 
for non-business passengers the own and cross-point elasticity values are greater than 
for business passenger for TTC attribute, for TTT attribute business passengers reported 
the highest values of own and cross-point elasticity, independently of the model type 
used. For instance, considering a 10% increase of TTT, the own-point elasticity 
measures for business and non-business passengers are, respectively, from -15% (LCC) to 
-29.8% (HSR1) and from -9.4%  (HSR2) to -12.1% (FSC) (MNL model). For the cross-
point elasticity are, respectively, from 7.4% (LCC) to 9.3% (HSR1) and from -2.2% 
(HSR1) to 5.7% (FSC) (MNL model). 
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Table 55 - Own and cross point elasticity for TOTAL TRAVEL COST – overall 
Direct and cross point elasticity for TTC - overall 
MNL ML 
TTC on HSR1: value stn. dev.  TTC on HSR1: value stn. dev.  
HSR 1 -0,8086*  0,4191 HSR 1 -1,3060*  0,5996 
HSR 2 0,2732 0,1309 HSR 2 0,3886 0,1914 
FSC 0,261 0,1165 FSC 0,3314 0,1807 
LCC 0,2948 0,138 LCC 0,3824 0,2264 
TTC on HSR2: value stn. dev.  TTC on HSR2: value stn. dev.  
HSR 1 0,2807 0,1197 HSR 1 0,407 0,201 
HSR 2 -0,6206*  0,4535 HSR 2 -1,2401*  0,7442 
FSC 0,2497 0,1034 FSC 0,3174 0,1607 
LCC 0,2529 0,1244 LCC 0,3841 0,2132 
TTC on FSC:  value stn. dev.  TTC on FSC:  value stn. dev.  
HSR 1 0,3307 0,1225 HSR 1 0,3403 0,2449 
HSR 2 0,311 0,1232 HSR 2 0,3265 0,2359 
FSC -1,2813*  0,6937 FSC -1,9866*  0,5953 
LCC 0,3299 0,1318 LCC 0,3328 0,2397 
TTC on LCC:  value stn. dev.  TTC on LCC:  value stn. dev.  
HSR 1 0,2879 0,1156 HSR 1 0,4795 0,207 
HSR 2 0,2839 0,1289 HSR 2 0,4721 0,2051 
FSC 0,3154 0,1206 FSC 0,4463 0,2378 
LCC -0,8978*  0,4937 LCC -1,3744*  0,5614 
Source: own elaboration 
Note: *: own-point elasticity  
 
Table 56 - Own and cross point elasticity for TOTAL TRAVEL TIME 
Direct and cross point elasticity for TTT - overall  
MNL ML 
TTC on HSR1: value stn. dev.  TTC on HSR1: value stn. dev.  
HSR 1 -1,8078*  0,4159 HSR 1 -2,7858*  0,5145 
HSR 2 0,6213 0,1586 HSR 2 0,8385 0,3459 
FSC 0,6445 0,193 FSC 0,8955 0,3861 
LCC 0,5967 0,2279 LCC 0,8661 0,3574 
TTC on HSR2: value stn. dev.  TTC on HSR2: value stn. dev.  
HSR 1 0,6855 0,3798 HSR 1 1,0717 0,71 
HSR 2 -1,5012*  0,5046 HSR 2 -2,4934*  0,8813 
FSC 0,5932 0,3303 FSC 1,0303 0,6177 
LCC 0,6139 0,3893 LCC 1,0959 0,7164 
TTC on FSC:  value stn. dev.  TTC on FSC:  value stn. dev.  
HSR 1 0,432 0,2585 HSR 1 0,5141 0,4059 
HSR 2 0,3471 0,2225 HSR 2 0,5025 0,3996 
FSC -1,6002*  0,4216 FSC -2,8075*  0,6001 
LCC 0,4421 0,2408 LCC 0,5714 0,4548 
TTC on LCC:  value stn. dev.  TTC on LCC:  value stn. dev.  
HSR 1 0,5359 2,432 HSR 1 0,9261 0,5302 
HSR 2 0,456 2,118 HSR 2 0,8768 0,4299 
FSC 0,5263 2,448 FSC 0,9753 4142 
LCC -1,5342*  0,5087 LCC -2,4171*  0,692 
Source: own elaboration 
Note: *: own-point elasticity  
 
Even more obvious are the elasticity results based on the ML model. In fact, with this 
model the own-point elasticity measures for business and non-business passengers are, 
respectively, from -37.5% (FSC) to -44% (HSR1) and from -14.5% (HSR2) to -17.9% 
(FSC). For the cross-point elasticity values are, respectively, from 10.2% (FSC) to 10.3% 
(HSR1) and from -1.9% (FSC) to 7.8% (HSR1). 
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Table 57 - Own and cross point elasticity for TOTAL TRAVEL COST – business versus non-business 
 
Direct and cross point elasticity for TTC - business 
 
Direct and cross point elasticity for TTC - non-business 
MNL 
 
ML 
 
MNL 
 
ML 
TTC on HSR1: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on HSR1: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on HSR1: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on 
HSR1: 
value 
stn. 
dev. 
HSR 1 -0,555* 0,2182 
 
HSR 1 -0,940* 0,4006 
 
HSR 1 -0,965* 0,6214 
 
HSR 1 -1,432* 0,7368 
HSR 2 0,1553 0,1421 
 
HSR 2 0,2876 0,2426 
 
HSR 2 0,3847 0,1259 
 
HSR 2 0,4664 0,1903 
FSC 0,1314 0,1027 
 
FSC 0,2287 0,2004 
 
FSC 0,412 0,1238 
 
FSC 0,4061 0,1841 
LCC 0,1523 0,1161 
 
LCC 0,2776 0,2489 
 
LCC 0,4387 0,1656 
 
LCC 0,4676 0,25 
TTC on HSR2: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on HSR2: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on HSR2: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on 
HSR2: 
value 
stn. 
dev. 
HSR 1 0,1488 0,1034 
 
HSR 1 0,2659 0,2112 
 
HSR 1 0,3934 0,1369 
 
HSR 1 0,497 0,2172 
HSR 2 -0,425* 0,2597 
 
HSR 2 -0,937* 0,5056 
 
HSR 2 -0,758* 0,6406 
 
HSR 2 1,3628* 0,8649 
FSC 0,1295 0,1066 
 
FSC 0,2183 0,1943 
 
FSC 0,3794 0,1402 
 
FSC 0,3826 0,1691 
LCC 0,1174 0,0908 
 
LCC 0,2527 0,2283 
 
LCC 0,3947 0,166 
 
LCC 0,4726 0,2339 
TTC on FSC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on FSC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on FSC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on FSC:  value 
stn. 
dev. 
HSR 1 0,3145 0,1726 
 
HSR 1 0,4948 0,3109 
 
HSR 1 0,2849 0,1653 
 
HSR 1 0,32 0,2764 
HSR 2 0,3272 0,1779 
 
HSR 2 0,4961 0,3045 
 
HSR 2 0,2388 0,1635 
 
HSR 2 0,3046 0,2803 
FSC -0,739* 0,398 
 
FSC 
-
1,3152* 
0,5644 
 
FSC -1,703* 0,8706 
 
FSC -2,197* 0,5625 
LCC 0,2919 0,166 
 
LCC 0,4897 0,3316 
 
LCC 0,2853 0,1699 
 
LCC 0,3122 0,2685 
TTC on LCC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on LCC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on LCC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on LCC:  value 
stn. 
dev. 
HSR 1 0,1967 0,1276 
 
HSR 1 0,3435 0,2005 
 
HSR 1 0,329 0,1142 
 
HSR 1 0,3899 0,1797 
HSR 2 0,1974 0,1252 
 
HSR 2 0,3502 0,2042 
 
HSR 2 0,3203 0,1228 
 
HSR 2 0,376 0,1695 
FSC 0,2098 0,1354 
 
FSC 0,3386 0,243 
 
FSC 0,3724 0,1248 
 
FSC 0,3426 31726 
LCC -0,569* 0,2674 
 
LCC -1,007* 0,3687 
 
LCC -1,130* 0,7267 
 
LCC -1,689* 0,6978 
Source: own elaboration 
Note: *: own-point elasticity  
 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
154 
 
 
Table 58 - Own and cross point elasticity for TOTAL TRAVEL TIME – business versus non-business 
 
Direct and cross point elasticity for TTT - business 
 
Direct and cross point elasticity for TTT - non-business 
MNL 
 
ML 
 
MNL 
 
ML 
TTC on HSR1: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on HSR1: value stn. dev.  
 
TTC on HSR1: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on HSR1: value 
stn. 
dev. 
HSR 1 -2,927* 0,9174 
 
HSR 1 -4,396* 0,8613 
 
HSR 1 -1,170* 0,287 
 
HSR 1 -1,651* 0,3815 
HSR 2 0,8055 0,3127 
 
HSR 2 1,0329 0,6738 
 
HSR 2 0,4733 0,2022 
 
HSR 2 0,6485 0,3112 
FSC 0,7536 0,253 
 
FSC 1,0262 0,7343 
 
FSC 0,5684 0,2749 
 
FSC 0,7053 0,3238 
LCC 0,7438 0,3377 
 
LCC 1,0759 0,7638 
 
LCC 0,4794 0,2436 
 
LCC 0,6742 0,3135 
TTC on HSR2: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on HSR2: value stn. dev.  
 
TTC on HSR2: value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on HSR2: value 
stn. 
dev. 
HSR 1 0,8996 0,4992 
 
HSR 1 1,2274 0,8941 
 
HSR 1 0,5188 0,3442 
 
HSR 1 0,7798 0,5136 
HSR 2 -2,633* 0,8756 
 
HSR 2 -4,154* 0,10287 
 
HSR 2 -0,938* 0,3562 
 
HSR 2 1,488*  0,6157 
FSC 0,7809 0,4521 
 
FSC 1,2377 0,9708 
 
FSC 0,4438 0,2966 
 
FSC 0,7436 0,4097 
LCC 0,7652 0,5194 
 
LCC 1,3051 1,0458 
 
LCC 0,471 0,3451 
 
LCC 0,7907 0,5073 
TTC on FSC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on FSC:  value stn. dev.  
 
TTC on FSC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on FSC:  value 
stn. 
dev. 
HSR 1 0,934 0,4379 
 
HSR 1 1,3281 0,9188 
 
HSR 1 0,223 0,1759 
 
HSR 1 0,2903 0,2586 
HSR 2 0,8779 0,3796 
 
HSR 2 1,3154 0,819 
 
HSR 2 0,1498 0,1532 
 
HSR 2 0,2857 0,2595 
FSC -2,213* 0,8385 
 
FSC -3,748* 1,3516 
 
FSC -1,214* 0,2801 
 
FSC -1,790* 0,3566 
LCC 0,9719 0,455 
 
LCC 1,492 1,0063 
 
LCC 0,2119 0,1702 
 
LCC 0,3193 0,2763 
TTC on LCC:  
 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on LCC:  value stn. dev.  
 
TTC on LCC:  value 
stn. 
dev.  
TTC on LCC:  value 
stn. 
dev. 
HSR 1 0,8738 0,4017 
 
HSR 1 1,193 0,7994 
 
HSR 1 0,3453 0,2435 
 
HSR 1 0,4815 0,3621 
HSR 2 0,7441 0,2989 
 
HSR 2 1,1228 0,5527 
 
HSR 2 0,2917 0,222 
 
HSR 2 0,4619 0,3437 
FSC 0,8344 0,3675 
 
FSC 1,311 0,7449 
 
FSC 0,3395 0,2266 
 
FSC 0,1883 0,274 
LCC -1,534* 0,9116 
 
LCC -3,998* 1,2514 
 
LCC -1,089* 0,3314 
 
LCC -1,619* 0,3954 
Source: own elaboration 
Note: *: own-point elasticity  
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7.4.3.  Value Of Time measures 
 
Value of Time (VOT) measures are calculated with both MNL and ML models. An 
overview of the results is reported in Table 59. In addition, the WTP space was calculated 
but due to the not yet stability of the NLogit version used, these results are omitted75. 
 
Without segmentation (‘overall’ scenario), VOT values between the different data 
sources are quite similar (except for the RP value – 60€-hour), while consistent 
differences are found between the two type of choice models.  
Moreover, distinguishing between the two types of passengers the different users’ 
sensitivity to the total travel time was identified. However, it is important to underline 
that in this case the Total Travel Time and Total Travel Cost are considered, while in the 
literature these attributes are used in the choice task in a different way (for instance, 
disaggregating the TTT in in-vehicle time, out-of-vehicle time, waiting time, access time 
etc.). Very high VOT values for business passengers were found in particular using only 
RP data, while with only SP or SP+RP data, the results are more reasonable and in line 
with the literature.  
 
 
Table 59 – Overview of the Value of Time measures 
Type of 
Model 
Type 
of 
Data 
Type of 
Consumers 
VOT 
(€-min.) 
VOT 
(€-hour) 
Range of VOT 
values  
(€-min.) 
Min. Max.  
MNL RP overall  1,00 €  60 / / 
MNL SP overall  0,65 €  39 / / 
MNL RP+SP overall  0,67 €  40 / / 
MNL RP business  7,81 €  469  / / 
MNL SP business  1,77 €  106  / / 
MNL RP+SP business  2,71 €  163 / / 
MNL RP non-business  0,28 €  17 / / 
MNL SP non-business  0,33 €   20  / / 
MNL RP+SP non-business  0,25 €   15  / / 
ML RP overall  1,27 €   76  0,84 2,78 
ML SP overall  1,24 €  74 0,27 11,84 
ML RP+SP overall  1,27 € 76 0,20 16,50 
ML RP business  8,62 €  510  5,15 10,20 
ML SP business  2,65 €  159  0,44 13,80 
ML RP+SP business  3,39 €  203  0,59 11,60 
ML RP non-business  0,32 € 19 0,24 1,73 
ML SP non-business  0,56 €  34 0,21 6,44 
ML RP+SP non-business  0,42 €  25 0,17 5,02 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter details the Ro-Mi survey from its planning to its implementation and 
analysis of results. As emerged, particular attention was paid at the definition of the 
                                                                 
75 The WTP space measures were calculated estimating a Generalized Mixel Logit Model.  
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choice set (attributes selection and description). This chapter provides answers to the 
main research questions of this PhD. thesis. In fact, is in this chapter that detailed 
explanation were provided with reference to the attributes importance, to the VOT for 
business and non-business passengers, to the own and cross-point elasticity measures 
and to the identification of the market share distribution between Ro -Mi transport 
operators. 
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8. The Case Study of The Rome-Milan Corridor: simulations and policy 
implications 
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8.1. Introduction 
 
Based the Ro-Mi market shares distribution found with the joint SP-RP ML model, policy 
simulations and implications are formulated and discussed. In particular, both business 
strategies for the Ro-Mi transport operators and Institutions indications are defined.  
With reference to the business strategies, econometric models’ output (reported in 
section 7.4.1) are used in order to testing different hypothetical policy changes and 
highlight Ro-Mi transport operators’ reactions.  
Policy implications related to Institutions, the main suggestions are addressed to the 
Italian Antitrust Authority and the Regulatory Authorities. In particular, indications are 
related to a recent IAA investigation concerning the non-recognition of the intermodal 
competition between air and HSR transport in the Ro-Mi corridor a recent decision of 
the Council of State rejected Alitalia’s memory against the entrance of a new airline in 
the most profitable FCO-LIN link (section 8.3). 
 
8.2. The Ro-Mi transport operators’ point of view 
 
In this section, simulations of potential policies are reported in the following tables. In 
particular, reactions of the Ro-Mi transport operators, in terms of market shares’ 
changes, are analysed. Transport modes considered are Trenitalia, NTV, Alitalia-Cai and 
Ryanair. 5 policies are selected based on the upcoming changes that will occur the study 
area. 
Two types of policy simulations are performed (ceteris paribus and sequential 
interactions). In the ceteris paribus analysis, the impact on the single policy on the base 
case scenario is calculated. Using sequential interactions, instead, the selected policies 
were tested providing the sum of the all impact of the selected policies (cumulating their 
single impact).  
 
Table 60 – Base case scenario (joint SP-RP ML model) 
Parameters  
Trenitalia 
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Total travel 
time 
3 h 40’  4 h 5’  3 h 10’  5 h 
Time travel cost  80€  104€  150€ 89€  
Delay 4’ 4’ 10’  7’ 
Flexibility 1 1 1 1 
ASC – Trenitalia  1 - - - 
ASC – NTV  - 1 - - 
ASC – FSC - - 1 - 
ASC – LCC - - - 1 
Market share:  45% 20% 25% 9% 
Source: own elaboration 
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Each transport alternative is characterized by real data. With reference the travel time, 
currently Trenitalia performs the station-to-station with around 20 minutes less than 
NTV (see the ad hoc survey detailed in Annex 5). Travel cost is obtained using data 
gathered from the Ro-Mi transport operators’ web sites (see again the ad hoc survey of 
Annex 5). Flexibility attribute is not significant so excluded. Although on-board services 
attribute reports a significant value, because of it has a wrong sign it was not included in 
the simulated scenario.  
Using joint SP-RP ML model’s results, adapted to current Ro-Mi operators’ features, the 
following market shares are pointed out: Trenitalia=45%, NTV=20%, Alitalia-Cai 25%, 
and Ryanair 9%. Numerous newspaper articles76 have attempted over time to provide 
numbers but without detailing the data source or the methodology. However, a strong 
awareness among transport operators and experts that air transport in the last three 
years has lost significant market share skilfully taken by HSR services is a fact. In fact, 
Alitalia-Cai has drastically lost its market share, while Trenitalia greatly enhanced its 
market share. In addition, the Italian Authority Antitrust (2012b) (p. 30) reports an 
analysis’ results provided by Alitalia-Cai with reference to the market shares’ 
distribution in the Fiumicino-Linate corridor: 55% HSR service, 35% air services and 
10% car. Unfortunately, it has not been specified to when these data were calculated  
(presumably a few years ago) and how these market shares were calculated. With 
reference with the results of this research, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
market share distribution provided in Table 60 could be rather representative of reality. 
 
 
Ceteris paribus analysis 
 
 
Scenario 1 – Air competition with the entrance of a new low cost airline (Easyjet Airlines)  
 
A few weeks ago, the Easyjet airlines started to operate a low cost passenger transport 
services between Fiumicino airport to Linate airport, eliminating the Alitalia-Cai‘s 
monopoly. As shown in Table 61, the Easyjet entrance has impacted on the Ro-Mi 
transport operator, in particular on incumbents (Trenitalia: -18% of m.s., and Alitalia-
Cai: -10%). Regarding the intramodal competition, thanks mainly to the reduced travel 
cost Easyjet has gained a considerable part of the Trenitalia and Alitalia-Cai’s market 
share, highlighting an important inter and intramodal impacts. This shift should 
responds to the behavioral change revealed by Alitalia-Cai during the Italian Antitrust 
Authority merger investigation with which business passengers switch from the business 
tariff to the economy one. Moreover, with reference to rail passengers, Easyjet should be 
a viable competition due to the reduced travel time and cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
76 For example, Panorama Economy – Antonella Bersani, “Milano-Roma: Alitalia e Frecciarossa rischiano 
di perdere la sfida”, http://economia.panorama.it/aziende/milano-roma-prezzi-alitalia-easyjet-
frecciarossa-italo, 30-10-2012.  
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Table 61 – Scenario 1: Air competition with the entrance of a new low cost airline (Easyjet Airlines)  
Parameters 
Trenitalia 
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Easyjet 
 
Total travel 
time 
3 h 40’  4 h 5’  3 h 10’  5 h 3 h 10’  
Time travel 
cost  
80€ 104€  150€ 89€ 60€ 
Delay 4’ 4’ 10’  7’ 10’  
ASC – 
Trenitalia 
1 - - - 1 
ASC – NTV  - 1 - -  - 
ASC – FSC - - 1 - - 
ASC – LCC - - - 1 - 
Market 
share:  
27% 13% 15% 6% 39% 
Variation 
(%) respect 
the Base 
case 
scenario:  
-18%  -7% -10% -3%  - 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Scenario 2 – Rail travel time reduction: NTV reduces travel time 
 
In the ad hoc survey (reported in Annex 5) a significant travel time difference between 
Trenitalia and NTV operators has revealed. In fact, currently Trenitalia performs the Ro -
Mi station-to-station on average in 2 hours and 55 minutes, while NTV in 3 ho urs and 20 
minutes. Therefore, a reduction of 25 minutes of travel time by NTV (by reorganizing its 
transport service) is tested. The impact on modal shares of a reduction of the travel time 
by NTV is the following:  
 
Table 62 – Scenario 2 - Rail travel time reduction: NTV reduces travel time 
Parameters  
Trenitalia 
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Total travel 
time 
3 h 40’  3 h 40' 3 h 10’  5 h 
Time travel cost  80€  104€  150€  89€  
Delay 4’ 4’ 10’  7’ 
ASC – Trenitalia  1 - - - 
ASC – NTV  - 1 - - 
ASC – FSC - - 1 - 
ASC – LCC - - - 1 
Market share:  42% 26% 23% 9% 
Variation (%) 
respect the Base 
case scenario:  
-3%  +6% -2%   - 
Source: own elaboration 
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As a result, the NTV’s market share increases of 6% with a general marginal reduction of 
the other market shares (in particular of Trenlitalia and Alitalia-Cai operators). Business 
passengers shifted from Trenitalia and Alitalia to NTV. The reduction of the travel time 
has an inter and intramodal effects on competition.  
 
 
Scenario 3 - Aggressive high speed rail prices competition: Trenitalia and NTV reduce 
ticket price 
 
Last year, Trenitalia and NTV have competed thanks a war of discounts, promotions and 
other marketing activities by providing discount tickets. Moreover, they have changed 
their ticket price system that became very complex and based on different parameters 
(see Annex 5). Therefore, in this scenario a reduction of the travel cost of 15€ for each 
HSR operator is tested (Table 63). This policy has impacted mainly on Alitalia-Cai that 
lost 4 percentage points of market share, while Ryanair lost only 1%. However, in the 
rail intramodal competition Trenitalia gain 2% more than NTV due to the average fare 
slightly lower than NTV. 
 
Table 63 - Aggressive high speed rail prices competition: Trenitalia and NTV reduce ticket price  
Parameters  
Trenitalia 
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Total travel 
time 
3 h 40’  4 h 5’  3 h 10’  5 h 
Time travel cost  65€  89€  150€  89€  
Delay 4’ 4’ 10’  7’ 
ASC – Trenitalia  1 - - - 
ASC – NTV  - 1 - - 
ASC – FSC - - 1 - 
ASC – LCC - - - 1 
Market share:  49% 22% 21% 8% 
Variation (%) 
respect the Base 
case scenario:  
+4%  +2% -4%   -1%  
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
 
Scenario 4 - Air travel price reduction: Alitalia-Cai reduces ticket price 
 
Given that it is impossible for airlines to reduce the airport-to-airport travel time, a fare 
reduction is tested. This policy is justified also, by what Alitalia-Cai has provided to the 
Italian Antitrust Authority during the merger investigation with AiroOne airlines. In fact, 
it stated that in the last year business passengers changed their preferences buying an 
economy ticket rather than the usual business ticket. To respond to this, Alitalia -Cai 
probably changed its ticket price system (5 tariffs with a special discount to those who 
make a round trip and back in a day). For all these reasons a fare reduction (50€) for 
Alitalia-Cai fare is tested.  
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The impact on modal shares of a fare reduction by Alitalia-Cai is the following: 
 
 
Table 64 - Scenario 4 - Air travel price reduction: Alitalia-Cai reduces ticket price  
Parameters  
Trenitalia 
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Total travel 
time 
3 h 40’  4 h 5’  3 h 10’  5 h 
Time travel cost  80€  104€  100€ 89€  
Delay 4’ 4’ 10’  7’ 
ASC – Trenitalia  1 - - - 
ASC – NTV  - 1 - - 
ASC – FSC - - 1 - 
ASC – LCC - - - 1 
Market share:  32% 14% 48% 7% 
Variation (%) 
respect the Base 
case scenario:  
-13%  -6% +23% -2%  
Source: own elaboration 
 
With this policy Alitalia-Cai has obtained an incredible increase in its market share of 
recording a +23%. Relevant losses in market shares occurred mainly for Trenitalia (-
13%) and NTV (-6%). Probably, this fare reduction could allow to Alitalia-Cai to 
maintain their business passengers became more sensitive to the travel cost and gain 
new passengers (from rail operators) sensitive also at the travel time. This policy had a 
both inter and intramodal effect on competition to the benefit to Alitalia-Cai. 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 5 – Rail travel time reduction: Trenitalia and NTV reduce travel time 
 
In the last months, Trenitalia has launched a new advertising regarding the purchase of 
a new high speed train (the so-called Frecciarossa-100077) as the fastest train in the 
world. At the end of 2013, these new trains should be operating in the Ro-Mi corridor. At 
the same time, NTV has announced that its next objective is to reduce the travel time to 
2 hours and 20 minutes. Considering the potential travel time reduction by Trenitalia 
(with the new and fast Frecciarossa-1000) that allows it to operate from Rome to Milan 
                                                                 
77 The Frecciarossa-1000, also known as the V300 Zefiro (Bombardier) or ETR 1000 (Trenitalia) is a 
design of HSR developed by Bombardier Transportation and AnsaldoBreda. 50 trainsets were ordered by  
Trenitalia in 2010. Ini tial specifications were for a train meeting European high speed technical standards,  
with a design commercial speed of 360 km/h, initially operated at 300 km/h, and to be tested to 400 
km/h. The Trenitalia contract was awarded to the Bombardier/Ansaldo in August 2010, for delivery into 
service in 2013, with the contract signed in September. The bid was less expensive at €30.8m per train 
than the €35m per train cost given by the other bidder,  Alstom. The contract value was €1.54bn of which 
Bombardier's share was €654m. (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frecciarossa_1000).  
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
163 
 
in 1 hour and 59 minutes, and by NTV with a travel time of 2 hours and 20 minutes, the 
impact on modal share of these policies are the following: 
 
Table 65 – Rail travel travel time reduction: Trenitalia and NTV reduce travel time 
Parameters  
Trenitalia 
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Total travel 
time 
2 h 30’  2 h 55’  3 h 10’  5 h 
Time travel cost  80€  104€  150€  89€  
Delay 4’ 4’ 10’  7’ 
ASC – Trenitalia  1 - - - 
ASC – NTV  - 1 - - 
ASC – FSC - - 1 - 
ASC – LCC - - - 1 
Market share:  56% 26% 13% 5% 
Variation (%) 
respect the Base 
case scenario:  
+11%  +6% -12%  -4%  
Source: own elaboration 
 
The impact of travel time reduction for both rail operators is consistent and important. 
Trenitalia gains 11% of market share and NTV gains 6%. Time-sensitive passengers of 
Alitalia-Cai (and Ryanair) should prefer a HSR services due to the important 
improvement in the travel time that allows doing a one-day round trip. In this situation 
no doubt there are on the substitutability between HSR and air transport also for 
business passengers. Regarding rail intramodal competition, Trenitalia is able to 
maintain a higher increase in market share compared to NTV due to the greater 
reduction of the travel time. 
 
 
Sequential interaction analysis 
 
In this section a sequential interaction of the 5 selected policies is reported. A summary 
is shown in Table 66. The percentage highlighted in a different colour indicates the 
operator who has adopted a policy change. The base case scenario is reported in the first 
row.  
This type of analysis simulates the real-world context in which each Ro-Mi transport 
operator takes decision in a sequential way and the impact of their decisions or policies 
is cumulative. The final market structure is the last row of Table 66. 
Overall, all Ro-Mi transport operators have modified their base case market share, 
missing some percentage points. With the market entry of Easyjet the air transport has 
gained important percentage points of market shares lost by Alitalia-Cai and Ryanair in 
the competition with the rail operators. However, in the final scenario the rail transport 
system serves most of the passengers on the market (60%). Overall, no dominant 
position should realize or strengthen. In fact, the rail and air incumbents have affected by 
both intra and inter-modal competition. 
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Table 66 – Synthesis of the sequential interaction analysis of the 5 selected policies 
Selected policies  
Trenitalia 
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
 
Easyjet 
 
Base case scenario: 45%  20% 25%  9% - 
Step 1 
(market entry of 
Easyjet):  
27%  13%  15%  6% 39%  
Step 2 
(NTV travel time 
reduction):  
26%  16%  15%  5% 37%  
Step 3 
(Trenitalia & NTV 
ticket price 
reduction):  
31%  19%  13%  5% 32%  
Step 4 
(Alitalia-Cai ticket 
price reduction): 
25%  16%  28%  4% 27%  
Step 5 
(Trenitalia & NTV 
travel time 
reduction) 
41%  19%  19%  3% 18%  
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: the percentage highlighted in a different colour indicates the operator who has adopted a policy 
change.  
 
Creation of a Decision Support System 
 
SP M1’s results were used to realize a DSS in order to help in particular transport 
operator in choosing the best policies to compete in the best way. In Figure 45 is reported 
the user’s interface of a simple DSS created with Exce l software package with the 
indications provided by Hensher, et al. (2005) in chapter twelve (p. 453).  
 
Figure 45 – User’s interface of the DDS for policy evaluation  
 
Source: own elaboration 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
165 
 
8.3. An Institutional point of view 
 
With this research important indications can be dressed for both Regulators and 
Authority aimed to promote competition and free access markets.  
 
The most important discussion is addressed toward the definition of the relevant 
market on which competition policy are based. To do this, a crucial phase was to verify if 
the EC Competition and the Italian Antitrust Authorities have recognized substitutability 
between transport modes (in particular between air and HSR for long-distance travel). 
Section 3.3 highlighted this point. Summarizing, the EC Competition’s approach 
recognizes the substitutability between air and HSR services for short-haul flights. This 
review revealed that substitutability between air and HSR have been evaluated in only 
airlines merger investigations and recognized many times (e.g. in London-Bruxelles, 
Paris-Amsterdam, Kolon-Leipzig, Bonn-Munchen corridors). The most relevant factors 
that the EC Competition considered evaluating the substitutability  between the selected 
transport modes are: 
1. the total travel time (the HSR total travel time have to be within 1 hour one way, and 
1 hour round trip for non-time sensitive passengers, while for time sensitive 
passengers the total travel time should be very similar to the air total travel time); 
2. the daily frequency of the transport service (the numbers of HSR connections per day 
have not too be inferior to that of the airplane and the first and last HSR connection 
in a day have to be similar to that of the airplane); 
3. the fare (HSR fares should overlap with those of the airplane); 
4. the level of service quality (the two transport modes have to be similar level of quality 
service); 
5. the presence of other transport operators interesting to market enter ; 
In their investigation, the EC Competition stressed the importance on the total travel 
time factor. Moreover, another important distinction is between non-time sensitive 
passengers and time sensitive passengers78. The substitutability between air and HSR is 
generally recognized for non-time sensitive passengers, while for time sensitive 
passengers those cases detected are much more limited.  
 
The Italian Antitrust Authority, in evaluating a merger operation between Alitalia and 
AirOne Airlines (April 2012), in the definition of the relevant market for the A litalia 
Airlines with a specific focus on the Rome-Milan corridors, has evaluated the possibility 
to consider Tranitalia HSR operator (with the Frecciarossa services) as a competitor. 
Comparing the total travel time, the type of services and the price of tickets of both 
transport modes, the IAA did not recognized the substitutability between air and HSR 
transport operators in the Ro-Mi corridor (for the 2009-2011 time period). It is 
important to underline that the focus of the IAA was on business passengers  (due to the 
specific type of Alitalia airlines’ passengers). However , no considerations were provided 
for non-business passengers.  
 
                                                                 
78 It is commonly accepted that business passengers  could be a synonym of time sensitive passenger and 
leisure passengers can be a proxy of non-sensi tive passengers. However, related to the Ro-Mi corridor the 
IAA has recognized a change in the business behavior in the LIN-FCO air route. In fact, many business users  
have bought economy tickets rather than business tickets.  
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In the last years, consistent improvements are made by the HSR operators to reduce the 
travel time, in particular in the Turin-Naples corridor. In fact, currently Trenitalia 
performs the Ro-Mi link in 2 hours and 55 minutes79.  
 
Also with reference to the daily frequency of transport services, HSR system has 
improved consistently its offer over time in particular in the early hours of the 
morning80. The HSR system provides 57 daily trains (33-Trenitalia and 24-NTV) while 
the air transport system provides 33 flights (25-Alitalia-Cai, 5-Easyjet, 3-Ryanair). 
 
As detailed in Annex 5, regarding the level of fare, the progressive increase of Trenitalia 
average ticket, the change of Alitalia-Cai in reducing its fares, and the market entrance of 
NTV with its price ticket system, have allowed in particular for business passengers a 
convergence between all Ro-Mi transport operators (except Ryanair). Provides a 
synthetic summary of the range of fares. 
 
Table 67 – Synthetic overview of the Ro-Mi transport operators’ fares  
Ro-Mi 
operator 
Business Non-business 
Trenitalia 116€ - 200€  59€ - 100€  
NTV 130€ - 390€  35€ - 118€  
Alitalia-Cai 99€ - 289€  99 €  
Source: own elaboration on data from Ro-Mi operators’ web site  
 
With reference to the price correlation analysis (reported in Annex 5), no positive 
results were found for the 1st service class between Ro-Mi operator, while high value of 
price correlation were found for the 2nd service class in particular for simulation carried 
out one or two week before the departure date. However, the limited number of 
simulations requires to consider these results as preliminary. 
 
In section 7.4.2 own (or direct) and cross-point elasticity measure are calculated with 
different types of choice models and segmenting for the types of passengers. On this 
point it is important to underline that these measures are referred to the mode-choice 
(also known as mode-split and volume share) elasticities that is different respect the 
‘regular’ demand elasticity. These measures does not take into account the effect of a 
price change on the ‘aggregate volume’ of traffic81. Relevant values of own-point 
elasticity are found for both travel time and travel cost changes. Moreover, positive 
values were found for the cross-point elasticity indicating the substitutability between 
the transport modes considered. As expected, cross-point elasticity values are smaller 
than those of the own-point elasticity. With reference to the segmentation analysis, 
business passengers revealed a higher own and cross-point elasticity measures toward a 
travel time change rather than a travel cost change. On the contrary, non-business 
passengers revealed a higher own and cross-point elasticity measures toward a travel 
cost change rather than a travel time change.  
 
                                                                 
79 At the beginning this link was performed in 3 hours and 30 minutes.  
80 This aspect was a weak point in particolar for business passengers with the need to de part early in the 
morning and late in the evening. 
81 For further details see T.H.Oum, Waters, and Yong (1992).  
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8.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter is focused on policy implications of the air and HSR competition in the Ro-
Mi corridor. This aim was analyzed from a Ro-Mi transport operator and Institution 
point of view. 
With reference to the business strategy, the current Ro-Mi market shares distribution 
(corresponding to the “Base case scenario”) is calculated and reported in Table 69. On the 
basis of this scenario, 5 policies were analyzed. Recent Italian Antitrust Authority and 
Ro-Mi transport operators’ decisions (e.g. market entrance of Easyjet, travel time 
reduction with a new and fast high speed train-Freciarossa 1000 etc.) were selected to 
test their impact in term of market shares variations. The policy with the greatest 
increase in market share was the reduction of the Alitalia-Cai’s travel cost (50€) that 
earned, in the ceteris paribus analysis, a +16% of market share. For rail transport, the 
best policy was the reduction of the travel time that allowed, in the ceteris paribus  
analysis, Trenitalia and NTV to improve their market share respectively of +9% and 5%. 
 
Regarding the institutional point of view, the definition of the relevant market was 
investigated. First, its definition from the EC Competition was reported and detailed. 
Subsequently, inspired by a recent investigation of the IAA, consideration were 
addressed to the Ro-Mi corridor following the EC competition approach to the definition 
of the relevant market. In these analyses, all the results of the different surveys were 
reported and synthetically summarized (e.g. own and cross-point elasticity measures, 
ticket price system of Ro-Mi operators, price correlation analysis etc.). 
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9. Conclusions and future research 
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9.1. Synthetic answers to research questions 
 
In order to understand and analyze travellers’ preferences between HSR and air 
transport in the Ro-Mi corridor and to perform competition analysis, six research 
questions were set up. These are: 
 
 Which attributes are important for the Ro-Mi passengers’ mode choice?  
 
The identification of attributes more relevant to determine modal choice has a crucial 
role both for transport operator and for policy maker. This objective is reached with 
several steps: 1) a literature review analysis (section 5.2), 2) an ad hoc survey (section 
7.2.2), and 3) using choice models’ estimation.  
Total travel time, total travel cost, delay, flexibility and on-board services were the 
selected five attributes tested in the SP choice experiments. The most important 
attributes were found to be the total travel time, total travel cost and delay.  
 
 Which are the VOT measures for different types of passengers (business vs. 
non-business pax)? 
 
Using the MNL and ML models’ results for different data sources (RP, SP, RP+SP), VOT is 
calculated. Without segmentation (‘overall’ scenario), VOT values between the different 
data sources are quite similar (except for the RP value – 60€-hour), while consistent 
differences are found between the two types of choice models. In fact, based on the MNL 
output, the average VOT values are 60 €-hour (with RP data), 39 €-hour (with SP data) 
and 40 €-hour (with SP-RP data), while with the ML output the VOT measures are 76 €-
hour (with RP data), 74 €-hour (with SP data) and 76 €-hour (with SP-RP data). 
Moreover, distinguishing between the two types of passengers the different users’ 
sensitivity to the total travel time was identified. Very high VOT values for business 
passengers were found in particular using only RP data (ranging from 460€-hour - MNL 
to 510€-hour - ML), while with only SP or SP+RP data, the results are more reasonable 
and in line with the literature. 
 
 Which are the own and cross-point elasticities of mode choice probabilities? 
 
Using the probability weighted sample enumeration technique, own and cross-point 
elasticity measures of travel time and travel cost changes are calculated for each 
transport mode alternative. Overall, the own-point elasticities values are reported in 
Table 68. 
 
Table 68 – Own-point elasticity measures  
OWN-POINT ELASTICITY 
Transport modes 
MNL ML 
+10% 
TTT 
+10% 
TTC 
+10% 
TTT 
+10% 
TTC 
HSR1 -18% -8% -28% -13% 
HSR2 -15% -6% -25% -12% 
FSC -16% -13% -28% -20% 
LCC -15% -9% -24% -14% 
Source: own elaboration 
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With a segmentation analysis by type of passengers elasticity measures changed as 
follow: 
 Total Travel Time (+10%): 
 MNL: 
 HSR1: Business passenger: -29%/Not business passengers: -12%; 
 HSR2: Business passenger: -26%/Not business passengers: -9%; 
 FSC: Business passenger: -22%/Not business passengers: -12%; 
 LCC: Business passenger: -15%/Not business passengers: -11%; 
 ML: 
 HSR1: Business passenger: -44%/Not business passengers: -17%; 
 HSR2: Business passenger: -42%/Not business passengers: -15%; 
 FSC: Business passenger: -38%/Not business passengers: -18%; 
 LCC: Business passenger: -44%/Not business passengers: -17%; 
 Total Travel Cost (+10%): 
 MNL: 
 HSR1: Business passenger: -6% /Not business passengers: -10%; 
 HSR2: Business passenger: -4%/Not business passengers: -8%; 
 FSC: Business passenger: -7%/Not business passengers: -17%; 
 LCC: Business passenger: -2%/Not business passengers: -11%;  
 ML: 
 HSR1: Business passenger: -9%/Not business passengers: -14%; 
 HSR2: Business passenger: -9%/Not business passengers: -14%; 
 FSC: Business passenger: -13%/Not business passengers: -22%; 
 LCC: Business passenger: -10%/Not business passengers: -17%; 
 
Interesting results were found also with reference to the cross-point elasticity measures 
although the magnitude of the values is quite lower than the own-point elasticity 
measures. However, without segmentation analysis for the Total Travel Time attribute 
the cross-point elasticity measures range from 4% to 7% (MNL model) and from 5% to 
11% (ML model), while for Total Travel Cost attribute the cross-point elasticity 
measures range from 2% to 3% (MNL model) and from 5% to 11% (ML model). 
 
 
 Which are the market shares in the Ro-Mi corridor? Which are the Ro-Mi 
passengers’ reactions to hypothetical policy changes (i.e., a decrease of 15 
minutes of the HSR’s total travel time)? 
 
Using the joint SP-RP ML model’s results, the actual market shares (see Table 69) have 
been identified. Passengers’ sensitivity to the significant attributes and the real features 
of the Ro-Mi transport operators were used in order to determine their current market 
shares. Although a meticulous application of a stratified sampling strategy was not 
completely possibly to perform82, it was only possible as sampling strategy take into 
account the high presence of business travelers. However, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the market share distribution reported in Table 69 could be rather representative of 
reality.  
 
                                                                 
82 Like reported above, the absent collaboration of the Ro-Mi’s transport operator was crucial. 
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Table 69 – Base case scenario (joint SP-RP data) 
Parameters  
Trenitalia 
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Total travel 
time 
3 h 40’  4 h 5’  3 h 10’  5 h 
Time travel cost  80€  104€  150€  89€  
Delay 4’ 4’ 10’  7’ 
Flexibility 1 1 1 1 
ASC – Trenitalia  1 - - - 
ASC – NTV  - 1 - - 
ASC – FSC - - 1 - 
ASC – LCC - - - 1 
Market share:  45% 20% 25% 9% 
Source: own elaborations  
 
With reference to the simulated policies, Table 70 provides a summary. In particular, the 
policy with the greatest increase in market share was the reduction of the Alitalia-Cai’ s 
travel cost (50€) that earned, in the ceteris paribus analysis, a +23% of market share. For 
rail transport, the best policy was the reduction of the travel time that allowed, in the 
ceteris paribus analysis, Trenitalia and NTV to improve their market shares respectively 
of +11% and 5%. 
 
 It is possible to create a Decision Support System (DSS) to evaluate policy 
changes?  
Econometric results were used to realize a DSS in order to provide an easy tool to 
analyze ex ante possible policy changes based on the variation on Ro-Mi operators’ 
market shares. A smart easy user’s interface is reported in Figure 45. This forecasting tool 
could be useful especially for transport operator to simulate policy variation to 
understand related market shares dynamics.  
 
 Is there substitutability between Ro-Mi transport operators? 
 
The substitutability between air and HSR is generally recognized by the EC Competition 
for non-time sensitive passengers, while for time-sensitive passengers those detected 
cases are much more limited. In 2012 the Italian Antitrust Authority, in evaluating a 
merger operation between Alitalia and AirOne Airlines, in the definition of the relevant 
market for the Alitalia Airlines with a specific focus on the Rome-Milan corridors, IAA 
did not recognized the substitutability between air and HSR transport operators in the 
Ro-Mi corridor (for the 2009-2011 time period). However, in the last years, consistent 
improvements are made by the HSR operators to reduce the travel time, in particular in 
the Ro-Mi corridor. In fact, currently Trenitalia performs the Ro-Mi link in 2 hours and 
55 minutes83.  
 
 
 
                                                                 
83 At the beginning this link was performed in 3 hours and 30 minutes.  
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Table 70  – Overview of the policy scenarios simulated: ceteris paribus vs. sequential interactions analysis  
Type of simulation  
Trenitalia  
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Easyjet 
 
Ceteris paribus analysis  
Base case scenario: 45% 20% 25% 9% - 
Policy 1  
(market entry of 
Easyjet): 
27% 13% 15% 6% 39% 
Policy 2  
(NTV travel time 
reduction): 
42% 26% 23% 9% - 
Policy 3  
(Trenitalia & NTV 
ticket price 
reduction): 
49% 22% 21% 8% - 
Policy 4 
(Alitalia-Cai ticket 
price reduction): 
32% 14% 48% 7% - 
Policy 5 
(Trenitalia & NTV 
travel time 
reduction) 
56% 26% 13% 5% - 
      
Type of simulation  
Trenitalia  
 
NTV 
 
Alitalia-Cai 
 
Ryanair 
 
Easyjet 
 
Sequential interactions analysis  
Base case scenario: 45% 20% 25% 9% - 
Policy 1  
(market entry of 
Easyjet): 
27% 13% 15% 6% 39% 
Policy 2  
(NTV travel time 
reduction): 
26% 16% 15% 5% 37% 
Policy 3  
(Trenitalia & NTV 
ticket price 
reduction): 
31% 19% 13% 5% 32% 
Policy 4 
(Alitalia-Cai ticket 
price reduction): 
25% 16% 28% 4% 27% 
Policy 5  
(Trenitalia & NTV 
travel time 
reduction) 
41% 19% 19% 3% 18% 
Source: own elaboration 
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Also with reference to the daily frequency of transport services, HSR system has 
improved consistently its offer over time in particular in the early hours of the 
morning84. The HSR system provides 57 daily trains (33-Trenitalia and 24-NTV) while 
the air transport system provides 33 flights (25-Alitalia-Cai, 5-Easyjet, 3-Ryanair). As 
detailed in Annex 5, regarding the level of fare, the progressive increase of Trenitalia 
average ticket, the change of Alitalia-Cai in reducing its fares, and the market entrance of 
NTV with its price ticket system, have allowed a convergence between all Ro -Mi 
transport operators ticket systems (except Ryanair). This is an important aspect due at 
the change of behavior carried out by time sensitive passengers of Alitalia-Cai85. 
Moreover, with reference to the own and cross-point elasticity measures (section 7.4.2) 
relevant values of own-point elasticity are found for both travel time and travel cost 
changes. Moreover, positive values were found for the cross-point elasticity indicating 
the substitutability between the transport modes considered. With reference to the 
segmentation analysis, business passengers revealed a higher own and cross-point 
elasticity measures toward a travel time change rather than a travel cost change. On the 
contrary, non-business passengers revealed a higher own and cross-point elasticity 
measures toward a travel cost change rather than a travel time change.  
 
 
 
9.2. Future research and unexplored aspects 
 
9.2.1. Future research with these data 
 
o To use multivariate statistics to perform market segmentation analysis and to define 
travelers’ profiles (a part of this point has been realized during my visiting in Las 
Palmas University with Prof. Concepción Roman and Prof. Juan Carlos Martín), 
o To compare Ro-Mi case study with Madrid-Barcelona case study, 
o To explore the role of personal experience and choice representativeness in deciding 
between alternative modes in the context of long distance travelling by HSR versus 
air (FSC and LCC). In particular, to model the intricate links between preference and 
scale heterogeneity and diﬀerent levels of experience, cognitive eﬀort and ’ease of 
representation’ of the choice between more or less familiar modes (the idea of this 
paper is born in collaboration with Amanda Stathopoulos and Stefan Hess based on 
Ro-Mi dataset in particular with RP data). 
 
 
9.2.2. Unexplored issues 
 
o Non-price competition (advertising, promotion etc.) 
o Regulatory issue, 
o To analyze policy scenarios with game theory. 
o To analyze HSR stations positioning in each city (Milan and Rome). 
                                                                 
84 This aspect was a weak point in particolar for business passengers with the need to de part early in the 
morning and late in the evening. 
85 Alitalia-Cai  stated that a large proportion of its time sensitive passengers prefer to buy an economy  
tickets that the 1st class tickey as usual. 
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1. List of alerts and notifications (1980-May 2011) 
 
Transpor
t sector 
Code 
Title of alerts and 
notifications 
Year Intervention objects 
Air 
transport 
AS18 Airport management 1993 
Corrective fiscal incentives (Low No 24 December 1992, n. 
537) 
Air 
transport 
AS47 
Statement Airport 
sector 
1995 
Decree Law of 29 April 1995, n. 133, entitled "Urgent 
provisions for airport operators" (CA 2439 of the XII 
legislature) 
Air 
transport 
AS78 
Airport clearance 
discipline 
1996 Council Regulation EEC January 18, 1993, No 95 
Air 
transport 
AS92 Civil Aviation Reform 1997 
Draft legislative decree implementing the mandate 
conferred by the law of 28 December 1995 No 549 on the 
reform of civil aviation (Article 2 comma2) 
Air 
transport 
AS123 
Liberalization of 
ground assistance in 
airports 
1998 
Draft law on "Measures for the implementation of 
obligations arising from membership of the European 
Communities - Community Law 1995-1997" (AS 1780-
B/XIII legislature, Article 24). 
Air 
transport 
AS148 
Noise pollution at 
airports 
1998 
DPR 11 December 1997, n. 496 "Regulation laying down 
rules for the reduction of noise pollution produced by civil 
aircraft" 
Air 
transport 
AS150 
Temporary measures 
for distribution of 
traffic between the 
airports of Linate and 
Malpensa 
1998 
Decree of the Ministry of Transport and Shipping of 
October 9, 1998, amending and supplementing the 
Ministerial Decree of 5 July 1996 and October 23, 1997 
Air 
transport 
AS177 
Regulation of 
scheduled air 
services with non-EU 
countries 
1999 
Addendum (March 31, 1999) to the State Convention on 
Alitalia-scheduled air services with non-EU countries 
Rail 
transport 
AS228 
Provisions relating to 
infrastructure and 
transport 
2002 
Draft law on "Measures for Infrastructure and Transport 
(AC 2032/XIV legislature, Art. 6) 
Air 
transport 
AS254 
Distribution of air 
traffic at Milan's 
airport system 
2003 
Ministerial Decree of 5 January 2001 on "Amendments to 
the Decree of 3 March 2000 on the distribution of air 
traffic at Milan's airport system 
Rail 
transport 
AS262 
Retrieval of railway 
stock necessary for 
the completion of 
tenders for the 
procurement of rail 
regional services 
2003 
Legislative Decree 11 November 1997, No 422 entitled 
"Contribution to the regions and local authorities of 
functions and tasks in the field of local public transport, in 
accordance with art. 4, paragraph 4, of Law No. 15 March 
1997 No 59 as amended by art. 45 of Law of 1 August 
2002, n. 166 "provisions in infrastructure and transport" 
Rail 
transport 
AS265 
Separation between 
infrastructure 
management and rail 
services 
2003 
Legislative Decree 8 July 2003, No 188 implementing 
Directive 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 
2001/14/CEDraft Law on "Amendments to the Code and 
Regulations Regarding navigation safety and efficiency of 
air transport" (AC 1401/XIV Term) 
Air 
transport 
AS274 
Liberalization and 
privatization of 
airport operations 
2004 
Draft Law on "Amendments to the code and regulations 
regarding navigation safety and efficiency of air transport" 
(AC 1401/XIV Legislature) 
Rail 
transport 
AS325 
Management of 
intermodal terminals 
on the Italian 
network and 
provision of 
terminalization 
service 
2006 
Legislative Decree 8 July 2003, No 188, the 
implementation of Directives 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC 
and 2001/14/EC and following the acquisition of control 
of CEMAT SpA by Trenitalia SpA 
Air 
transport 
AS354 
Scheme of imposition 
of public service 
obligations on 
scheduled services to 
and from Sardinia 
2006 
Comments on the scheme of taxation of public service 
obligations on scheduled air services to and from Sardinia 
under Article 4 paragraph 1, read. a) of the EC Regulation 
2482/92 as well as incorporated in Article 36 of Law No 
17 May 1999 144 and specified in the various ministerial 
decrees implementing 
Air 
transport 
AS380 
Transport service 
along the route 
Ciampino Airport - 
Termini 
2007 
Verify the operations of an operator service operator of 
local public transport on the route line Ciampino Airport-
Termini. 
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Air 
transport 
AS386 
Bilateral agreement 
on air transport 
activities between 
Italy and Russia 
2007 
Observations on the implementation of the Bilateral 
dating back to 1969 that regulates the activities of air 
transport between Italy and Russia, with particular 
reference to links with Russia from Sicily 
Air 
transport 
AS426 
Directive on the 
regulation of fees 
charged for airport 
services on an 
exclusive basis and 
application 
guidelines 
2007 
Opinion on the definition of the Guidelines by ENAC with 
reference to the "Directive on the regulation of fees 
charged for airport services on an exclusive basis", 
approved by CIPE June 14, 2007 
Air 
transport 
AS441 
Aircraft ground 
assistenza 
2008 
Comments on the decision of the National Civil Aviation 
Authority to refuse the renewal of certificates of eligibility 
are indispensable for the activities of the handler, to those 
operators that do not apply the national collective labor 
contract Assoaeroporti 
Air 
transport 
AS509 
Scheme of taxation of 
public service 
obligations on air 
services to and from 
Sardinia 
2009 
Comments on the scheme of taxation of public service 
obligations on scheduled air services to and from Sardinia 
under Article 4 paragraph 1, letter a) of the EC Regulation 
2482/92 as well as incorporated in Article 36 of Law No 
17 May 1999 144 and specified in the ministerial decree 
last August 5th, 2008 
Air 
transport 
AS522 
Determination of 
maximum operating 
capacity of the Linate 
airport (Milan) 
2009 
Observations on the unjustified restrictions of competition 
in the markets for air transport of passengers involved in 
the maintenance line in the determination of 18 
movements per hour maximum capacity at Linate. 
Rail 
transport 
AS528 
Public service 
obligations in the 
field of rail transport 
2009 
Observations on the effects on production and supply of 
rail services due to the continuing lack of clarity regarding 
the definition of public service obligations in the field 
Rail 
transport 
AS635 
Terms and rates for 
transport of people 
on the railways of the 
State (Article 19) 
2009 
Comments on the provisions of art. 19 of the "conditions 
and rates for the carriage of persons on the Ferrovie dello 
Stato" (hereinafter "Rates and Terms") governing the 
method of calculating the rate per km for the rail 
transport service provided by Trenitalia 
Rail 
transport 
AS658 
Regione Piemonte - 
Competition for the 
award of regional rail 
services 
2010 
The Piedmont Region has sent a request for an opinion, 
later supplemented on January 18, 2010, regarding certain 
issues related to competition for the award of regional rail 
services that the Region is carrying out, following 
publication of an EU ban on specific lots 
Air 
transport 
AS722 
Taxi service on 
routes to and from 
airports 
2010 
Comments on the rules for the regulation of the taxi 
service to and from the airports open to civilian air traffic, 
as contained in Art. 14, paragraph 8, of Legislative Decree 
19 November 1997, No 422. 
 
 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
177 
 
 
2. List of investigations (1980-May 2011) 
 
Transport 
sector 
Code Title of invetsigations Actors involved Year Outcome 
Economic 
Fine € 
Type 
of 
abuse 
Rail 
Tranport 
I78 Consorzio Capri 
Ferrovie dello Stato, 
Consorzio Capri Spa., 
Ansaldo Trasporti Spa., Abb 
Tecnomasio Spa., Breda 
Costruzioni Ferroviarie Spa., 
Firema Consortium Spa. 
1993 Violation 
 
AoDP 
Rail 
Tranport 
A35 
Fremura/Ferrovie 
dello Stato 
Ferrovie dello Stato Spa., 
Italcontainer Spa., Fremura 
Spa., Associazione Logistica 
1993 Violation 
 
AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A44 
Gruppo 
sicurezza/Aeroporti di 
Roma 
Gruppo Sicurezza Spa., 
Aeroporti di Roma Spa. 
1993 Violation 59.144 AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A11 
Ibar/ Aeroporti di 
Roma 
Ibar, Aeroporti di Roma Spa. 1993 Violation 925.960 AoDP 
Rail 
Tranport 
C1159 
Ferrovie dello Stato 
SpA./Sogin 
Ferrovie dello Stato Spa., 
Sogin Spa. 
1993 
Operation 
granted  
F 
Air 
transport 
C804 Alitalia/Malev Alitalia Spa., Malev Spa. 1993 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
A58 
Assoutenti/Alitalia 
Airline SpA. 
AlitaliaSpa., Assoutenti 1994 Violation 
 
AoDP 
Rail 
Tranport 
I80 
Consorzio Trevi, 
Consorzio Capri, 
Ferrovie dello Stato, 
TAV 
Ferrovie dello Stato, 
Consorzio Trevi  Spa., Fiat 
Ferroviaria Spa., Ansaldo 
Transporti Spa., Abb 
Trazione Spa., Breda 
Costruzioni Ferroviarie Spa.,  
Firema Consortium, Treno 
ad alta velocità Spa. 
1994 No violation 
 
AoDP 
Rail 
tranport 
I95 
Fercomit-Mer. 
Armamento 
Ferroviario 
Consorzio Fercomit, Ferrovie 
dello Stato Spa. 
1994 No violation 
 
AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A11B 
Ibar/Aeroporti di 
Roma 
Ibar, Aeroporti di Roma Spa. 1994 No violation 
 
AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A56 
Ibar/Società esercizi 
aeroportuali Milano 
Ibar, Società per azioni 
Esercizi aeroportuali Spa. 
1994 Violation 567.380 AoDP 
Rail 
tranport 
I79 Treno alta velocità 
Ferrovie dello Stato, Tav 
Spa., Eni Iri, Fiat Spa., 
Cepav1, Cepav2, Iricav1, 
Iricav2 
1994 No violation 
 
AoDP 
Air 
transport 
C1533 Alitalia/A.T.I. 
Alitalia Spa., Aero Trasporti 
Italiani Spa. 
1994 No violation 
 
F 
Air 
transport 
C1599B Alitalia/Avianova Alitalia Spa., Avianova Spa. 1994 Violation 
 
NOT-
C 
Air 
transport 
C1365 
Eurofly/Aviofin/Air 
Europe 
Eurofly Spa., Aviofin Spa., Air 
Europe Spa. 
1993 Violation 30.987 
NOT-
C 
Air 
transport 
C2930 Fin Flight/Air Europe 
Fin Flight Spa., Air Europe 
Spa. 
1994 Violation 
 
NOT-
C 
Air 
transport 
A61 
De Montis Catering 
Roma/ Aeroporti di 
Roma 
Aeroporti di Roma Spa., De 
Montis Catering Roma Spa. 
1995 Violation 
 
AoDP 
Rail 
Tranport 
I129 
Italcontainer/T.C.F. 
Trasporti Combinati 
Ferrostradali 
Italcontainer Spa., Trasporti 
Combinati Ferrostradali Spa. 
1995 
Not 
applicable  
ARC 
Air 
transport 
I117 
Ram-Rifornimenti 
Aeroportuali Milanesi 
Elf Idrocarburi Italiana Spa., 
Fina Italiana Spa., Kuwait 
Petroleum Italia Spa., Shell  
Italia Spa., Aviazione Spa., 
Total Italia Srl., Tamoil Italia 
Spa., Tatom Srl., Mars Srl., 
Ram Srl. 
1995 No violation 
 
ARC 
Air 
transport 
A56B 
Ibar/ Società esercizi 
aeroportuali Milano 
Ibar, Società per azioni 
Esercizi Aeroportuali 
1995 No violation 
 
AoDP 
Rail 
tranport 
C1853 
Ferrovie dello Stato 
SpA./Idrovie 
Ferrovie dello Stato Spa., 
Idrovie Spa. 
1995 
Operation 
granted  
M 
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Rail 
tranport 
C1159B 
Ferrovie dello Stato 
SpA./Sogin 
Ferrovie dello Stato Spa., 
Sogin Spa. 
1995 No violation 
 
NOT-
C 
Air 
transport 
I155 
Aeroporti di 
Roma/Gruppo 
Sicurezza 
Aeroporti di Roma Spa., 
Gruppo sicurezza Srl., 
International Aviation 
Security Srl., International 
Consultant Target Security 
Italia Srl., Centro Nazionale 
Sicurezza Spa., Air security 
Srl. 
1996 No violation 
 
ARC 
Air 
transport 
A102 
Associazione 
Consumatori 
Utenti/Alitalia SpA. 
Associazione Consumatori 
Utenti, Alitalia Spa., 
Aliadriatica Spa., Meridiana 
Spa., Air Dolomiti Spa. 
1996 Violation 59.145 AoDP 
Rail 
Tranport 
I95B 
Ferrovie dello Stato 
SpA./Fercomit 
Ferrovie dello Stato Spa., 
Cons. Fercomit, Ilva Srl., 
Acciaierie e Ferrerie 
Piombino Srl., Dalmine Spa., 
Omese Spa., CIPAF, Cons. 
Strade Ferrate, Ipa Spa., 
Cepiv Spa., Cons. Bonifica 
Acustica e sistemi Ecologici, 
Ipa Engineering Spa. 
1996 No violation 
 
AoDP 
Rail 
Tranport 
C2395 Fiat Ferroviaria/S.I.G. 
Fiat Ferroviaria Spa., SIG 
Group Spa. 
1996 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Rail 
Tranport 
I351 
Ferrovie dello Stato 
SpA./Caronte 
Shipping/Tourist Ferri 
Boat 
Ferrovie dello stato Spa., 
Caronte Shipping Spa., 
Tourist Ferri Boat Spa. 
1998 
Withdrawal 
of notice  
ARC 
Rail 
Tranport 
A209 
Goriziane/Fiat 
ferroviaria 
Goriziane Spa., Fiat 
terroviaria Spa., Gestione 
Commissariale governativa 
delle ferrovie Appulo-Lucane 
ed autoservizi integrativi 
1998 Violation 7.746 AoDP 
Air 
transport 
I276B Alitalia/Meridiana Alitalia Spa., Meridiana Spa. 1998 Violation 
 
ARC 
Air 
transport 
I348 Alitalia/Minerva Alitalia Spa., Minerva Spa. 1999 Violation 
 
ARC 
Rail 
Tranport 
A277 
Cesare fremura-
Assologistica/Ferrovie 
dello Stato 
Cesare Fremura-
Assologistica Srl., Ferrovie 
dello stato Spa., Italcontainer 
Spa. 
1999 Violation 3.247.752 AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A247 
Aeroporti di Roma-
Tariffe del ground 
handling 
Alitalia Spa., Associazione 
Gestori Indipendenti Servizi 
Aeroportuali, Aviation 
Services Spa., Cimair Spa. 
2000 Violation 
 
AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A291 Assoviaggi/Alitalia 
Alitalia Spa., Associazione 
Italiana Agenzie di Viaggio e 
Turismo, Hello Travel Spa. 
2001 Violation 26.851.627 AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A306 Veraldi/Alitalia Alitalia Spa. 2001 No violation 
 
AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A291B Assoviaggi/ Alitalia Assoviaggi, Alitalia Spa. 2002 Violation 2.000.000 
NOT-
C 
Air 
transport 
I446 
Compagnie aeree – fuel 
charge 
Alpi Eagles Spa., Gandalf 
Airlines Spa., Deutsche 
Lufthansa AG., Federico II 
Airways Spa., Azzurra Air 
Spa., National Jet Italia Spa.,  
British Airways Plc. 
2002 Violation 1.838.482 ARC 
Air 
transport 
A303 
Aviapertner/Aeroporto 
di Bologna 
Aviapartner SA, Società 
aeroporto Bologna Spa. 
2003 Violation 880.000 AoDP 
Air 
transport 
I532 Alitalia SpA./Volare 
Alitalia Spa., Volare Goup 
spa. 
2003 Violation 
 
ARC 
Rail 
Tranport 
C6237 
Enertad-
Trenitalia/SODAI 
Enertrand Spa., Trenitalia 
Spa., SODAI Spa. 
2004 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Rail 
Tranport 
C6246 
Enel Hydro-
Trenitalia/Wisco 
Enel Hydro Spa., Trenitalia 
Spa. 
2004 
Operation 
granted  
DE-M 
Air 
transport 
I613 Alitalia-Meridiana Alitalia Spa., Meridiana Spa. 2004 
Withdrawal 
of notice  
AoDP 
Air 
transport 
C334 Alitalia servizi/Ales Alitalia Servizi Spa., Ales Spa. 2005 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Rail 
Tranport 
C7476 
Ferrovie dello Stato 
CARGO/CEMAT 
Ferrovie dello Stato Cargo 
Spa., CEMAT Spa. 
2006 
Operation 
granted  
M 
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Air 
transport 
C7667 Alitalia/Volare Alitalia Spa., Volare Spa. 2006 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
C7909 Aiport Elite/Ristop Airport Elite Srl., Ristop Srl. 2006 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
C7947 
Flightcare/Aeroporti di 
Roma Hnadling 
Flightcare Srl., Aeroporti di 
Roma Handling Spa. 
2006 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
I641 
Rifornimenti 
aeroportuali 
Eni Spa., Esso Italia Spa., 
Kuway Petrolium Spa., Shall 
Italia Spa., Tamoil Petroli 
Spa., Total Italia Spa., Disma 
Srl., Seram Srl.Hub Srl., 
Rifornimenti aeroportuali 
Italiani Srl., 
2007 Violation 301.030.000 ARC 
Air 
transport 
C8227 Meridiana/Eurofly Meridiana Spa., Eurofly Spa. 2007 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
C8616 
Leonardo/Aeroporti di 
Roma 
Leonardo Srl., Aeroporti di 
Roma Spa. 
2007 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
SP86 
Aeroporti di 
Roma/Attività cargo 
Fiumicino 
Aeroporti di Roma Spa. 2007 Violation 25.000 DE-M 
Air 
transport 
C9237 
Alenia Aeronautica-
Oao Sukhoi/Zao Sukhoi 
Civil Aicraft Superjet 
Iinternational 
ALENIA Aeronautica S.p.A., 
OAO Sukhoi Company 
2008 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
C7667B Alitalia/Volare Alitalia Spa., Volare Spa. 2008 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
A376 
Aeroporti di Roma – 
Tariffe aeroportuali 
Alitalia Spa., AironeSpa., 
Cyprus Airways Spa., Japan 
Airlines Spa., KLM Royal 
Dutch Air Lines Spa., Iberia 
Spa., Delta Air Lines Spa., 
Swiss International Air Lines 
Spa., TAP Air Portugal Spa., 
American Airlines Spa., ICTS 
Spa., EAS Spa., IATA, New 
Trasport S.r.l., Consorzio 
Airport Cargo Operators, 
First International S.r.l., 
Boccanera 
2008 Violation 1.668.000 AoDP 
Rail 
Tranport 
A389B 
Rail Traction 
Company-Rete 
Ferroviaria Italiana-
Ferrovie dello Stato 
Rete Ferroviaria Italiana 
Spa., Ferrovie dello Stato 
Spa., Nord Cargo S.r.l., 
Railion Italia S.r.l. 
2008 
Accepting 
commitments  
AoDP 
Air 
transport 
A377 
Società Esercizi 
Aeroportuali Milano – 
Tariffe aeroportuali 
IBAR, Società esercizi 
aeroportuali Milano Spa. 
2008 Violation 1.549.000 AoDP 
Rail 
Tranport 
SP95 
Rete Ferroviaria 
Italiana-Attività di 
traghettamento di 
automezzi e passeggeri 
sullo stretto di Messina 
Rete Ferroviaria Italiana Spa. 2008 Violation 20.000 
NOT-
C 
Air 
transport 
C7708 
Alitalia-Ramo d 
azienda Gandalf 
Alitalia Spa., Gandalf S.p.A., 
CAI 
2009 Violation 5.000 
NOT-
C 
Air 
transport 
C9637 
Iberia LinesS Aereas De 
Espana/Nueva Vueling 
Iberia Lineas Aereas de 
Espana SA., Clickair SA., 
Vueling Airlines SA. 
2009 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
C100843 
Società Esercizi 
Aeroportuali 
Milano/Malpensa 
Eenrgia 
Società Esercizi Aeroportuali 
Milano Spa., Malpensa 
Energia S.r.l.  
2009 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
C10085 
Air Berlin & CO. 
Luftverkehrs/Ramo di 
azienda di Hapag-Lloyd 
Air Berlin Plc., Air Berlin Plc. 
& Co. Luftverkerhrs KG, 
Gruppo Hapag –Lloyd 
2009 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Air 
transport 
C10356 
Cef Express/Ramo di 
azienda di Compass 
Group Italia 
(Aeroporto di 
Ciampino) 
Chef Express S.p.A., Compass 
Group Italia S.p.A. 
2010 
Operation 
granted  
M 
Note: Type of abuse: AoDP (Abuse of Dominant Position), M (Merger), DE-M (De-merger), F (Fusion), NOT-C 
(Not-compliance), ARC (Agreement Restricting Competi tion).  
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3. “Manual of the good interviewer” for the Ro-Mi survey 
 
 
 
 
                                  Facoltà di Scienze Politiche 
DIPES 
 
 
   
PROGETTO Ro-Mi 
ANALISI DELLA SCELTA MODALE:  
IL CORRIDOIO ROMA-MILANO 
 
 
 
Il manuale del Bravo intervistatore 
Dott.ssa Eva Valeri                     
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Il progetto Ro-Mi 
 
Titolo del Progetto di Ricerca:  
Analisi della scelta modale e della competizione tra treno ad alta velocità e aereo nella 
tratta Roma-Milano; 
 
1.1 Obiettivi 
Individuazione delle determinanti (e relativo peso) che influenzano la scelta modale nel 
corridoio citato; definizione quote di mercato, simulzioni e implicazioni di policy.  
 
1.2 Attività 
Definizione, sviluppo e somministrazione di interviste Stated Preferences (SP) e 
Revealed Preferences (RP) ai passeggeri della tratta Roma-Milano nonché ai passeggeri 
potenziali. Applicazione di modelli econometrici e validazione dei risultati. 
 
Le interviste e il ruolo degli intervistatori 
 
Le interviste dovranno essere somministrate non solo in luoghi come stazione 
ferroviaria (Termini e Tiburtina) o in aeroporto ma anche in luoghi quali centri 
commerciali, sale di attesa etc. 
Come si può desumere dalle finalità sopra esplicitate, il ruolo e il compito degli 
intervistatori è cruciale per garantire che il progetto vada a buon fine. 
Alcune riflessioni sulle interviste personali 
  
3.1 Considerazioni generali 
Le interviste personali sono molto efficaci e possono produrre risposte più affidabili e 
precise. Nel caso di studi di valutazione economica diretta è fondamentale che gli 
intervistatori adottino un stesso protocollo di comportamento co sì da ridurre la 
percentuale di risposte distorte. 
Con le interviste dirette i partecipanti sono più motivati e stimolati a partecipare grazie 
alla presenza dell’intervistatore, esso infatti può chiarire dubbi e fornire risposte in 
merito ai contenuti dell’indagine. È quindi importante che l’intervistatore prenda 
coscienza dei messaggi, verbali e non, che l’intervistato gli fornisce durante l’intervista 
(Ferrini, 2005). 
  
L’intervistatore deve essere un buon comunicatore dimostrandosi abile nel trasmettere 
all’intervistato un senso di sicurezza ed affidabilità. L’intervistatore deve essere capace 
di condurre e guidare l’intervista senza perdere di vista l’obiettivo di raccogliere dati 
sulle preferenze degli intervistati e non sostituendosi ad essi come, a volte, la dinamica 
dell’intervista ci porterebbe a fare. 
  
3.2 Segnali 
Molti segnali, verbali e non, potrebbero risultare più o meno appropriati per un 
intervista. 
È, quindi, importante che l’intervistatore prenda coscienza dei segnali che emette così da 
poterli usare correttamente. 
I segnali più rilevanti sono l’apparenza/abbigliamento,  la gestualità, l’espressione 
facciale, la postura, il tono di voce, il contatto visivo. 
3.3 Osservazioni 
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Le osservazioni fatte dall’intervistatore devono essere limitate a ciò che vede e sente ed 
è fondamentale che esso non interferisca sulle risposte. Gli intervistatori non devono 
quindi farsi tentare dall’interferire sulle osservazioni del partecipante anche se questo 
ultimo gli chiede conferme. In questo caso è opportuno sottolineare che si è interessati a 
conoscere le opinioni dell’intervistato e che non vi sono risposte giuste o sbagliate a 
priori. 
Il linguaggio è l’altro aspetto fondamentale dell’intervista. Definizioni e significati sono 
insite nella persona e quindi variano da soggetto a soggetto. Pertanto, l’interpretazione e 
le risposte possono essere abbastanza diverse da ciò che l’intervistatore si aspettata, in 
questi casi, esso può ponderatamente chiarire e spiegare il significato delle domande 
così da ridurre le ambiguità. 
  
Se l’intervistatore ha dei dubbi sulle risposte fornite, alla fine dell’inter vista può tornare 
indietro e chiedere ulteriori spiegazioni sul significato di affermazioni e risposte 
dell’intervistato. Questa pratica è particolarmente rilevante in fase di pre -test. 
I primi minuti di contatto con l’intervistato sono cruciali, è importante che 
l’intervistatore si presenti e stabilisca un clima confortevole, questo può includere lo 
scambio di semplici e banali battute sul tempo, il traffico o altro. 
L’intervistatore è responsabile dell’intervista e deve trattare tutti i partecipanti nello  
stesso modo. 
Quattro aspetti devono essere considerati in fase di intervista: 
 -l’approfondita conoscenza del problema di ricerca da parte dell’intervistatore,  
 - la conoscenza della tecnica di campionamento utilizzata,  
 - la collocazione geografica dell’area d’indagine (dotarsi di mappa della città),  
 - la disponibilità ad ascoltare e comunicare. 
  
 
Pianificazione della somministrazione delle interviste 
 
Verrà fornito un tesserino che dovrà obbligatoriamente essere indossato durante la 
somministrazione delle interviste. A tale fine si richiederà una fototessera ad ogni 
intervistatore. 
 
4.1 Luogo delle interviste 
Il luogo delle interviste è principalmente la città di Roma. 
 
4.2 Numerosità delle interviste 
La numerosità delle interviste verrà definita sulla base da specifiche esigenze dettate dal 
design generato dal software Ngene per la definizione del questionario da sottoporre 
agli intervistati, del numero di intervistatori che aderiranno al progetto nonché dalla 
relativa disponibilità giorni/ore da loro forniti. 
Il numero di interviste da effettuare verrà comunicato successivamente. 
 
4.3 Campionamento 
Inizialmente si adotterà la tecnica di campionamento causale semplice per poi passare 
alla tecnica di campionamento stratificato (vedere il glossario per l’esplicazione di questi 
concetti). 
4.4 Tempistica 
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Le interviste verranno effettuate indicativamente nel periodo di tempo compreso tra 
aprile e luglio 2010.  
 
 
Sviluppo e spiegazione del questionario 
 
Questo paragrafo illustra le differenti parti/sezioni che compongono e caratterizzano il 
questionario. 
Tali informazioni sono state scritte sotto l’immagine della sezione del questionario che si 
intende esplicare per permettere un’immediata comprensione dei nostri suggerimenti.  
Il questionario potrebbero differenziarsi per tipologia di soggetto intervistato o sulla 
base di specifiche esigenze dettate dal software Ngene. Su questo punto verrete 
aggiornati in seguito. 
 
I questionari si compongono di cinque parti fondamentali: 
Dettagli intervista; 
Pre-intervista;  
 Esercizi di scelta; 
 Post-intervista; 
 Valutazione intervista. 
 
Vediamo nel dettaglio ogni singola parte.  
Le domande esplicate nelle differenti sezioni del questionario potranno essere integrate 
con altre domande. 
 
5.1 Dettagli intervista  
 
 
 
Assegneremo ad ogni intervistatore un codice (numero) identificativo da inserire 
nell’apposita casella.  
Le interviste potranno essere somministrate con supporto cartaceo, CAPI (cioè con 
l’ausilio del computer) o tramite mail (chiedendo l’indirizzo mail e spedendo per  mail il 
questionario). Nella casella corrispondente al “Tipo di intervista” andrà riportato la 
tipologia di somministrazione dell’intervista quindi se cartacea la sola scritta 
cartaceo/CAPI/mail. Nota bene: “spingere” l’intervistato ad effettuare l’intervista 
cartacea. 
Si consiglia di compilare questa parte prima di iniziare l’intervista.  
 
5.2 Pre-intervista 
L’obiettivo di questa parte del questionario è raccogliere informazioni socio -economiche 
riguardanti l’intervistato, la sua frequenza di utilizzo del TAV e dell’aereo nella tratta 
Roma-Milano nonché ulteriori  informazioni sull’ultimo viaggio effettuato sempre su 
questa tratta.  
Questa parte si compone di due gruppi di macro domande. Entriamo nei dettagli.  
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GRUPPO DOMANDE 1 
 
  
Da questa prima sessione di micro-domande vogliamo ottenere informazioni generiche 
sulle anagrafiche del soggetto intervistato. Le informazioni da chiedere, a parte quella 
relativa al SESSO (a cui potete rispondere direttamente voi apponendo una X 
nell’apposita casella), sono ETA’, LIVELLO D’ISTRUZIONE (con “post università” 
intendiamo chi oltre alla laurea ha effettuato master, dottorato di ricerca, corsi di 
perfezionamento etc.), OCCUPAZIONE attuale (nota bene: abbiamo suddiviso 
volontariamente la categoria “Dipendenti” in “Dip . impiegato” e “Dip. dirigente”) e 
ATTUALE RESIDENZA/DOMICILIO per il quale si richiede il CAP.  
 
GRUPPO DOMANDE 2 (DA 2.1 A 2.6)  
 
 
Con questa seconda parte di domande si intendono raccogliere informazioni sulla 
frequenza di utilizzo del TAV e dell’aereo nella tratta Roma-Milano (nota bene: questa 
domanda è specificatamente rivolta a conoscere la frequenza di utilizzo della tratta 
Roma-Milano e non in generale!).  
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È ammessa una sola risposta per domanda. 
Con riferimento alla modalità aerea, oltre a chiedere la tipologia di frequenza di utilizzo 
si chiede all’intervistato di precisare la tipologia di compagnia aerea generalmente 
utilizzata suddividendo il punteggio massimo di 100% tra comp. aerea tradizionale e tra 
comp. aerea low-cost (vedere il glossario per definizione ed esempi di comp. aerea 
tradizionale e low cost).  
Per esempio: SI: 80% comp. aerea tradizionale – 20% comp. aerea low cost 
Per esempio: NO: 70% comp. aerea tradizionale – 50% comp. aerea low cost 
 
Il gruppo di domande da 2.3 a 2.6 (poste nel box sotto la scritta in rosso) sono da 
somministrare solo nel caso in cui l’intervistato ha effettuato almeno un viaggio o con 
TAV o con l’aereo sulla tratta Roma-Milano. Non devono essere somministrate in tutti i 
quei casi nei quali ad entrambe le due domande sulla frequenza di utilizzo l’intervistato 
ha risposto MAI. 
Quando si sottopongono queste micro-domande è fondamentale specificare 
all’intervistato di rispondere facendo riferimento all’ultimo viaggio effettuato su questa 
tratta. Le domande da sottoporre sono le seguenti: SCOPO DEL VIAGGIO, MODALITA’ DI 
TRASPORTO UTILIZZATA, QUALI ALTRE MODALITA’ DI TRASPORTO HA CONSIDERATO 
durante il processo di scelta della modalità di trasporto con cui ha viaggiato (in questo 
caso sono ammesse più di una risposta) e, infine, il LUOGO DI PARTENZA (chiedendo 
anche in questo caso solo il CAP). 
 
GRUPPO DOMANDE 2 (DA 2.7 A 2.8)  
 
 
 
DOMANDA 2.7 
Quanto riportato nel quadrante sovrastante è una parte molto importante e delicata del 
questionario. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
187 
 
A questa domanda dovranno rispondere tutti gli intervistati.  
A chi ha effettuato almeno un viaggio nella tratta Roma-Milano (con qualsiasi modalità 
di trasporto - TAV o aereo) prima di porre la domanda si deve specificare che 
l’intervistato dovrà rispondere pensando all’ultimo viaggio effettuato in questa tratta 
(come il gruppo di domande precedenti).  
A chi, invece, non ha mai effettuato nessun viaggio su questa tratta si chiederà 
un’ulteriore sforzo e al contempo maggiore attenzione da parte dell’intervistatore per 
garantire la qualità delle informazioni ottenute.  
Con questo gruppo di domande chiediamo di assegnare dei valori a specifiche 
caratteristiche del viaggio come tempo totale di percorrenza, costo totale del viaggio etc. 
È fondamentale in questa parte esplicare in maniera opportuna ma al contempo rapida 
le caratteristiche del viaggio proposte, riutilizzate in seguito anche nella sezione del 
questionario “Esercizi di scelta” (vedere negli allegati la Legenda che esplica questi 
attributi). 
In questo gruppo di micro-domande, soprattutto chi non ha mai effettuato un viaggio 
nella tratta Roma-Milano, può trovarsi in difficoltà. L’intervistatore dovrà essere abile ed 
intelligente a “suggerirgli” di rispondere semplicemente dicendo per esempio: “Secondo 
lei quanto è il tempo totale di percorrenza da casa sua e il punto di destinazione finale 
per un ipotetico viaggio in questa tratta?” oppure “Come si immagina che sia la 
flessibilità di un ipotetico biglietto?”, “Secondo lei quanto è il ritardo medio per un 
ipotetico viaggio tra Roma-Milano in TAV|aereo?”. Potrebbe capitare che qualche 
intervistato vi chieda di suggerirgli la risposta: rispondere semplicemente che non esiste 
una risposta “esatta” e che noi siamo interessati a sapere la sua percezione di quello che 
è il servizio attuale. Per questa tipologia di intervistato si richiede uno sforzo di 
“immaginazione”. Per chi ha effettuato almeno un viaggio, invece, dovrà essere 
indirizzato a ricordare e fornire i dati relativi alle caratteristiche di quel viaggio. 
Con riferimento alla “Flessibilità” si intende la possibilità di modificare nel tempo (con o 
senza supplemento) la prenotazione del biglietto effettuata. A differenza di tutte le altre, 
per questa caratteristica si “costringe” l’intervistato a scegliere tra tre possibilità che 
sono specifiche e diverse per modo di trasporto.  
Come vediamo nella figura sotto per il TAV gli intervistati possono scegliere tra: i) 
nessun cambio; ii) cambio fino alla partenza; iii) cambio fino 1 ora dopo della partenza.  
Per l’aereo (sia comp. aerea low cost sia tradizionale) gli intervistati possono scegliere 
tra: i) nessun cambio; ii) cambio fino 2 giorni prima della partenza con supplemento; iii) 
cambio fino 2 giorni prima della partenza senza supplemento. 
 
Focus: 
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Dopo aver completato la caratterizzazione dei cinque attributi del servizio di trasporto 
l’intervistatore dovrà procedere a chiedere all’intervistato di specificare se le risposte 
fornite nella colonna AEREO si riferiscono al servizio di trasporto fornito da una comp. 
aereo tradizionale o low cost, apponendo semplicemente una X in corrispondenza della 
apposita casella. 
 
Dopo aver fornito i dati sulle caratteristiche delle due modalità di trasporto come 
richiesto, procedere a chiedere la SCELTA EFFETTUATA dallo stesso, cioè dato il suo 
choice set di scelta così come descritto, con quale modalità di trasporto l’intervistato ha 
viaggiato?. 
Nota bene: È estremamente importante evitare di lasciare incomplete anche solo alcune 
sezioni di queste micro-domande in quanto anche un solo dato mancante non ci 
permetterà di capire e poter valutare la “scelta” dell’ultimo viaggio effettuato 
dall’intervistato:  
“costringere”/guidare l’intervistato a fornire ogni singola informazione. 
Quanto precisato è valido sia per chi ha effettuato almeno un viaggio nella tratta oggetto 
del progetto sia per chi non ha mai viaggiato. 
 
DOMANDA 2.7 
Dopo aver compilato queste prime micro-domande si chiede all’intervistato se le 
informazioni da lui fornite nel gruppo di domande precedenti sono rappresentative del 
suo viaggio tipico.  
 
5.3 Esercizi di scelta 
In questa sezione del questionario verranno presentati 5 esercizi di scelta o scenari. È 
una fase estremamente delicata e importante. 
Ogni esercizio di scelta proposto in questa parte dell’intervista è strutturato come sotto 
riportato, preceduto dalla nota informativa e seguito dalla legenda esplicativa degli 
attributi (inserita negli allegati del presente manuale). 
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Ogni questionario contiene 5 scenari o esercizi di scelta con la stessa struttura ma 
ovviamente con livelli degli attributi differenti.  
 
- Come interpretare l’esercizio di scelta: 
In orizzontale ci sono le caratteristiche (che noi definiamo “attributi”) e corrispondenti a 
“tempo totale di percorrenza”, “costo totale del viaggio”, “ritardo”, “flessibilità”, “servizi a 
bordo”.  
In verticale, invece, ci sono i diversi profili tra cui l’intervistato deve scegliere. Per il suo 
ipotetico viaggio tra Roma-Milano l’intervistato ha a disposizione 4 differenti modalità 
di trasporto: TAV 1, TAV 2, comp. aerea tradizionale, comp. aerea low cost. Per esempio 
il servizio di trasporto offerto dalla comp. aerea tradizionale è caratterizzato da un 
tempo totale di percorrenza di 4 ore e  
10 minuti, da un costo totale del biglietto pari a 150 euro, da un ritardo di 30 minuti etc.  
 
- Fasi domande: 
Dopo aver esplicato brevemente la struttura dell’esercizio di scelta/scenario, 
l’intervistato, date le 4 modalità di trasporto caratterizzate da differenti livelli di 
servizio, dovrà apporre una X nell’apposita casella in corrispondenza de lla modalità di 
trasporto scelta. 
 
- Indicazioni da fornire all’intervistato per rispondere alle domande: 
L’intervistato dovrà scegliere una delle quattro modalità di trasporto a disposizione 
(TAV 1, TAV 2, comp. aerea tradizionale, comp. aerea low cost) apponendo una X 
nell’apposita casella posta sotto. 
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Le modalità di trasporto TAV1 e TAV2 intendiamo due differenti servizi di trasporto 
ferroviario ad alta velocità. 
 
5.4 Post intervista 
In questa parte del questionario ci sono 7 domande. 
 
DOMANDA 1 
 
Con questo gruppo di domande si vogliono raccogliere due tipologie di informazioni: 
Quale/i attributo/i non sono stati considerati dall’intervistato nelle scelte effettuate 
nella parte precedente del questionario, cioè si intende raccogliere informazioni su come 
hanno considerato gli attributi negli “Esercizi di scelta”:  
    “Con riferimento alle risposte fornite ai 5 scenari a cui ha risposto prima c’è 
uno/qualche attributo che non ha considerato nella scelta?” (per esempio: i business 
man sono meno interessati al costo del biglietto in quanto rimborsato dall’azienda. In 
questo caso apporre la X in corrispondenza della casella “Costo totale del viaggio” ma 
specificando, inoltre, per quale modalità di trasporto, cioè se non considerano questo 
attributo solo per una modalità o per tutte le modalità di trasporto). 
 
Quale/i modalità di trasporto l’intervistato non sceglierebbe mai per un suo ipotetico 
viaggio tra Roma-Milano per qualsiasi tipo di motivo. 
 
“Con riferimento alla tratta Roma-Milano vi è una/qualche modalità di trasporto che lei 
non utilizzerebbe mai? (per esempio: i business man sono meno interessati alla 
compagnia aerea low cost). 
Per entrambe le domande sono ammesse più risposte. 
 
DOMANDE 2, 3, 4 
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La domanda 2 vogliamo sapere se l’intervistato è disposto a pagare un supplemento sul 
biglietto di viaggio per ridurre l’impatto ambientale generato dal suo viaggio 
chiedendogli di fornire un punteggio da 1 (molto disponibile) a 5 (indisponibile). Tale 
dato deve essere fornito sia per il TAV che per l’aereo. 
 
La domanda 3 ha la stessa struttura della domanda precedente. Si indaga l’importanza 
della garanzia di un’elevata sicurezza nel settore dei trasporti. Chiedere di assegnare un 
punteggio da 1 (molto importante) a 5 (poco importante). Tale dato deve essere  fornito 
sia per il TAV che per l’aereo. 
 
DOMANDA 5 
 
 
Questa domanda intende indagare la complessità generale del questionario in tutte le 
sue parti. 
 
DOMANDE 6 E 7  
 
 
Con la domanda 6 si richiede il reddito medio mensile netto dell’intervistato. 
 
La domanda 7 è da sottoporre solo a quei intervistato che alla domanda “Scopo del 
viaggio” del Pre-intervista hanno risposto LAVORO. 
 
5.5 Valutazione intervista 
 
DOMANDE 1, 2 E 3 
 
 
Questa ultima parte dell’intervista deve essere compilata dall’intervistatore. S i richiede 
di esprimere un giudizio personale e razionale con riferimento al livello di attenzione 
prestato dall’intervistatore durante la somministrazione dell’intervista e di indicare la 
parte del questionario dove l’intervistato ha riscontrato difficoltà.  
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Nota bene: Qualsiasi tipo di commento sia dell’intervistatore sia dell’intervistato è 
prezioso e quindi deve essere inserito nella sezione “Ulteriori commenti”.  
 
Attività di data entry delle interviste 
 
Ogni intervista cartacea somministrata dovrà essere inserita in uno specifico file di cui 
sarete successivamente dotati. Le informazioni dovranno essere inserite seguendo 
specifiche regole di codifica dei dati di cui sarete informati anche su questo 
successivamente. Seguirà Manuale del Data entry.  
 
 
Rassegna delle qualità di un buon intervistatore 
 
1) Fa, da subito, capire all’intervistato che si è INTERESSATI e SERI nel cercare di 
CAPIRE e COMPRENDERE le opinioni di chi si sta intervistando; 
2) Organizzato e preparato; 
3) Ha compreso a fondo gli obiettivi della ricerca; 
4) È un buon ascoltatore; 
5) Dotato di pazienza e cortesia. Non interrompe o mettere fretta all’intervistato;  
6) Persistente, determinato ma non aggressivo nell’ottenere il permesso a fare 
l’intervista; 
7) Capisce i dubbi dell’intervistato ed è in grado di chiarirli parafrasando la domanda 
ove necessario; 
8) Sa mettere a suo agio il rispondente facendogli capire che non ci sono risposte giuste 
o sbagliate; 
9) Legge, in modo chiaro e convincente, le domande così come scritte nel questionario, 
evitando, per quanto possibile, di interferire a fine di garantire che le interviste siano 
comparabili tra di loro poiché univocamente interpretate; 
10) Finire SEMPRE l’intervista con un grazie; 
11) Sottolineare esplicitamente che verrà sempre garantito  il rispetto della privacy e che 
verrà mantenuto il più stretto riserbo sulle risposte  fornite; 
12) Annotarsi sempre le specifiche sensazioni salienti (ad esempio le difficoltà 
incontrate durante l’intervista) così da poterne parlare con gli altri durante  gli incontri 
di verifica dell’indagine e, soprattutto, con i vostri supervisori. 
 
 
Glossario 
 
CAMPIONAMENTO CAUSALE SEMPLICE 
Il campionamento casuale semplice (CCS) costituisce il metodo di campionamento più 
elementare; può avere valenza autonoma, ma viene più frequentemente utilizzato in 
congiunzione ad altre tecniche. 
Sebbene non sia molto diffuso nella pratica delle indagini, il campionamento casuale 
semplice rappresenta il naturale punto di partenza per lo studio di tutti gli altri disegni 
campionari. Il campionamento casuale semplice è la tecnica che attribuisce la stessa 
probabilità di selezione ad ogni insieme di n unità distinte della popolazione: con tale 
tecnica si seleziona un campione di numerosità n da una popolazione di N elementi, 
senza o con ripetizione, in modo tale che ogni possibile campione abbia uguale 
probabilità di essere estratto. Consegue che anche ogni singola unità della popolazione 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
193 
 
ha la stessa probabilità di entrare a far parte del campione. I disegni di campionamento 
che possiedono questa ultima proprietà vengono detti equiprobabilistici. Un disegno 
equiprobabilistico dà luogo ad un campione così detto autoponderante. 
Nella selezione di un campione casuale è possibile scegliere se ogni unità possa entrare 
più di una volta nel campione. Se questa possibilità non è ammessa il campionamento è 
detto senza ripetizione, altrimenti con ripetizione. Nella pratica, l’estrazione con 
ripetizione viene adottata raramente. 
Il CCS si caratterizza quindi per i seguenti elementi:  
le unità di campionamento coincidono con le unità di rilevazione; 
ciascuna unità possiede la stessa probabilità di inclusione nel campione (metodo 
autoponderante); 
qualsiasi sotto insieme di n elementi (campione) ha la stessa probabilità di estrazione. 
 
 
Fonte: 
http://www.unich.it/unichieti/ShowBinary/BEA%20Repository/Area_Siti_federati/Sci
enze%20Sociali/Materiale_Didattico/Prof.%20Fontanella%20-
%20Tecniche%20di%20campionamento%201//file;jsessionid=lzwpJhyFQtyjBDsPYRT
L7zFqbwh7ZZfT1WDJWycLDlG5MDvMQnMS!59255841 
 
CAMPIONAMENTO STRATIFICATO 
Nel campionamento stratificato la popolazione è suddivisa in sottogruppi, mutuamente 
esclusivi, in base ad una o più variabili ausiliarie o di classificazione. I sottogruppi cosi 
determinati sono detti strati. Lo strato h, con h = 1, 2, …, H, contiene Nh elementi. Da 
ciascun sottogruppo viene estratto in maniera indipendente un campione di numerosità 
nh. 
La stratificazione ha i seguenti obiettivi:  
aumentare la precisione delle stime rispetto al campionamento casuale semplice, 
qualora i sottogruppi siano omogenei al loro interno e disomogenei tra di loro; 
facilitare e razionalizzare il campionamento, che può presentare problematiche diverse 
nei vari sottogruppi, come nel caso del campionamento della popolazione residente in 
zone urbane o rurali; 
conseguire stime per suddivisioni di interesse della popolazione. 
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Fonte: 
http://www.unich.it/unichieti/ShowBinary/BEA%20Repository/Area_Siti_federati/Sci
enze%20Sociali/Materiale_Didattico/Prof.%20Fontanella%20-
%20Tecniche%20di%20campionamento%201//file;jsessionid=lzwpJhyFQtyjBDsPYRT
L7zFqbwh7ZZfT1WDJWycLDlG5MDvMQnMS!59255841 
 
C.A.P. 
Codice di Avviamento Postale (Per esempio: Roma 00100). 
 
COMPAGNIE AEREE NELLA TRATTA ROMA-MILANO 
Le comp. aeree ad oggi operative nella tratta citata sono Alitalia, Airone, Easyjet, Ryanair 
e Lufhtansa. 
 
COMPAGNIA AEREA TRADIZIONALE 
Compagnie statali o private che offrono servizi di trasporto aereo passeggeri/merci 
differenziati (per stile, qualità, immagine o altre caratteristiche) a ciascun segmento di 
mercato e che competendo quindi cercando principalmente di differenziare il prodotto, 
specialmente il comfort (spazio fra sedili, larghezza delle poltrone, programmi frequent 
flyers, sale di attesa business etc.). 
Nella tratta Roma-Milano ci sono Alitalia-Airone e Lufhtansa. 
 
COMPAGNIA AEREA LOW COST 
Questa tipologia di compagnia aerea generalmente offre voli a prezzi molto inferiori 
rispetto alle compagnie aeree tradizionali, eliminando gran parte dei servizi non 
essenziali rivolti ai passeggeri.  
Nella tratta Roma-Milano ci sono Easyjet, Ryanair. 
Le caratteristiche di una compagnia aerea a basso costo, alcune delle quali potrebbero 
giungervi “nuove” e grazie alle quali i prezzi risultano estremamente economici, sono: 
- singola classe di passeggeri, libera scelta dei posti a sedere in base all’orario di arrivo 
all’aeroporto 
- singolo modello di aeroplano (in questo modo scendono i costi delle riparazioni e 
dell’addestramento del personale), spesso un Airbus A320 o un Boeing 737 (per 
esempio: Ryanair: Boeing Serie-737, Easyjet: Boeing 737 e soprattutto Airbus A319) 
- configurazione dell’aereo con maggior numero di posti a sedere; ad esempio il Boeing 
737-300 della Lufthansa offre 132 posti, quello della easyJet 148 posti oppure un Airbus 
320 dell’Alitalia ha 150 posti, mentre uno della Vueling 180. 
- viene consentito un peso inferiore per il bagaglio rispetto agli offerenti “tradizionali” (il 
peso in eccedenza viene trasportato con un sovraprezzo) 
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- eliminazione dei pasti gratuiti durante il volo. Si possono comperare delle bevande e 
delle merende a bordo. 
- multiruolo dei dipendenti (gli assistenti di volo svolgono più funzioni, ad esempio 
puliscono l’aereo e operano alle porte d’imbarco) 
- gli assistenti di volo ricevono una parte dello stipendio come percentuale sulle vendite 
effettuate a bordo 
- utilizzo della flotta più intenso (utilizzo diario, così per esempio Easyjet vola 
mediamente 10,7 ore al giorno e British Airways circa 7,1 ore), attraverso brevi soste 
negli aeroporti (tournaround - di regola 25 minuti tra due voli), voli brevi  
- collegamenti tra aeroporti secondari, spesso fuori città, convenienti senza restrizioni di 
slot, senza grande traffico e tasse aeroportuali basse. 
- voli diretti tra due luoghi senza trasferimento dei bagagli su altri voli di coincidenza  
(processi di registrazione separato), nessun piano di volo coordinato con altre 
compagnie aeree. 
- le offerte economiche (anche a € 0,99) valgono solo per prenotazioni anticipate o 
delimitate, per un contingente relativamente basso di posti messi a disposizione.  
- variabilità dei prezzi a seconda dell’affollamento previsto, 
- amministrazione: Lean management (risparmio sul personale). 
- accordi con aziende locali di trasporto da/per gli aeroporti, autonoleggi, alberghi ecc 
(la compagnia aerea le pubblicizza in cambio di una percentuale sulle vendite) 
- finanziamento pubblico : ovvero percezione di danaro elargito da strutture pubbliche 
al fine di aiutare il vettore nelle fasi di avvio del servizio ed al fine di incentivare 
l’esercizio del collegamento. 
- assenza di garanzia per i proseguimenti (il viaggio può essere solo da punto a punto). 
- assenza di servizio cargo (consente di ridurre i tempi di sosta dell’aeromobile). 
 
INTERVISTA CAPI (computer assisted personal interview) 
Tecnica di somministrazione del questionario basata sull’utilizzo del computer che 
gestisce il questionario elettronico. 
 
 
 
Contatti responsabile della ricerca 
 
Per qualsiasi tipo di informazione/problema relativo al Progetto ROMI anche durante la 
somministrazione del questionario contattare: 
Dott.ssa Eva Valeri 
cell.: 347 XXXXX 
ufficio: 06 XXXXX 
e-mail e.valeri82@gmail.com, eva.valeri@phd.units.it 
Skype eva.valeri 
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Allegati 
 
 
10.1 Legenda attributi 
 
Tempo totale di percorrenza:  
Oltre al tempo per effettuare la tratta principale (da stazione a stazione o da aeroporto a 
aeroporto) comprende anche il tempo casa/ufficio-stazione/aeroporto di partenza, il 
tempo di attesa nella stazione/aeroporto, il tempo impiegato per fare il check-in ed il 
tempo di attesa per ritirare il bagaglio. 
 
Costo totale del viaggio: oltre al prezzo del biglietto comprende  il costo per 
accedere/uscire dall’aeroporto (con mezzi pubblici e/o con mezzi privati).  
 
Ritardo: ritardo in minuti (in partenza o in arrivo) rispetto all’orario previsto.  
 
Flessibilità (prenotazione): possibilità di modificare nel tempo (con o senza 
supplemento) la prenotazione del biglietto di viaggio effettuata.  
 
Servizi a bordo: disponibilità di usufruire di servizi a valore aggiunto a bordo del 
mezzo. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
197 
 
 
4. Manual for the data entry 
 
PROGETTO ROMI 
MANUALE PER EFFETTUARE  
IL DATA ENTRY DELLE INTERVISTE 
 
 
 
Dott.ssa Eva Valeri 
 
Indice 
 
 
INDICAZIONI PRELIMINARI 
COME INSERIRE L’INTERVISTA 
INDICAZIONI PER L’INSERIMENTO DATI RELATIVI AGLI ES. DI SCELTA 
SINTESI PRINCIPALI REGOLE RELATIVE ALL’INSERIMENTO DATI 
Contatti responsabile della ricerca 
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INDICAZIONI PRELIMINARI 
 
Per utilizzare le informazioni contenute in ogni questionario somministrato con 
modalità cartacea è necessario effettuare l’attività di data entry delle interviste su 
supporto informatico (nel nostro caso si utilizzerà l’applicazione excel).  
Ho predisposto tre differenti files per espletare questa attività e si chiamano: 
Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_1_dataentry 
Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_2_dataentry 
Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_3_dataentry 
 
Questi 3 files si “accoppiano” ai 3 questionari di cui siete dotati per effettuare le 
interviste. 
Il questionario 1 (vedere il num. 1 in alto a destra nella parte sopra la pre-intervista) 
dovrà necessariamente essere inserito nel file: 
Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_1_dataentry, il questionario num. 2 con il file 
Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_2_dataentry etc. 
NOTA BENE: non inserire l’intervista effettuata con il questionario di tipo/blocco 
1 nel file del data entry per il questionario/blocco 2 o 3! 
 
Ogni intervista dovrà essere inserita in un solo file.  
 
Ogni file dovrà essere salvato con l’attuale nome del file seguito dal vostro codice 
intervistatore e dal numero dell’intervista effettuata. Il numero dell’intervista deve essere 
progressivo e non deve tenere conto dei blocchi.  
Esempio: Come salvare i files dei data entry delle prime 6 interviste effettuate. 
File 1: Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_1_dataentry_EV_001 
File 2: Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_2_dataentry_EV_002 
File 3: Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_3_dataentry_EV_003 
File 4: Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_1_dataentry_EV_004 
File 5: Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_2_dataentry_EV_005 
File 6: Questionario_ondata_c_oldb_blocco_3_dataentry_EV_006 
 
Come emerge dall’esempio ho inserito le mie iniziali di nome e cognome (codice 
intervistatore che trovate nel file in risposta alle vostre domande a lezione) e il numero 
progressivo dell’intervista.  
Tale numero, tuttavia, dovrà corrispondere al numero dell’intervista inserito 
nell’apposita casella all’interno del questionario. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
199 
 
 
COME INSERIRE L’INTERVISTA 
 
Ho cercato attraverso una particolare e semplice grafica di rendervi questa attività il più 
semplice possibile in quanto errori in questa sezione portano inevitabilmente a stime 
errate. Un errore nella fase di inserimento dati rende vano il vostro impegno 
nell’effettuare l’intervista nel migliore dei modi.  
Premesso questo entriamo nel dettaglio.  
L’attività di data entry consiste nell’inserire, nella maggior parte dei casi numeri, in 
specifiche celle. Le celle nelle quali dovrete inserire i numeri sono quelle bianche. Ogni 
informazioni contenuta nel questionario somministrato dovrà essere “trasformata” in 
un numero seguendo una specifica codifica. 
NOTA BENE: Tale codifica non deve essere in nessun modo alterata.  
 
Esempio: Cosa intendo per “codifica” della domanda relativa al sesso dell’intervistato e 
come inserire il dato. 
 
* SESSO:     1 = maschio; 0 = femmina; 
 
Se l’intervistato era maschio apporre il numero 1 nella casella bianca in corrispondenza 
della scritta SESSO, altrimenti apporre 0 (zero). 
Non dovete fare altro che, seguendo la codifica che ho precisato per singola domanda e 
posta accanto alla stessa, riportare le risposte presenti sul questionario cartaceo in 
excel. 
Ipotizziamo di aver intervistato un ragazzo: 
 
* SESSO:  1   1 = maschio; 0 = femmina; 
 
Potrebbe capitare, spero raramente in quanto non è un aspetto positivo, di non aver 
potuto rilevare un dato (l’intervistato non ha fornito la risposta – per noi sono missing 
values). 
In questi casi procedere ad inserire il numero -999. 
 
Inoltre, potrà capitare la situazione seguente: 
Esempio: Come codificare quando non avete un dato in quanto l’intervistato non doveva 
rispondere o fornire quel dato. 
 
* OCCUPAZIONE: 
    
1 = Dipendente impiegato; 2= Dipendente dirigente; 
3=Lavoratore autonomo; 4=Studente; 5=Studente-
lavoratore; 6=Pensionato;   
    4    7=Casalinga/o; 8=Disoccupato; 9=altro (specificare)   
                           
  
  
                          
In questo esempio l’intervistato era uno Studente (codifica 4). Cosa mettere nella casella 
vuota sotto la scelta “altro” (specificare)? Dato che l’intervistato è uno studente e la 
codifica quindi è il numero 4, nella casella vuota procedere a inserire -777 come sotto 
riportato: 
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* OCCUPAZIONE: 
    
1 = Dipendente impiegato; 2= Dipendente dirigente; 
3=Lavoratore autonomo; 4=Studente; 5=Studente-
lavoratore; 6=Pensionato;   
    4    7=Casalinga/o; 8=Disoccupato; 9=altro (specificare)   
                  
-
777  
       
  
  
                          
 
Nel caso in cui, invece, l’occupazione attuale dell’intervistato non  rientri tra le prime 8 
possibilità proposte, questa domanda andrà compilata come segue: 
 
* OCCUPAZIONE: 
    
1 = Dipendente impiegato; 2= Dipendente dirigente; 
3=Lavoratore autonomo; 4=Studente; 5=Studente-
lavoratore; 6=Pensionato;   
    9    7=Casalinga/o; 8=Disoccupato; 9=altro (specificare)   
                  sportivo         
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INDICAZIONI PER L’INSERIMENTO DATI RELATIVI AGLI ES. DI SCELTA 
 
Ho creato un foglio per ogni singolo esercizio di scelta, come il questionario cartaceo.  
Assicurarsi due cose: 
inserire la risposta nello scenario giusto; 
inserire la scelta dell’intervistato codificata come “1” (uno); 
controllare che non ci siano più di un 1 per singolo scenario. 
 
 
SINTESI PRINCIPALI REGOLE RELATIVE ALL’INSERIMENTO DATI 
 
 
se ho l’informazione sul questionario cartaceo: inserire il numero codifica (1,2,3, 
...); 
se non ho l’informazione sul questionario cartaceo (missing value): inserire -999; 
se ho celle vuote per le quali l’intervistato non doveva fornire una risposta: 
inserire -777 
 
 
Contatti responsabile della ricerca 
 
Per qualsiasi tipo di informazione/problema relativo al Progetto ROMI anche durante la 
somministrazione del questionario contattare: 
Dott.ssa Eva Valeri 
cell. 347 XXXXX 
ufficio (non reperibile prima di maggio) 06 XXXXX 
e-mail e.valeri82@gmail.com, eva.valeri@phd.units.it 
Skype eva.valeri 
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5. Survey on the tickets system of the Ro-Mi transport operators 
 
 
The aim of this survey was analyzed the Ticket Price System (TPS) and the Average Ticket 
Price (ATP) and Price Correlation (PC) of the Ro-Mi transport operators. 
Over the last year, after the dynamics reported in section 7.1.1.3, in particular Trenitalia 
and Alitalia-Cai has changed their TPS. A brief description of the current is shown below. 
These data are collected from the web site of the Ro-Mi operators in September 2012. A 
total of 8 simulation were carried out. As suggested by the Office of Fair Trading (1999), 
the minimum number of observation in order to calculate PC is 20. Furthermore, due 
also to the numerous problem recognized in the antitrust literature PC results is no 
longer considered a sufficiently robust approach to determine if two or more services 
are in the same product relevant market (Office of Fair Trading, 1999; Rubinfeld, 2010). 
Accordingly mentioned above, the following PC’s results are to be considered with the 
right considerations. 
First of all, an overview of the current TPS of the all Ro-Mi operator is provided. In the 
following Tables (Table 71, Table 72 and Table 73) a comparison of the penultimate and 
last TPS is represented. As it is shown, the current TPS is more complex, probably due at 
the entrance of the new HSR operator in the most profitable corridor. In fact, currently 
the TPS is differentiated by type of service, respectively, related to Frecciarossa type of 
HS train and to Frecciabianca and Intercity HS trains. The TPS of NTV, reported in Table 
74, is more less complex than the previous one. In July 2012, Alitalia -Cai have decided, 
for the Ro-Mi air route, to simplifying its TPS, setting only 5 ticket price categories 
(Promo ROMI, Easy, Easy flex, Comfort, Comfort Fullflex) (Table 75). 
 
Table 71 - Ticket price system of Trenitalia 2009 
Type of ticket price  1st class 2nd class Ticket price 
Basic x  109 €  
Basic  x 79 €  
Flexibile x  129 €  
Flexibile  x 99 €  
Promo x  94 €  
Promo  x 67 €  
Special  x 49 €  
Super  x 33 €  
Source: own elaboration on data from Trenitalia web  site (2009)  
 
Table 72 – Ticket price system of Trenit alia by type of service (solution 1) 2012 
Type of service 
 Type of ticket price  
 Super 
economy  
Economy  Base 
Executive - - € 200  
1a Business with lounge  - € 116  € 128  
1a Businss  UTP € 86  €116  
1a Businss with quiet area  UTP € 86  € 116  
2a Premium UTP € 79 € 100  
2a Standard € 39 € 59  € 86  
 Average ticket price:   - € 85 € 124 
Source: own elaboration on data from Trenitalia web  site (September 2012)  
Notes: solution 1 is for Frecciarossa type of HS trains. UTP: undetectable ticket price because exhausted 
from the web site simulation.  
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Table 73 - Ticket price system of Trenitalia by type of service (solution 2) 2012 
Type of service  Type of ticket price  
 Super economy   Economy   Base 
1a Classe with lounge    -   € 116   € 128  
1a Classe  €   49   €   74   € 103  
2a Classe  UTP  € 59   €   86  
 Average ticket price:    -   € 78  € 106  
Source: own elaboration on data from Trenitalia web  site (September 2012)  
Note: solution 2 is for Frecciabianca and Interci ty type of HS trains. UTP: undetectable ticket price because 
exhausted from the web site simulation. 
 
Table 74 - Ticket price system of NTV  
Type of service 
Type of ticket price  
Smart Prima Club 
Base € 88 € 118 from 130€ to 390€  
Economy € 61 € 88 - 
Low cost € 45 € 55 - 
Promo Italo € 35 - - 
Average ticket price:  € 57 € 72 €  260 
Source: own elaboration on data from NTV web  site (September 2012)  
 
Table 75 - Ticket price system of Alitalia-Cai 
Type of ticket price  
Promo ROMI Easy  Easy flex Comfort Comfort Fullflex 
€ 99 € 98.81 198.81 188.81 288.81 
Source: own elaboration on data from Alitalia-Cai web  site (September 2012)  
Note: Promo ROMI is available only for round-trip travel. 
 
A second section of this survey is related to compare the ATP between Ro-Mi operators 
and calculate PC. Data are collected through the web site of the Ro-Mi operators for 1 
month, one week, 2 weeks before the departure date and respect a fixed date.  
Rail/air routes for which simulations were carried out: 
 LIN-FCO (CAI); 
 BGY-CIA (Ryanair); 
 CEN-TER (Trenitalia); 
 PGA-TIB (NTV). 
The ticket price is summarized in  
Table 76. In this table, min., max and an average is reported by type of service class and 
by operator.  
 
Table 76 – Simulated ticket price by type of service class and operator: range and average  
Transport 
operator: 
1st class 2nd class 
Range 
Average 
Range 
Average 
Min. Max Min. Max 
Trenitalia €        118  €        202  €        116  €           88 €         145  €         118  
NTV €        236  €        780  €        305  €           70 €         143  €           92 
Alitalia-Cai €        382  €        384  €        376  €         104  €         212  €         171  
Ryanair - - - €           24 €           86 €         144  
Source: own elaboration on data from Ro-Mi operators’ web site  
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Table 77 shows the PC’s results. In bold those PC values greater than 0.50. Although there 
is no a useful rule that determines the appropriate cut-off describing when the 
correlation is sufficiently high to support two products being in the same market 
(Rubinfeld, 2010). Overall, strong PC is present for the 2nd service class in particular for 
tickets bought 1 and 2 weeks before the departure date. Not significant results are 
revealed purchasing the ticket 4 weeks before.  
 
Table 77 – Price correlation analysis  
Transport 
operator: 
Price correlation for the  
1st service class 
Price correlation for the 
2nd service class 
Average – 
1st 
Average – 
2nd  
Trenitalia 
versus: 1  2 4 1 2 4 average average 
NTV 0,32 0,41 -0,11 0,75 0,85 0,43 0,21 0,68 
Alitalia-
Cai 
0,42 -0,10 0,01 0,53 -0,21 * 0,11 * 
Ryanair 0,44 0,59 -0,07 0,86 0,36 -0,29 0,32 0,31 
         
NTV 
versus: 1 2 4 1 2 4 average average 
trenitalia 0,32 0,41 -0,11 0,75 0,85 0,43 0,21 0,68 
alitalia 0,06 -0,13 0,14 0,17 -0,05 * 0,02 * 
ryanair -0,89 -0,64 0,11 0,89 0,57 -0,15 -0,47 0,44 
         
Alitalia 
versus: 1 2 4 1 2 4 average average 
Trenitalia 0,42 -0,10 0,01 0,53 -0,21 * 0,11 * 
NTV 0,06 -0,13 0,14 0,17 -0,05 * 0,02 * 
Ryanair 0,54 -0,02 -0,29 0,50 0,08 * 0,08 * 
         
Ryanair 
versus: 1 2 4 1 2 4 average average 
Trenitalia 0,44 0,59 -0,07 0,86 0,36 -0,29 0,32 0,31 
NTV -0,89 -0,64 0,11 0,89 0,57 -0,15 -0,47 0,44 
Alitalia-
Cai 
0,54 -0,02 -0,29 0,86 0,08 * 0,08 * 
Source: own elaboration on data from Ro-Mi operators’ web site  
Notes: * - i t was not possible to calculate the correlation value.  
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6. Data dictionary 
 
Table 78 – Ro-Mi case study data dictionary  
Variable name Variable description Coding variables 
TIME total travel time number of minutes 
COST total travel cost € 
DELAY Delay number of minutes of delay 
SERVICE on-board services mobile phone, internet, mobile phone+internet 
FLEX Flexibility no ticket change (for HSR and AIR), change until the departure date (for HSR), change until 1 
hour after the departure date (for HSR), change until 2 days before the departure date with a 
extra-fee(for AIR), change until 2 days before the departure date without a extra-fee(for AIR) 
LCC ASC for Alternative LCC ASC 
FSC ASC for Alternative FSC ASC 
GENDER Gender of respondent 1: male; 0: female 
AGE Age of respondent age (number of years) 
INSTRUCTION Level of education of the respondent 1= primary school; 2= secondary school; 3= high school; 4=University; 5=Post-university 
INCOME current monthly income of the 
respondent 
1= less than 500€; 2= between 500€ and 1500€; 3= between 1500€ and 2500€; 4= between 
2500€ and 3500€; 5= between 3500€ and 4500€; 6= more than 4500€ 
INCOME_HIGH current monthly  high income of the 
respondent 
1 = > 3500€; 0=otherwise  
INCOME_MEDIUM current monthly medium income of 
the respondent 
1 = 1500€ < income > 3500€; 0=otherwise 
PURPOSE_BUSINESS When the respondent travelled for 
business purpose 
1= travelled for business; 0=otherwise 
Source: own elaboration 
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7. RP models’ output 
 
Table 79 - RP-M1: RP Multinomial logit model  
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
TIME_RP -0.00435***  0.000789951 -5.51 .0000 
COST_RP -0.00434***  0.000839509 -5.17 .0000 
DELAY_RP -0.00404 0.00253118 -1.59 0.1108 
FLEX_RP 0.40472*** 0.0678186 5.97 .0000 
ASC-FSC 0.102174 0.0957667 1.07 0.2860 
ASC-LCC -0.0361494 0.104584 -0.35 0.7296 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-828.03989 
   
Nobs.: 1.275 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
Table 80 - RP-M2: RP Multinomial logit model with mode specific coefficients  
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
TIME_HSR_RP -0.00133211 0.00102431 -1.300 0.1934 
COST_HSR_RP -0.0193385*** 0.00174751 -11.066 0.0000 
DELAY_RP -0.00493001 0.00271135 -1.818 0.0690 
FLEX_HSR_RP 0.415027***  0.0898731 4.618 0.0000 
ASC-FSC 0.239681 0.380179 0.630 0.5284 
ASC-LCC 0.34128 0.359841 0.948 0.3429 
TIME_AIR_RP -0.0082204*** 0.00102808 -7.996 0.0000 
COST_AIR_RP -0.0029201*** 0.000889295 -3.284 0.0010 
FLEX_AIR_RP 0.247956***  0.0909044 2.728 0.0064 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-748.1561 
   
AIC:  1458,32 
   
Nobs.: 1.275 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
Table 81 -  RP-M3: RP Multinomial logit model with socio-economic data 
Attributes  Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
TIME_RP -0.0045135*** 0.00079586 -5.671 0.0000 
COST_RP -0.0049990*** 0.000866713 -5.768 0.0000 
DELAY_RP -0.00438486 0.0025584 -1.714 0.0865 
FLEX_RP 0.404608***  0.0687169 5.888 0.0000 
ASC-FSC 0.351289***  0.116629 3.012 0.0026 
ASC-LCC 0.373743**  0.137856 2.711 0.0067 
INCOME_HIGH 0.33587*** 0.104234 3.222 0.0013 
INCOME_MEDIUM 0.272927***  0.0763374 3.575 0.0003 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-814.4712 
   
Nobs.: 1.275 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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Table 82 - RP-M4: RP Nested logit model  
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
TIME_RP -0.00434875 0.000789951 -5.505 0.0000 
COST_RP -0.00434417 0.000839509 -5.175 0.0000 
DELAY_RP -0.00403639 0.00253118 -1.595 0.1108 
FLEX_RP 0.404722 0.0678186 5.968 0.0000 
ASC-FSC 0.102174 0.0957667 1.067 0.2860 
ASC-LCC -0.0361494 0.104584 -0.346 0.7296 
IV parameters, RU2 form = mu(b|l),gamma(l)  
GROUND 1.0000000 ......(Fixed Parameter)....... 
AIR 1.0000000 ......(Fixed Parameter)....... 
Underlying standard deviation = pi/(IVparm*sqr(6)  
GROUND 1.2825498 ......(Fixed Parameter)....... 
AIR 1.2825498 ......(Fixed Parameter)....... 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-828.0399 
   
Nobs.: 1.275 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
 
 
Table 83 - RP-M5: RP Mixed logit model 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
Random parameters in utility functions  
COST_RP -0.00530753*** 0.00102737 -5.166 0.0000 
TIME_RP -0.00483085*** 0.000899448 -5.371 0.0000 
Random parameters in utility functions  
FLEX_RP 0.429291***  0.0690664 6.216 0.0000 
DELAY -0.00383 0.00257848 -1.485 0.137446 
ASC_HSR -0.0529783 0.0796144 -0.665 0.505772 
Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions  
TsCOST 0.00530753*** 0.00102737 5.166 0.0000 
TsTIME  0.00483085*** 0.000899448 5.371 0.0000 
Log 
likelihood 
function:  
-825.0512 
   
AIC:  
    
Nobs.: 1.275 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table 84 - RP-M6: RP Mixed logit model with socio-economic data 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
Random parameters in utility functions  
COST_RP 0.0234171*** 0.00280963 -8.335 0.0000 
TIME_RP 0.00273375**  0.00124436 -2.197 0.0280 
Random parameters in utility functions  
FLEX_RP 0.466381***  0.0792048 5.888 0.0000 
DELAY -0.00440595 0.00285366 -1.544 0.1226 
ASC-FSC 0.118939 0.113224 1.050 0.2935 
ASC-LCC -0.0573388 0.121827 -0.471 0.6379 
Heterogeneity in mean, Parameter:Variable  
COST: INCOME_HIGH  0.0238964*** 0.00345255 6.921 0.0000 
COST: INCOME_MEDIUM 0.0191603*** 0.00293061 6.538 0.0000 
TIME: INCOME_HIGH -0.00884218*** 0.00268455 -3.294 0.0010 
TIME: INCOME_MEDIUM -0.00524926*** 0.00167798 -3.128 0.0018 
Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions  
TsCOST 0.0234171*** 0.00280963 8.335 0.0000 
TsTIME  0.00273375*** 0.00124436 2.197 0.0280 
Log likelihood function:  -825.0512 
   
AIC:  
    
Nobs.: 1.275 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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8. SP model’s output 
 
Table 85 - SP-M1: SP Multinomial logit model 
 
 Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
TIME_SP -0.0087711*** 0.000351726 -24.937 0.0000 
COST_SP -0.013474*** 0.000404534 -33.308 0.0000 
DELAY_SP -0.0069763*** 0.00128734 -5.419 0.0000 
FLEX_SP 0.00630761 0.0164097 0.384 0.7007 
SERVICE_SP -0.115636*** 0.01734 -6.669 0.0000 
ASC_FSC 0.202835***  0.0396525 5.115 0.0000 
ASC_LCC -0.152442*** 0.0346136 -4.404 0.0000 
Log 
likelihood 
function:  
-7971.665         
Nobs.: 6.390    
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
 
Table 86 - SP-M2: SP Multinomial logit model with coefficients mode specific 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
TIME_HSR_SP -0.0040907*** 0.000513871 -7.961 0.0000 
COST_SP -0.0144107*** 0.000422176 -34.134 0.0000 
DELAY_HSR_SP 0.00825572*** 0.00259778 3.178 0.0015 
FLEX_HSR_SP -0.181323*** 0.0264914 -6.845 0.0000 
SERVICE_HSR_SP -0.310898*** 0.0267629 -11.617 0.0000 
ASC_FSC 204.895*** 0.247221 8.288 0.0000 
TIME_AIR_SP -0.014426** 0.000603404 -2.390 0.0000 
DELAY_AIR_SP -0.01674***  0.00182038 -9.196 0.0000 
FLEX_AIR_SP 0.0692394** 0.0278236 2.489 0.0128 
SERVICE_AIR_SP 0.0927142*** 0.0280198 3.309 0.0009 
ASC_LCC 16.462*** 0.243933 6.749 0.0000 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-7971.665 
   
Nobs.: 6.390 
   
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 87 -  SP-M3: SP Multinomial logit model with socio-economic data 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
TIME_SP -0.009216*** 0.00035664 -25.844 0.0000 
COST_SP -0.014166*** 0.0004043 -35.030 0.0000 
DELAY_SP -0.007942*** 0.0012926 -6.144 0.0000 
FLEX_SP 0.0197076 0.0172079 1.145 0.2521 
ASC_FSC 0.768651***  0.0950499 8.087 0.0000 
SERVICE_SP -0.154104*** 0.0408888 -3.769 0.0002 
INCOME_HIGH 0.694692***  0.0720675 9.639 0.0000 
INCOME_MEDIUM 0.0330332 0.0572947 0.577 0.5642 
ASC_LCC -0.148106*** 0.0344712 -4.2967 0.0000 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-7888.905 
   
Nobs.: 6.390 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
 
Table 88 - SP-M4: SP Nested logit model 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
Attributes in the Utility Functions (beta)  
TIME_SP -0.007789*** 0.000415848 -18.731 0.0000 
COST_SP -0.011142*** 0.000505626 -22.035 0.0000 
DELAY_SP -0.0087491*** 0.00104064 -8.407 0.0000 
FLEX_SP 0.0135105 0.0139334 0.970 0.3322 
SERVICE_SP -0.10146***  0.0137019 -7.405 0.0000 
ASC_FSC 0.341586***  0.051682 6.609 0.0000 
ASC_LCC 0.0259057 0.0465202 0.557 0.5776 
IV parameters, RU2 form = mu(b|l),gamma(l)  
GROUND 0.931926***  0.0578674 16.105 0.0000 
AIR 0.608803***  0.0408186 14.915 0.0000 
Underlying standard deviation = pi/(IVparm*sqr(6))  
GROUND 137.624*** 0.0854566 16.105 0.0000 
AIR 210.667*** 0.141247 14.9145 0.0000 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-7948.084 
   
Nobs.: 6.390 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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Table 89 - SP-M5: SP Mixed logit model 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
Random parameters in utility functions  
COST_SP -0.0220161*** 0.0006531 -33.7112 0.0000 
TTIME_SP -0.0140916*** 0.0005019 -28.073 0.0000 
SERVICE_SP -0.0678683*** 0.0189042 -3.590 0.0003 
Nonrandom parameters in utility functions  
DELAY_SP -0.00724797*** 0.00137008 -5.290 0.0000 
FLEX_SP -0.0512575**  0.0177017 -2.896 0.0038 
ASC_FSC 0.262065***  0.0407869 6.425 0.0000 
ASC_LCC -0.21037***  0.0368014 -5.716 0.0000 
Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions  
TsCOST 0.0220161*** 0.0006531 33.72 0.0000 
TsTIME  0.0140916*** 0.0005019 28.073 0.0000 
TsSERVICE  0.0678683*** 0.0189042 3.590 0.0003 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-7596.463 
   
Nobs.: 6.390 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table 90 - SP-M6: SP Mixed logit model with socio-economic data 
Attributes Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
Random parameters in utility functions  
COST_SP -0.0440497*** 0.00178281 -24.708 0.0000 
TIME_SP -0.0348383*** 0.0018499 -18.833 0.0000 
SERVICE_SP -0.703704*** 0.0942987 -7.462 0.0000 
Nonrandom parameters in utility functions  
DELAY_SP -0.0121905*** 0.00154316 -7.900 0.0000 
FlEX_SP -0.0384018**  0.019628 -1.956 0.0504 
ASC_FSC 0.109182**  0.0456917 2.390 0.0169 
ASC_LCC -0.249953*** 0.0401323 -6.228 0.0000 
Heterogeneity in mean, Parameter:Variable  
COST:INCOME  0.0062621*** 0.000640706 9.774 0.0000 
COST:GENDER -0.00150611 0.00151412 -0.995 0.3199 
COST:AGE  0.000154865** 5,57E+00 2.781 0.0054 
COST:  
INSTRUCTION 
-0.000238275 0.000594638 -0.401 0.6887 
TIME:INCOME  -0.00568182*** 0.000547828 -10.370 0.0000 
TIME:GENDER 0.00329682**  0.00125561 2.626 0.0086 
TIME:AGE  0.00035045*** 4,76E-01 7.363 0.0000 
TIME: 
INSTRUCTION 
0.0057552*** 0.000586453 9.814 0.0000 
SERVICE:INCOME 0.0427822** 0.0190997 2.240 0.0251 
SERVICE:GENDER 0.0706751 0.04512 1.566 0.1173 
SERVICE:AGE  0.00259386 0.00174538 1.486 0.13723 
SERVICE: 
INSTRUCTION  
0.109542***  0.0244249 4.485 0.0000 
Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions  
TsC 0.0440497*** 0.00178281 24.708 0.0000 
TsT 0.0348383*** 0.0018499 18.833 0.0000 
TsS 0.703704***  0.0942987 7.462 0.0000 
Log likelihood 
function:  
-7052.028 
   
Nobs.: 6.390 
   
Source: own elaboration 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
213 
 
 
References  
 
 
A. Lòpez-Pita, F. R. (2003). The Madrid-Barcelona high-speed line. In  Institution of Civil Engineers 
(Vol. 156, 3-8). 
Aaker, D. a., & Day, G. S. (1990). Marketing Research (Vol. IV edition). New York: Wiley. 
Abdelwahab, W. M., Innes, J. D., & Stevens, A. M. (1992). Development of disaggregated mode 
choice models of intercity travel in Canada. Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 19, 965-
974. 
Abrate, G., & Erbetta, F. (2010). Efficiency and patterns of service mix in airport companies: An input 
distance function approach. Transportation Research Part E, 46, 693–708. 
ACI Europe Policy Committee. (1999). European Airports: A Competitive Industry. In. 
Adler, N. (2001). Competition in a deregulated air transportation market. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 129, 337-345. 
Adler, N. (2005). The effect of competition on the choice of an optimal network in a liberalized 
aviation market with an application to Western Europe. Transportation Science, 39, 58-72. 
Adler, N., & Berechman, J. (1996). EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS AFTER 
LIBERALIZATION. In  European Transport Conference. 
Ahsbahs, S. (2008). Deregulation of Groundhandling Market at European Airports. In  (Vol.  1, pp. 12-
18): Institute of Organization and Managment in Industry „ORGMASZ”. 
Anderson, S., Palma, A. D., & Thiesse, J. F. (1992). Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Arrigo, U., & Giuricin, A. (2006). Gli effetti della liberalizzazione del trasporto aereo e il ruolo delle 
compagnie low cost: un confronto USA - Europa. In  XVIII Conferenza della Società Italiana di 
Economia Pubblica - "SERVIZI PUBBLICI: Nuove tendenze nella regolamentazione, nella 
produzione e nel finanziamento". Università di Pavia COMPAGNIA si San Paolo. 
Attili, E. M. A. (2008). La ripartizione di responsabilità nell’esercizio dell’handling aeroportuale 
relativamente al trasporto aereo di persone. Unpublished PhD thesys, Università degli Studi 
di Sassari, Sassari, Italia. 
Aviation Management Associates. (2008). The Impact of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement on Air 
Traffic in the North Atlantic. In  (Vol. DTFAWA-050C-00044 (REAPS)): Aviation Management 
Associates. 
Baccelli, O., & Cattaneo, F. (2001). Scenari e prospettive del sistema ferroviario italiano nel contesto 
di liberalizzazione europea. In. Milano: Centro di Economia regionale, dei Trasporti e del 
Turismo (CERTeT). 
Barff, R., Mackay, D., & Olshavsky, R. W. (1982). A Selective Review of Travel -Mode Choice Models. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 8, 370-380. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
214 
 
Barrett, S. D. (2000). Airport competition in the deregulated European aviation market. Journal of Air 
Transport Management, 6, 13-27 %U 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969699799000186. 
Barros, C. P., & Dieke, P. U. C. (2008). Measuring the economic efficiency of airports: A Simar-Wilson 
methodology analysis. Transportation Research Part E, 44, 1039-1051. 
Bates, J. (2011). Implementation of Panel Data with Unlabeled Alternatives. In: Biogeme. 
Beckers, T., Hirschhausen, C. v., Haunerwald, F., & Walter, M. (2009). Long-Distance Passenger Rail 
Services in Europe: Market Access Models and Implications for Germany. In  (Vol. December 
2009): OECD Joint Transport Research Centre. 
Ben-Akiva, M. (2008). Stated Preference Surveys. Presented at the Discrete Choice Analysis: 
Predicting Demand and Market Shares. In. École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, 
Switzerland. 
Ben-Akiva, M., Cascetta, E., Coppola, P., Papola, A., & Velardi, V. (2010). High speed rail demand 
forecasting: italian case study. In  WCTR. Lisbon. 
Ben-Akiva, M., & Lerman, S. (1985). Discrete choice analysis:  theory and application to travel 
demand. Cambridge, London: The MIT Press. 
Benacchio, M. (2004). Liberalizzazione, concorrenza e interventi Antitrust nel settore ferroviario a 
livello comunitario e nazionale. In  Corso di Economia dei Trasporti, Seminari 14-15 aprile 
2004. 
Benacchio, M. (2008). Consolidation in the air transport sector and antitrust enforcement in Europe. 
European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research, 8, 91-116. 
Bhat, C. (1995). A heteroscedastic extreme value model of intercity travel mode choice. 
Transportation Research  B, 29, 471-183. 
Bhat, C. (1997). Covariance heterogeneity in Nested Logit Models: econometric structure and 
application to intercity travel. Transportation Research B, 31, 11-21. 
Bhat, C. (1998). Accommodating variations in responsiveness to level-of-service measures in travel 
mode choice modelling. Transportation Research A, 32, 495-507. 
Bliemer, M. C., & Rose, J. M. (2005). Efficiency and Sample Size Requirements for StatedChoice 
Studies. In  (pp. ITLS-WP-05-08). Sydney: Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies, 
University of Sydney. 
Bliemer, M. C., Rose, J. M., & Hensher, D. A. (2010). Discrete Choice Models: Introduction, Estimation 
and Analysis. In  Presented at the Executive Course. Mechelen, Belgium. 
Bliemer, M. C. J., & Rose, J. M. (2011). Experimental design influences on stated choice outputs: An 
empirical study in air travel choice. Transportation Research Part A, 45, 63–79. 
Briginshaw, D. (2009). North-South High-Speed Line Opens for Business. International Railway 
Journal, 49, 20-22. 
Button, K. J. (1993). Transport economics: Edwar Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
215 
 
Capon, P., Longo, G., & Santorini, F. (2003). Rail vs. air transport for medium range trips. In  7th 
International Conference on Traffic Science (ICTS) . Nova Gorica, Slovenija, 6-8 November 
2003. 
Carlsson, F. (1999). Private vs. Business and Rail vs. Air Passengers: Willingness to pay for Transport 
Attributes. Discussion Paper in Economics - Department of Economics Goteborg University, 1-
17. 
Cascetta, E. (1998). Teoria e metodi dell’ingegneria dei sistemi di trasporto. Torino: UTET. 
Cascetta, E., & Coppola, P. (2012). An elastic demand schedule-based multimodal assignment model 
for the simulation of high speed rail (HSR) system. EURO Journal on Transportation and 
Logistics, 1, 3-28. 
Cascetta, E., & Pappola, A. (2001). Random utility models with implicit availability/perception of 
choice alternatives for the simulation of travel demand. Transportation Research C, 9, 249-
263. 
Centro di Economia Regionale Trasporti e Turismo. (2006). Il rapporto tra vettori ed aeroporti: analisi 
e valutazione del sistema di regolazione in Italia. In: Associazione Nazionale Vettori ed 
Operatori del Trasporto Aereo (ASSAEREO). 
Cherchi, E. (2003). Il valore del tempo nella valutazione dei sistemi di trasporto. Milano: FrancoAngeli. 
Civil Aviation Authority. (2011). Guidance on the assessment of airport competition - Draft 
Guidelines. In. 
Cokasova, A. (2006). Analysis of Passenger Viewpoints and of the Practical Shift in Air Rail Intermodal 
Transport. University of Zilina, Slovak Republic. 
Corte dei Conti Europea. (2010). Migliorare le prestazioni di trasporto lungo gli assi ferroviari 
transeuropei: gli investimenti dell’UE nel settore delle infrastrutture ferroviarie sono stati 
efficaci? In  (Vol. 8). Relazione speciale. 
Cranfield University, INECO, Gruppo CLAS, & Denton Wilde Sapte. (2002). Study on Competition 
between Airports and the Appiication of State Aid Rules. In  (Vol. Final report): European 
Commission - DG Energy and Transport Directorate F - Air Transport. 
Curi, C., Gitto, S., & Mancuso, M. (2010). The Italian airport industry in transition: a performance 
analysis. Journal of Air Transport Management, 16, 218-221. 
Daly, A., & Zachary, S. (1978). Improved multiple choice models - Identifying and measuring the 
determinants of mode choice. In Q. D. D. Henser (Ed.). Teakfield, London. 
Danielis, R. (2012). I trasporti in Italia: mercati e politiche. In  Working papers SIET (Società Italiana 
degli Economisti dei Trasporti). 
Davis, P., & Garcés, E. (2009). Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis: 
Princeton University Press. 
Doganis, R. (2006). The Airline Business: Routledge. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
216 
 
Domenich, T., & McFadden, D. (1975). Urban Travel Demand - A Behavioural Analysis. Amsterdam: 
North Holland Publishing. 
Econometric Software Inc. (2009). NLOGIT. Econometric Software Inc. In: 
http://www.limdep.com/products/nlogit/. 
Ekbote, D., & Laferrière, R. (1993). Demand model developments to assess High Speed passenger 
train markets on Windsor to Quebec City Corridor. In: Research commissioned by Air Canada 
and CP Rail System. 
Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile. (2007). Dati di Traffico 2007. In. Roma: Direzione Sviluppo 
Aeroporti. 
Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile. (2008). Dati di Traffico 2008. In. Roma: Direzione Sviluppo 
Aeroporti. 
Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile. (2009). Dati di Traffico 2009. In. Roma: Direzione Sviluppo 
Aeroporti. 
Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile. (2010a). ATLANTE DEGLI AEROPORTI ITALIANI PARTE PRIMA: 
Studio sullo sviluppo futuro della rete aeroportuale nazionale quale componente strategica 
dell’organizzazione infrastrutturale del territorio. In  (Vol. Edizione 1 - settembre 2010). 
Roma. 
Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile. (2010b). Dati di Traffico 2010. In. Roma: Direzione Sviluppo 
Aeroporti. 
Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile. (2011). Dati di Traffico 2011. In. Roma: Direzione Sviluppo 
Aeroporti. 
European Commission. (1996). COST 308 - Interaction between high speed and air passenger 
transport. In. Brussels: European cooperation inthe field of scientific and technical research. 
European Commission. (2009). Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Monitoring Development of the Rail  Market. In. Brussels, Belgium: COM 
(2009) 676 final. 
European Commission. (2010). Rail services: Commission legal action against 13 Member States for 
failing to fully implement first railway package. In. IP/10/807, Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. (2011). WHITE PAPER - Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – 
Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system. In. Brussels: COM(2011) 144 
final. 
European Commission. (2012). Competition in Transport. In: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/specific_sectors/transport/index_en.h
tm. 
European Commission DG TREN. (2006). Air and rail competition and complementarity. In  (Vol. Final 
report). 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
217 
 
European Commission Directorate General of Transport. (1998). COST 318 : Interaction between 
high-speed rail and air passenger transport : final report. In: Office for official publications of 
the European Communities. 
European Low Fares Airline Association. (2004). Liberalisation of European Air Transport: The 
Benefits of Low Fares Airlines to Consumers, Airports, Regions and the Environment. In. 
Brussels, Belgium. 
Ferrini, S. (2005). Corso di formazione per gli intervistatori. In. Firenze: Università degli Studi di 
Firenze. 
Filippi, F. (2010). Innovative Solutions to Freight Distribution in the Complex Large Urban Area of 
Rome. In. Göteborg: Volvo Research and Educational Foundations (VREF). 
Formica, G. (2007). L’industria aeroportuale  italiana tra incertezze del passato e sfide del futuro. 
Mercato Concorrenza Regole, IX, 303-338. 
Fowkes, A. S., Wardman, M., & Holden, D. G. P. (1993). Non-orthogonal stated preference design. In  
Proceedings of the PTRC Summer Annual Meeting (pp. 91-97). 
Fu, X., Oum, T. H., & Zhang, A. (2010). Air transport liberalization and itsimpact on airline competition 
and air passenger traffic. Transportation, 49, 24. 
García, C. R. (2008). Competencia intermodal en el corredor Madrid-Zaragoza-Barcelona ante la 
introducción del tren de alta velocidad 
Serie Economía de las Infraestructuras CÁTEDRA Fedea – Abertis, Colección Estudios Económicos 11-
08.  
Gitto, S., & Mancuso, P. (2010). Airport efficiency: a DEA two stage analysis of the Italian commercial 
airports. MPRA Paper. 
Green, P. E. (1974). On the Design of Choice Experiments Involving Multifactor Alternatives. Journal 
of Consumer Research, 1, 61–68. 
Halcrow Fox. (1998). Project Isambard Demand and Revenue Study. In: Final Report to British 
Airways. 
Hansen, M. (1990). Airline Competition in a Hub-Dominated Environment: An Application of 
Noncooperative Game Theory. Transportation Research B, 24, 27-43. 
Harris, B., & Veljanowski, C. (2003). Critical Loss Analysis: It's growing Use in Competition Law. 
European Competition Law Review, 24, 217. 
Hensher, D. A. (1997). A practical approach to identifying the market potential for High Speed Rail: a 
case study in the Sydney-Canberra Corridor. Transportation Research A, 31, 431-446. 
Hensher, D. A., Rose, J. M., & Greene, W. H. (2005). Applied Choice Analysis: A Primer. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hess, S., Smith, C., Falzarano, S., & Stubits, J. (2008). Measuring the effects of different experimental 
designs and survey administration methods using an Atlanta managed lanes stated 
preference survey. Transportation Research Record, 2049, 144–152. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
218 
 
Hildebrand, D. (2006). Using Conjoint Analysis for Market Definition: Application of Modern Market 
Research Tools to Implement the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. World Competition, 29, 315-
336. 
Huber, J., & Zwerina, K. (1996). The importance of utility balance and efficient choice designs. Journal 
of Marketing Research, 33, 307-317. 
International Air Transport Association. (2008). The Impact of International Air Transport 
Liberalisation on Employment. In. London, United Kingdom: NERA Economic Consulting. 
Italian Authority Antitrust. (2003). AS265 - SEGNALAZIONE SULLA SEPARAZIONE FRA GESTIONE DELLE 
INFRASTRUTTURE E SERVIZI DI TRASPORTO FERROVIARIO. In. Roma. 
Italian Authority Antitrust. (2004). AS274 - Liberalizzazione e privatizzazione delle attività 
aeroportuali. In  Segnalazioni e pareri. Roma, Italia. 
Italian Authority Antitrust. (2005). IC 24 - Dinamiche tariffarie del trasporto aereo passeggeri. In  
Indagine conoscitiva. Roma, Italia. 
Italian Authority Antitrust. (2009a). A389 - RAIL TRACTION COMPANY/RFI. In. Roma. 
Italian Authority Antitrust. (2009b). A409 - NTV/RFI-ACCESSO AL NODO DI NAPOLI. In. Roma. 
Italian Authority Antitrust. (2012a). A436 - Trasporto ferroviario: Antitrust, gruppo fs ha abusato della 
propria posizione dominante per ostacolare l’ingresso della societa’ arenaways nel trasporto 
ferroviario passeggeri. In. Roma. 
Italian Authority Antitrust. (2012b). C9821 - Alitalia-AirOne - Milano Linate-Roma Fiumicino 
(adunanza dell’11 aprile 2012). In. Roma. 
Janić, M. (1993). A model of competition between high-speed rail and air transport. Transpn Planning 
and Technology, 17, 1-23. 
Johnson, F. R., & Desvousges, W. H. (1997). Estimating Stated Preferences with Rated-Pair Data: 
Environmental, Health, and Employment Effect of Energy Programs. Journal of Environmental 
and Management, XXXIV, 79-99. 
Khan, O. (2007). Modelling passenger mode choice behaviour using computer aided stated preference 
data. Queenseland University of Technology. 
Kitagawa, T., Saratchai, O., & Terabe, S. (2005). Various Factors Affecting Modal Choice Behaviour of 
The Inter-City Passenger Between Keihanshin and Fukuoka. In  Proceedings of the Eastern 
Asia Society for Transportation Studies (Vol. 5, pp. 199 – 208). 
Kleymann, B., & Seristö, H. (2004). Managing strategic airline alliance: Ashgate Publishing. 
Kroes, E. P., & Sheldon, R. J. (1988). Stated preference methods. Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy. 
Lancaster, K. (1966). A new approach to Consumer Theory. Journal Pol. Economics, 74, 321-157. 
Laperrouza, M., & Finger, M. (2009). Regulating Europe’s single railway market: Integrating 
performance and governance. In. Brussels, Belgium: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
219 
 
Leeuw, E. D., Hox, J. J., & G.Snujkers. (1995). The Effect of Computer-Assisted Interviewing on Data 
Quality: A Review. Journal of Market Research Society, XXXVII, 325-344. 
Louviere, J. J. (1988). Analyzing Decision Making: Metric Conjoint Analysis. Newbury Park, California: 
SAGE. 
Louviere, J. J., & Hensher, D. A. (1983a). Using Discrete Choice Models with Experimental Design Data 
to Forecast Consumer Demand for a Unique Cultural Event. Journal of Consumer Research, 
10, 348-361. 
Louviere, J. J., & Hensher, D. A. (1983b). Using discrete choice models with experimental design data 
to forecast consumer demand for a unique cultural event. Journal of Consumer Research, 10, 
348-381. 
Louviere, J. J., Hensher, D. A., & Swait, J. (2000). Stated Choice Methods: Analysis and Application. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Louviere, J. J., Swait, J. D., & Hensher, D. A. (2000). Stated Choice Methods: Analysis and Applications. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Louviere, J. J., & Woodworth, G. (1983). Design and analysis of simulated consumer choice or 
allocation experiments: an approach based on aggregated data. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 20, 350-367. 
Luce, R. D. (1959). Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis: Dover Publications. 
Malighetti, P., Martini, G., Paleari, S., & Redondi, R. (2007). An Empirical Investigation on the 
Efficiency, Capacity and Ownership of Italian Airports. Rivista di Politica Economica, 97, 57–
188. 
Manski, F. (1977a). The Structure of Random Utility Models. Theory and Decision, 8, 228-254. 
Manski, F. (1977b). The Analysis of Qualitative Choice. Cambridge: Department of Economics, MIT. 
Marschak, J. (1960). Binary-choice constraints and random utility indicators. In K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin & 
P. Suppes (Eds.), Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences (pp. 312–329). Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Martini, G., & Scotti, D. (2010). Potere di mercato e distribuzione dei profitti nella filiera del trasporto 
aereo. Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 173-210. 
McFadden, D. (1978). Modelling the Choice of residential Location. In L. L. A. Karlquist, F. Snickars, J. 
Weibull (Ed.), Spatial Interaction theory and Planning Models. North Holland, Amsterdam. 
McFadden, D. (1981). Econometrics Models of Probabilistic Choice, Structural Analysis of Discrete 
Data. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
McFadden, D., & Train, K. (2000). Mixed MNL models of discrete response. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 15, 447-470. 
McHardy, J., & Trotter, S. (2005). Airport deregulation and airline competition. Sheffield Economic 
Research Paper Series. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
220 
 
Meyer, C. S. (2007). Designing and Using Surveys to Define Relevant Markets. In N. E. Consulting 
(Ed.), Economics of Antitrust: Complex Issues In a Dynamic Economy. 
Miyoshi, C. (2007). Analysis Of The Effects Of Air Transport Liberalisation On The Domestic Market In 
Japan. Cranfield University. 
Monsalve, C. (2011). Railway Reform in South East Europe and Turkey On the Right Track? In: WORLD 
BANK. 
Morikawa, T. (1989). Incorporating Stated Preference Data in Travel Demand Analysis.  MIT 
University. 
Morikawa, T., Ben-Akiva, M., & Yamada, K. (1991). Forecasting  Intercity  Rail  Ridership  Using 
Revealed  Preference  and  Stated  Preference  Data. Transportation Research Record, 1328,  
30-35. 
Motta, M. (2004). Competition policy – Theory and Practice: Cambridge University Press. 
Motta, M., & Polo, M. (2004). Antitrust. Economia e politica della concorrenza. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Müller, J., Orak, G., Petkov, E., & Schulz, S. (2003). Restructuring of the European Ground Handling 
Market after the EU Market Liberalization. In: GERMAN AIRPORT PERFORMANCE. 
NGENE 1.0. (2009). Ngene 1.0 - USER MANUAL & REFERENCE GUIDE. In. Sydney: Choice Metrics. 
Office of Fair Trading. (1999). Quantitative techniques in competition analysis. In: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft266.pdf. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2006). Report to the council on the 
implementation of the recommendation concerning structural separation in regulated 
industries. In: Report no. C(2006)65.  
Orme, B. (1998). Sample Size Issue for Conjoint Analysis Studies. In: 
http://www.sawtoothsftware.com/download/techpap/samplesz.pdf. 
Ortúzar, J. d. D., & Simonetti, C. (2008). Modelling the demand for medium distance air travel with 
the mixed data estimation method. Journal of Air Transport Management, 14. 
Oscar Faber. (1995). Railtrack East Coast Main Line Market Research: Demand Model Calibration. In  
Railtrack. London. 
Piermartini, R., & Rousovà, L. (2008). Liberalization of Air Transport Services and Passenger Traffic. In. 
Romàn, C., Espino, R., & Martìn, J. C. (2007). Competition of high-speed train with air transport: Tha 
case of Madrid-Barcelona. Journal of Air Transport Management, 13, 277-284. 
Rubinfeld, D. L. (2010). Econometric Issues in Antitrust Analysis. In: University of Berkley: 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd/Profile/publications/EconometricIssues.pdf
. 
Sanko, N. (2001). Guidelines for Stated Preference Experiment Design. School of International 
Management Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Rue de la Fontaine, France. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
221 
 
Sarasua, W. A., & Meyer, M. D. (1996). New technologies for household travel surveys. In 
Transportation Research Board (Ed.), Conference on Household Travel Surveys: New Concepts 
and Research Needs. Irvine, California. 
Schmidt, T. (2012). Liberalization of European passenger rail transportation: Competitive business 
strategies in the long-distance market. Berlin School of Economics and Law. 
Sciandra, L. (2008). Aeroporti e infrastrutture: prospettive e criticità del quadro regolatorio. In: 
Estratto Rapporto ISTITUTO DI STUDI E ANALISI ECONOMICA (ISAE). 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW. (2003). State Antitrust Enforcement Handbook: ABA Publishing. 
Senguttuvan, P. S. (2007). Impact of Air Transport Liberalization and the role of framing Economic 
Mechanism in Airport Regulation and Competition – Modern Approach towards Regulating 
Public Utility Industry. In  40th Annual Conference of Transport Research Forum. George 
Washington University, Washington DC. 
Small, K. A., & Rosen, H. S. (1982). Applied welfare economics with discrete choice models. 
Econometrica, 49, 105-130. 
Swait, J. (2001). Choice set generation within the generalized extreme value family of discrete choice 
models. Transportation Research B, 35, 643-666. 
Swan, W., & Adler, N. (2006). Aircraft trip cost parameters: A function of stage length and seat 
capacity. Transportation Research E, 42, 105-115. 
T.H.Oum, Waters, W. G., & Yong, J.-S. (1992). Concepts of price elasticities of transport demand and 
recent empirical estimates - An interpretative survey. Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy, 26, 139-154. 
Templin, C. (2007). Competition on Airports – Ground Handling Services in Europe. Case studies on 
six major European Hubs. In D. G. Peter Forsyth, Jürgen Müller, Hans-Martin Niemeier, David 
Starkie (Ed.), Airport Competition: Ashgate. 
Train, K. E. (2002). Discrete choice methods with simulations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
UIC High Speed Department. (2010). High speed around the world: Maps In. Paris, France: 
12/15/2010. 
Valeri, E. (2010a). Analisi della scelta dell’aeroporto di partenza in un area multiaeroporto: teoria e 
applicazione. In  Working papers SIET (Società Italiana degli Economisti dei Trasporti). 
Valeri, E. (2010b). La scelta modale: analisi selettiva dei principali studi. In D. R. a. M. E. Borruso G. 
(Ed.), Trasporti, Logistica e Reti di Imprese: Competitività del Sistema e Ricadute sul 
Territorio. Trieste: Società Italiana degli Economisti dei Trasporti (SIET), Franco angeli, 
Milano. 
Wardman, M., Bristow, A., Toner, J., & Tweddle, G. (2002). Review of Research Relevant to Rail 
Competition for Short Haul Air Routes. In: EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre. 
Wen, C. H., & Koppelman, F. S. (2001). The Generalised Nested Logit Model. Transportation Research 
B, 35, 627-641. 
Ph.D. thesis: Eva Valeri                 2013       
222 
 
Williams, H. C. L. (1977). On the Formation of Travel Demand Model and Economic Evaluation 
Measures of User Benefit. Environment and Planning, 9, 285-344. 
 
 
